

# THE MONIST

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## A STUDY OF JOB AND THE JEWISH THEORY OF SUFFERING.

THE book of Job is the master-work of Hebrew Poetry. It is the natural product of the Hebrew spirit and theology and the Hebrew conception of nature. It is the culmination, at the point in history where it is found, of the genial aptitudes of the Hebrew religious spirit plus the particularism of Semitism,—of these two confronted by the observed and observable facts of experience. It has a history of development which robs it of all uniqueness as a thought-product. It is begotten, not made,—begotten in a land and in the midst of a people who were intensely religious, devoid of any profound knowledge of the operation of natural law,—among whom, indeed, the concept of natural law was excluded by the belief, which was more than a working theory, in a constant and immediate divine intervention,—begotten in the heart of a people who were plumb at every point to the most august spirit of independence.

The mediæval and modern Jew who cringes to power and fawns for friendship is a development, not a creation,—the product of the Ghetto, not the free-born of Judæa. The ancient Hebrew, like the ancient Semite, everywhere challenged regard. In the hour of conscious right he flung defiance in the face of despots and hurled his anathemas and his spear against the overwhelming might of imperial Babylon and Rome.

The spirit of the Jew is in Job,—Job, who all his life feared his God and now defies him. The voice of conscious integrity within could not be silenced. We are here with a spirit remarkable for an age when knowledge was in its twilight, and that broader conception of a *universe*, with all its implications, was unthought,—that conception which has robbed human souls of the terrors of the Unseen by enshrining deity within them.

Job in his defiant moods is an ancient Laertes as he is described in George Eliot's *College Breakfast Party*. "What to me are any dictates, though they came with thunder from the Mount, if still within I see a higher Right, a higher Good compelling love and worship? Though the earth held force electric to discern and kill each thinking rebel,—what is martyrdom but death-defying utterance of belief, which being mine remains my truth supreme, though solitary as the throb of pain lying outside the pulses of the world? Obedience is good: ay, but to what? And for what ends? For say that I rebel against your rule as devilish, or as rule of thunder-guiding powers that deny man's benefit: rebellion then were strict obedience to another rule *which bids me flout your thunder*." The same voice that speaks here speaks in Job. In Laertes it is intellectual and Faustian, in Job it is religious. In both it is the ethical imperative that asserts itself. It is the compulsion of an inner law of Right,—the behest of a commanding truth uttering itself with unmistakable and imperial authority from the very throne of the soul itself. Such an authority upon such a throne is regnant over all moral action. To disobey it, whatever other voices may demand audience, whether coming from earthly or heavenly conclaves, were to bring swift damnation by dealing a paralysing blow at the ethical consciousness. Job and Laertes do not differ in their ethical attitudes. Job insists upon personal integrity, and he cannot deny his own inward sense of right. To do so would be to unsheathe the sword of his own scabbard with suicidal result. If Jahwe (Jehovah), his God, is to be justified by his admission of guilt, by self-condemnation despite the inward sense of perfect rectitude, then the voice within must rise imperious in the maintenance of its personal rights and



Jahwe must needs justify Himself in the presence of this ethical imperator. Job felt what Schiller later wrote:

"For, by the laws of spirit, in the right  
Is every individual character  
That acts in strict accordance with itself;  
Self-contradiction is the only wrong."

The self-reliant, independent spirit of the old Hebrews, natural to them as a part of their Semitism, fostered by the vicissitudes of their history, and by their religious belief in the national protection of Jahwe, is one of the elements which may not be ignored in any serious effort to discover the causes of this literary work. We do not affirm a spirit of independence and consciousness of moral right unique among the Hebrews. It is, however, especially strong among them. The prophets are its first and great exponents; John the Baptist, and Jesus, and Paul died in maintaining their spiritual freedom. These were Ajaxes defying the lightning. Prometheus who believes that Zeus has withheld his gifts from his people shows it in his theft of heavenly fire for human benefit. Foreknowing well his doom, he opposes the will of Zeus in obedience to the higher law of benevolence within. We have it in Socrates; and Faust, standing on the vantage-ground of new ideas of physical law, cuts clean athwart the doctrines current in his age. Self-assertive independence which faces the frowns of traditionalism, maintaining the right to determine for itself its own actions and beliefs, is the potent force in all the revolutionising and progressive works of literature. It varies in degree, but exists among all peoples. In proportion as it possesses a people, it makes of them ministers to the progress of civilisation and knowledge. It is precisely to those peoples among whom it has been most potent—the Hebrew, Greeks, and Anglo-Saxons—that we find we are most indebted when we come to take account of our intellectual and spiritual stock.

Another element entering into the causes which operated, or rather conditioned, the production of the Book of Job was the Semitic dogma of the relation between sin and suffering,—between individual righteousness and individual prosperity, national infidel-

ity and national failure. Between God and man there was no intermediary. The doctrine of Secondary Causes, brought in by the Greeks, was unknown. There was no law which worked out its unerring results and which God Himself might not transgress without inducing a cosmical and moral cataclysm. They did not know the law of gravitation could not be suspended without destroying the universe, because they did not know the law. God was to them a despot,—a good despot on the whole, especially to the Jews whom He had chosen as His favorites. His will was fugitive, whimsical, irrational. As God's people, if they suffered, God sent the suffering because they had sinned. All the good and goods of life were, in a strict sense, of His immediate bestowal. All the calamities and woes of life were punishments sent for disobedience or transgression. Listen to the inquirer of Jesus, "Who *did sin*, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" Virtue was not its own reward, but *brought* its reward as an external thing, conveyed from without, not reached from within by bringing the soul into harmony with its own ideal.

The experiences of men were forcing into the foreground of thought other ideas. Long before the Book of Job was written there probably had been current in popular tradition the story of "the good and upright man" "who feared God and eschewed evil," and yet in the end had gone down in the overwhelming loss of family and property and fell himself the victim of a foul disease. History had taught them the same lesson.

The most pious king that had ever sat upon the throne, Josiah the son of Amon, had been abandoned in the day of his trouble. More than any other king he had shown himself zealous for the pure worship of Jahwe and used his utmost energies to abolish idolatries and superstitions. He decreed the destruction of the "higher places," the removal of images, abolished foreign cults and local sanctuaries and altars, and centralised worship in Jerusalem in entire obedience to the law book of the temple. And where was the reward? What was the end? He fell unprotected in the hour of his need in that fatal battle with Pharaoh-Necho in the plain of Esdraelon. Where was Jahwe then, and why did He not come to

his rescue if this Jewish theory of the miseries, sufferings, and ills of life gave an adequate explanation of Jahwe's relation to the world? Clearly, it was insufficient.

And we are not left here to conjecture the effects of these experiences and observations upon the Jewish people. We know distinctly from the prophets that there were some who denied this doctrine *in toto* and pointed to the well-known facts of history to justify their infidelity. Ezechiel heard the complaint oft repeated by pious lips, "The way of Jahwe is not right!" And the Jews who were in Egypt with Jeremiah (see Cap. 44) replied to his persuasions and threatenings. "As for the word which thou hast spoken unto us in the name of Jahwe we will not hearken unto thee, but we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven and to pour forth drink-offerings unto her as we have done, we and our fathers our kings and our princes, in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem; *for then* had we plenty of victuals and were well and saw no evil, but since we left off to burn incense to the queen of heaven and to pour out drink-offerings unto her, we have wanted all things and have been consumed by the sword and by famine. And when we burnt incense to the queen of heaven and poured out drink-offerings unto her, did we make her cakes to worship her and pour out drink-offerings to her without our men?" The worship of Jahwe they claimed was no better for them than the worship of the foreign goddess. While they worshipped the latter they were prosperous and happy, and their fellows and husbands instead of being slain in battle lived secure with them in peaceful homes and joined with them in their sacrifices. These observable and simple facts of experience and plain records of history must have been as patent to the profound believer in Jahwe as to these sceptical idolaters. The question must have presented itself to thoughtful minds: "Were the times and the nation so utterly corrupt and bad when Jerusalem was destroyed?" History said "No!" Though not free from idolatry the times were never better, and yet the storm of Babylon broke upon them and crash upon crash the walls of Jerusalem fell in heaps and Judah was desolated.

To overcome this conviction wide-spread among the people, Ezechiel found it necessary to construct a theodicy; Jahwe's ways had to be vindicated. A rapid survey of Israel's history is made and the conclusion reached that it is written in wrongs from first to last. Sodom even when compared with Jerusalem was less abandoned, and Samaria and the heathen were far more preferable.

Still doubt of the old dogma had found a place in the ethical consciousness and once lodged there it could not be uprooted. Men had come to that stage of experience and reflexion where, while they acknowledged that sin was the direct cause of much evil, it was, nevertheless, not admitted to be the cause of all individual and national suffering and misfortune. This, then, is another of the historical facts in the development of the people which must be borne in mind in accounting for the appearance of this sceptical work in Hebrew literature as well as in every attempt to interpret it.

A third element which enters into the book and which gives to it one of its great charms is its descriptions of nature. They cannot be surpassed in literary charm. They have been given once and they can never be given again, because we have emerged completely out of the old mythical ideas of nature which underlie them. With our advance in science and our spirit of philosophical analysis, our conceptions of an orderly and ordered universe, nature has taken on for us new mysteries but she has lost her pale prodigies and old marvels. The spirits of the air are lost in a vanished night, the waters beneath are robbed of their leviathans and *Ungeheuer*. Cloud-mists scaling the mountain side no longer rise as furious giants to scale the battlements of heaven and storm the gods in their Olympian citadel. The heavenly constellations, still "Great" and "Little Bears," once mighty potentates and fierce monsters warring against the God of heaven, but conquered and bound in chains in their respective places, are now star worlds not unlike our own. Orion needs no chains. The dragon Rahab and the serpent are no longer, "as in the ancient days and in the generations of old," "cut to pieces," like the *ribu Tidmat* of Babylonian myth, to build or decorate the firmament. These and all the rest of the old mythologies which still held sway over oriental minds

when this book was written have been so far left behind us that few readers of the Old Testament know even what are referred to. The sky is "unpropped," as the Indian sage sang. Its Babylonian and Jewish "pillars" have fallen. As the great spirits have become a vanished race, so the stars no longer "clap their hands for joy," and the sun has ceased to create visions of a "strong man rejoicing to run a race." What a world! What a time to live in! Up in heaven Jahwe held his counsels—a kind of Olympian conclave—angels met with him and *Satan* appeared in the assembly. Jahwe had swift winds and lightnings for his messengers, and special ambassadors were sent on supreme errands. The memories were still vivid of olden days when the Titan monsters rose rebellious against God. Eliphaz knows of them, and Job in his defiant mood recalls them to him:

"Wilt thou keep to the ancient path  
Which the wicked men have trod?  
Who were speedily cut down,  
Whose foundations were poured out as a flood;  
Who kept saying to 'El (God): 'Depart from us!'  
And: What can *Shaddai* do unto them?  
And yet had He filled their houses with good things."

Job knows them, too. In 16, 14 he complains that Jahwe has treated him like one of them. "He breaketh me with breach upon breach."

In an age when the ocean-deeps could be looked upon as a female monster, and falling stars were discordant angels hurled from heaven, the imagination was quite capable of peopling the earth with a race of demons. All such ideas endure long after a people have arrived at a stage of development wholly inconsistent with them,—endure though doubted, and even consciously rejected, yet unconsciously propagating the memory of themselves in the literary forms and figures of thought which always finds itself more or less dominated by the "old ways." We are not surprised, then, to find these and other kindred ideas wrought into this poetic work. It is precisely this simplicity of the age which made all nature a



living thing, capable of seeing, feeling, and "groaning together," which lends to the book so much of its poetic charm.

#### WHO WAS JOB?

The book of Job is not the history of a person. It is the record of an idea. It presents a phase of scepticism such as is invariably engendered by an imperfect, too devout, and unreasoned faith. Job in Hebrew means simply "the attacked." Whether such a person as Job lived or not, we have no means of determining, but that a tradition, or tale, of a righteous man who met with great misfortune, had lived, we are perhaps compelled to assume. Such a tradition, which may have been wrought into the form of a prose narrative at an early period, may have been taken up by the poet. In the simple and slender story of "the good man in the land of Uz" the poet saw the way prepared for a completer tale in whose telling he could engage all the attractions of Hebrew verse and into which he might pour all the ferment of ideas that were stirring within his own soul. The earlier story may have served our poet just as the *Volksbuch* served Goethe for the framework of his Faust and just as the latter unconsciously in other parts and consciously in the *Prolog im Himmel* drew from the Book of Job. We have nothing left of this popular tale if it ever was reduced to literary form except the prologue and short epilogue. The remainder of it was dropped, and the poet added his own creations to the narrative part.

The history of the imaginary events are confined to extra-Israelitish territory, and consequently the name of the national God Jahwe is carefully omitted. It occurs only in portions conceded by many to be corrupt. The other divine names, *El*, *Eloah*, *Elohim*, *Shaddai*, are chosen. For the same reason, viz., the non-Israelitish setting of the work, no reference is found to Israelitish law and ritual.

#### THE AGE OF THE BOOK AND ITS PURPOSE.

It is probably not earlier than the exile. There are still those in our midst who speak of it as "one of the oldest works of litera-

ture,—a statement which proves more in respect to the tenacity of old views than to the age of our poem.

With reference to its object much has been said, and scholars are not yet agreed. Cheyne says, "I would entitle it, 'The Book of the trial of the righteous man and of the justification of God.'" Dr. Davidson of Edinburgh in speaking of the idea and purpose of the book writes: "The book of Job, as we possess it, conveys the impression that it is a finished and well-rounded composition. Its form—Prologue, Poem, and Epilogue—suggests that the writer had a clear idea before his mind, which he started, developed, and brought to an issue, in a way satisfactory to himself. . . . the author being assumed, however, to have a distinct idea, this idea still remains so obscure, and the question: 'What is the purpose of the book?' has been answered in so many ways, that a judgment regarding it must be put forth with the greatest diffidence."

We must assume that the suffering hero gives expression, in his rebuttal of the quasi-arguments advanced by his opponents, to the poet's own views. The antagonists are all agreed in their doctrine that sin and suffering are invariably connected as 'unholy cause and effect. Suffering cannot reign where there has not been previous sin, conscious or unconscious. If Job has not been guilty of wilful and open sin, then there must have been unconscious and secret sin. The purpose of the book of Job, so far as its main contention goes, is to show that this teaching in the Jewish doctrine of hamartialogy is wholly inadequate to the explanation of the facts of human experience. Job presents himself as a case of suffering, and so conscious is he of his purity that not even God himself could wrest from him a confession of guilt; and God ultimately commends him. Besides his own case there are instances sufficiently numerous, Job points out, of notoriously wicked men whose lives are hedged about with prosperity and the end thereof crowned with peace.

This doctrine of sin was as prominent among the Hebrews as the contemporary doctrine of Jahwe's special guidance which issued in the Jewish ideas of the theocracy. The prophets who were far beyond their contemporaries, both within and without Judah and

Israel, in their theology never rose above it; but Jesus refuted it: "Neither did this man sin nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." All the woes of the nation were ascribed by every prophet in turn to Jahwe's anger because he was forsaken. The purpose of the book will be made clearer when we have made a survey of its contents. If, however, what has already been said as to the main historical cause be supported, this will not exclude the *possibility* that the work has a secondary purpose, based upon the establishment of the untenableness of the old dogma, of consoling the nation as a whole in the multifarious calamities which befell them. There still remains the divine moral purpose in suffering,—the testing and edification of the righteous by adversity, but this is nowhere clearly predicated. Besides these ideas, and incidental to the discussion, the limitations of human knowledge are enforced.

#### THE LITERARY FORM OF THE BOOK.

Is the Book of Job an epic or a drama, or is it more distinctly a didactic poem? I prefer to place it in the category of didactic poems. Many writers, however, are pleased to regard it as a drama, and it certainly is not lacking in dramatic elements. It has its *dramatis persona*, we may say, plot, and denouement, but the *finale* is not the necessary consequence of the preceding action. The question of evil is not definitely answered; at best Job is acquitted of the charge and justified in his antagonism to and refutation of the old dogma. That evil may find its explanation in a sphere above and beyond human ken is intimated in the book, but the explanation is *not* given but postponed. Omitting the minor forms of the drama, melodrama, lyric, etc., and rejecting the second great division, the comic, there remains only the tragic with which the work has certain distinct affinities. The mental or spiritual situations are intensely tragic, but the happy issue is not in harmony with a tragic play. When compared with Prometheus with which in many respects it has generic affinities, it, nevertheless, fails to show the same distinctively and decisively dramatic elements. In the Greek play the situation is beyond dispute. There

is a definite act—fire is stolen from heaven for human benefit, contrary to the will of Zeus. Prometheus foresees the consequences and accepts his doom. In Job all is uncertain—the *act* is dogmatically inferred by his opponents from supposed results, and a plot against the unwitting victim is secretly made in the heavenly conclave. Prometheus acts consciously and defiantly and knows the cause of his suffering. In so far as they show the same vehemence of invective against their respective gods, Prometheus and Job are alike—they are different in that the former is enlisted in the interest of humanity, the latter in the defence of his integrity.

#### ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK.

The book consists of five parts :

(1) The prologue written in prose, Caps. 1-2 ; (2) the colloquies or dialogues between Job and his three friends, Caps. 3-31 ; (3) the discourse of Elihu, Caps. 32-37 ; (4) Jehovah's answer to Job, Caps. 38-47 : 6 ; (5) epilogue in prose, 47: 7-17.

In the prologue Job is represented as a great Arabian Sheik dwelling in the land of Uz. He is a worshipper of Jehovah, who in the heavenly council declares that "there is none like Job on the earth." On account of his virtue he has been the recipient of the greatest of earthly blessings. He is a great Eastern Emeer, with a large family and possessions. Job is scrupulously pious. After the great family festivities, moved by fear that in the midst of their rejoicings they may have committed some inadvertence or sin, he was wont to sanctify them and present burnt offerings. We are introduced into the heavenly conclave in verse 6. The sons of *Elohim* enter the assembly. They are supernatural beings of a lower rank than *Elohim*, and were probably primitive rebellious Titan spirits who were ultimately made subject.

The phrase "sons of God" (*bene Elohim*) is not descriptive of their office, but of their nature. In their midst appears the Satan, or accuser, who is in the service of *Elohim* as a moral censor of the human race. He has just completed one of his customary rounds of inspection of the world and returned on high. Presumably he has been telling in the heavenly conclave what a bad place

it is, and Jahwe directs his attention to Job: "Hast thou considered carefully my servant Job, for there is not his like in the earth, a man perfect and upright, who feareth *Elohim* and turneth away from evil?" Satan, bent on mischief, asks whether Job's virtue is not mere selfish interest. "Is it for nought that Job fears *Elohim*?" Jahwe delivers Job to Satan to test him and permits him full exercise of his malevolent power. One after another Job's flocks are destroyed, then his servants, finally he is bereft of his children. His wife who is to play the rôle of a tempter is, "with grim humor," spared to him. With calmness and resignation Job weighed his sorrow and said, though despoiled of all, he was as well off as when he entered the world naked at his birth. When the Satan enters the assembly a second time Job is extolled as superior to his worst assaults; and Satan replies that his failure was due to Job's unmeasured selfishness. He was willing to sacrifice everything if his own life were untouched: "all that a man hath will he give for his life." Put forth thine hand and touch his bone and his flesh and he will renounce thee to thy face. Satan is then allowed to afflict him in his person as he will, on condition that his life be not wholly taken. Job is then afflicted with a loathsome form of leprosy. His wife taunts him with his integrity and calls upon him to curse God and die. Yet Job sinned not; but reproved his tempter in words of patient fidelity: "Shall we receive good at the hand of God and shall we not receive evil?" When these elements of the plot are introduced Satan disappears, and the rest of the book centres about his behavior under his dire misfortune and his steadfast maintenance of his integrity in opposition to his accusers. He does not know that he is on trial, or that Satan's accusation is the mediate occasion of his affliction and he the direct cause. He ascribes everything to God. The position is distinctly tragic. All the powers of good and evil have consented to test to the uttermost a mortal's integrity, and he knows it not. Job, therefore, faces the problem as a modern might who has lost faith in the devil's existence. The situation is simpler, but for superficial thought less solvable. It is here that the inner tragedy of the book begins. Spoiled of his property, bereft of his family, his body as it were moth-eaten



by a foul disease, Job, the man of exemplary piety, applauded for it in the heavenly conclave by God himself, assails in unmistakable language the current dogma of the Hebrews which taught an invariable causal connexion between suffering and sin, prosperity and integrity. Notwithstanding his overwhelming misfortune and unbearable suffering he insists upon conscious rectitude and unimpeachable character. The discussion between Job and his friends falls into three groups of speeches, (1) Caps. 4-14; (2) Caps. 15-21; (3) Caps. 22-31. We have six speeches in each of the groups except the last. Elephaz first appears in defence of Jahwe and Job replies. Bildad next presents the case in favor of Jahwe and Job replies. Zophar follows on Jahwe's side and Job replies. In the same order of debate the three friends present their arguments in each group except in the last where Zophar is left speechless. The poet suggests that the opportunity was given again to Zophar, but he failed to return to the debate. After Job finished his reply (in Cap. 26) to Bildad's last brief reiteration of his position he seems to have anticipated the return of Zophar but was disappointed. Cap. 27, therefore, goes on: "And Job again took up his parable and said." The exclusion of the third opponent at this point is a fine intimation on the part of the poet that the contention of the friends was untenable and that Job would finally triumph. The briefness of Bildad's speech in Cap. 25 points in the same direction. He had exhausted his resources in the previous effort and hence had nothing important to add beyond what must have appeared to Job as a pious platitude about God's infinite greatness, and the *non-sequitur* that the stars must appear impure in his sight, *ergo*, man, who was only a worm at best, the unclean product of the impure *σάρξ* or flesh of woman, could not be pure.

We have here in this idea of the impurity of the flesh the old Hebrew notion of sin—the notion that is brought out forcibly in the apostle Paul's argument in his Epistle to the Romans, that there is something in the material flesh of man that is essentially sinful. It is a view of things which even Job himself admits in Cap. 14, where he asks, "Who can bring a clean thing out of an

He says that the night when he was conceived may be traced

unclean?" And it is to this idea of the impurity of matter that we owe the philosophical introduction to the Gospel of John.

#### THE SPEECHES.

Let us now return to the speeches. Job, after he is smitten with disease, which is rotting away his bones and skin, is presented sitting in ashes trying to find relief from the irritation of his body by scratching it with a piece of broken pottery, as many a poor leprous afflicted sufferer does at the present day in the Orient. Near Job on the ground sit his three friends amazed and stupefied. Their silence is both sympathetic and merciful. The poet has a double reason for leaving them in dumb thoughtfulness. In the midst of great suffering even the best-meant words of comfort or consolation may pierce the soul like iron. Their silence proves their humane and genuine feeling and Job's unspeakable suffering. Silent sympathies are the strongest, just as silent suffering is the most unendurable. These are "friends" and deeply sympathising friends, and by presenting them thus at the beginning the poet brings out more strongly their stubborn faith in their narrow creed when later they show themselves merciless in accusing him of secret sin, and in heartless chidings for his folly. That is the kind of faith which made Paul hold Stephen's coat while others stoned him, and which made inquisitors out of otherwise humane spirits. Whether or not the poet intended to emphasise the dehumanising effects of a narrow faith, the effect is certainly here by implication. Had they not felt for him so keenly they would have spoken before several days passed. They were not waiting to hear his first impatient complaint that they might have definite ground for attack, for they came expressly to comfort him. They were old friends and must have been closely knit to him as the result of his well-known conduct and character.

When Job at length speaks, his misery has mastered his first spirit of resignation. In words of violent indignation and despair he curses the day of his birth and wishes that it may be blotted out of the year's calendar, and that he had died at once from the womb. He prays that the night when he was conceived may be robbed

even of its glimmering twilight, and that the deep darkness may claim as its possession the day whereon he was born. (Cap. 3: 2-12.) This first outburst of Job brings him before us not as a reasoner or inquirer, but as a despondent sceptic. His life, previously untouched by ill and hedged about by happy circumstances, had not led him into those profounder regions of thought where its great antinomies of joy and sorrow, happy hey-days and death's shadows, call for reconciliation. Now the whole weight of these antagonistic problems of existence come upon him and he is crushed. His life was as inexplicable as it was unbearable, and he found no consolatory explanation. His religion did not even hold out to him hope for an explanation in another world, and he does not try to find one. The misery of life is beyond all plaint and endurance. He is suddenly a pessimist like Schopenhauer, and the poem is at one in this pessimism with all the sceptical dramas ancient and modern.

Job in this attitude of longing for release in oblivion and death is no longer a Jew but a member of the human family. He is at one with Prometheus in his reply to the chorus of the daughters of Okeanos when they came to sympathise with him as Job's friends came to him, when looking upon Prometheus "spiked down on chains upon the rock beneath the open sky" the chorus says: "I see Prometheus and a fearful mist steals o'er my two tearful eyes seeing how thy frame doth pine upon this rock, helplessly bound in adamant chains." Prometheus answers just as Job has answered here: "Would that in Hades beneath or Tartaros unlimited, home of the dead where darkness reigns, he'd placed me."

This is the first impulse in all the sceptical dramas where there is overwhelming suffering. Faust in his frantic despair of knowledge, failing to achieve it by study and magic, dotes on the poisonous cup until he hears on Easter morn the words of the Easter anthem:

"Christ ist erstanden,  
Freude dem Sterblichen,  
Den die verderblichen,  
Schleichenden, erblichen  
Mängel umwanden."

Hamlet too, when the pressure of his surroundings forces upon him his inequality for the task which they impose, meditates on suicide and asks whether 'tis better "to be or not to be." To appreciate Job fully in his plight we must remember that the Jew was by nature ecstatic, joyous, sentimental. He had a rapture in living unknown to us of Saxon blood and Puritan heritage. Existence without happiness found no explanation or justification. He asks despairingly in this chapter of maledictions :

"Wherefore giveth he to the suffering light,  
And life to those who are bitter of soul,  
Who long for death, but it comes not,  
Who search for it more than for treasure,  
Who would be glad unto exultation  
And rejoice should they find the grave?"

He is led by his own sufferings to raise the question in the name of all suffering humanity. Verses 20-26 of this third chapter give us the problem of the book. Why is life the gift of God made miserable? By raising the question *he pronounces it unanswerable*. He knows what the friends will say. They will fall back upon the old dogma, "suffering implies sin." He puts himself in direct antagonism to their view before they speak.

#### FIRST SPEECH OF ELIPHAZ.

Eliphaz is the first to take up the argument in support of the Jewish theory. He attempts to conciliate Job with fair compliments after suggesting that it is with a certain delicacy of feeling for him in his trouble that he ventures to discuss the subject at all. "If one essay to speak with thee wilt thou be displeased, but who can withhold himself from speaking?" "Thou," he says, "hast instructed many, thou hast strengthened the weak hands, and upholden him that was falling. Now that it toucheth thee, wilt thou, wise counsellor, great *consolator*, faint and be troubled?"

"Is not the fear of God thy confidence,  
And thy hope the integrity of thy ways?"

Experience teaches that such confidence is well founded, for

"Think now who ever perished being innocent,  
Or when were the upright cut off?"

Eliphaz points out that the great law of nature that like produces like is verified in his own experience as applicable to human conduct.

"According as I have seen they that plowed iniquity  
And sowed trouble reaped the same.  
By the breath of God they perished,  
And by his anger-blast were they consumed."

More than this, he has been visited in the night by a spirit who held secret communion with him:

"There was silence, and I heard a voice:  
Can man be just before God?  
Can a man be pure before his maker?  
Behold He trusteth not in his servants,  
And His angels He chargeth with folly:  
How much more them that dwell in clay houses!"

Were Job to appeal against God to some of the angels for deliverance from this state of moral inability and consequent suffering, he would only aggravate the case and vex himself unto death. He is bidden again to remember that affliction does not come uncaused.

"For affliction cometh not out of the dust,  
Nor doth trouble sprout forth from the ground."

The implications of Eliphaz's words are that whatever Job may think of his own innocence, innocent he cannot be. Man is a sinful creature, and no one is so perfect before God that he can claim exemption from suffering. He says in substance God's law of action is grounded in goodness. "If he makes sore, he also binds up." He urges Job to submit to the chastening, and all that he has lost will be restored and he himself delivered. Even nature shall be in league with him, and he shall come to his grave in peace and in a full age.

This speech of Eliphaz is adroitly put, but Job in his reply (in Chapter vi.) implies that the argument lacked cogency, because it did not meet the demands of the case. Eliphaz has based his rea-



soning on human imperfections in general, and such unusual sufferings as his could not be explained by referring them to the common defects of the race. He is wholly unconscious of guilt, and yet his sufferings are exceptionally severe. The speech of his friend has ignored this most essential point. By treating his unparalleled sufferings as though common troubles, arising from common causes, he has increased them. Job, therefore, impatient of his consoler, cries out:

"Would that my displeasure were thoroughly weighed,  
And my destruction balanced (with it) in scales!  
For now it is heavier than the sand of the sea:  
Therefore my words do stammer."

Violent as his words have been, and he admits this, his displeasure has been in no sense commensurate with his wretched plight. If he has been violent, it is because his spirit has been poisoned by the poisoned arrows of the Almighty. Eliphaz has drawn his analogies from nature to prove his point; so can he. Has he not cause for his vehemence? Does the wild ass go about braying when he has grass to eat? Does the ox stand bellowing over a full crib? Job's vehemence comes from violent abuse; consequently he does not set his hope in future good fortune, but in death. Were a future release to be hoped for, or had he strength to endure, he might repress violent words.

"What is my strength that I should hope,  
And what is my end that I should prolong my life (for it)?  
Is my strength the strength of stones,  
Or is my flesh bronze?"

If God would only crush him out of existence, put forth his hand and cut him off, that were an act of mercy in which he would rejoice, for "never have I denied the words of the Holy One." This self-assertion, in the face of unbearable suffering, and its sublime self-conscious rectitude is truly Promethean. Conscious of omnipotent power which may do with him as it pleases, he refuses to yield his integrity. Like Prometheus, who knew that Zeus was unjust, Job feels that God is unjust and implies it, though he does not explicitly assert it.

Job now animadvert strongly upon the falsity of his friends, whom he sarcastically calls his brothers. He had a right to receive comfort from them, but they have cruelly disappointed his hopes as the treacherous brook-beds which entice the caravans of the desert only to leave them to perish with unslacked thirst. Let them *teach him*, and he will hold his peace. Thus far they have been no better than evil men who would gamble for the body of an orphan and sell their friends for gain. They have a theory to uphold and are ready to sacrifice his breaking heart to it, and he has discernment enough to understand them. Would they withdraw from him?—then be it so, rather than let injustice be continued in their accusations of guilt!

In Cap. VII. Job dwells upon the brevity of human life. He longs for the end of it, as the weary and sunburnt toiler longs for shadow of night. Besides his mental anguish his body is racked with pain, with ulcerous and worm-breeding sores, and his skin wastes in streams of corruption. Therefore, because life is short, he *must speak* in the anguish of his spirit and pour out all his complaint. With fierce invective he assails God. God has so little care for him that he no longer hesitates, as in Cap. III., to vent his feeling in fiercest speech.

"So then I will not restrain my speech,  
I will speak in my distress of spirit,  
Will utter my wail in my bitterness of soul,—  
Am I a sea or a sea monster  
That thou settest a guard over me?"

He feels that God is dealing with him as though he were one of that old wicked brood of demons that He subdued long ago. The *tannin* of the text does not mean "whale" (Av.) but refers to the destroying serpent of Babylonian myth. The unrestrained indignation of the sufferer in this chapter reaches in its expression the utmost limits of Titanic defiance, and the language is unsurpassed in power by any of the sceptical dramas. They are fierce utterances, as defiant as those of the Greek in his reply to the chorus when they suggest that Zeus may send him worse woes than he has, "Well, worship ye, kneel and cringe to him who rules. For me I

care for Zeus e'en less than nought, so, let him do!" They recall the equally defiant words of Faust:

"I reverence thee! For what?"

Hast thou ever assuaged the pains of the suffering?

Hast thou ever stopped the tears of the sorrowing?"

Job does not say he will worship God no more; but his feeling has become for the time completely master of him. The common Jewish conception of God's gracious attributes are lost sight of, and God is daringly accused of injustice, cruelty, arbitrariness, malice, and meanest espionage. The poor victim of his omnipotent tyranny is not even allowed respite to swallow his spittle. Granting, though not admitting, that he has sinned, why, if He is a benevolent God, does He not pardon him? We must bear in mind that this outburst of scepticism is temporary, and induced by a revolt from a theology which pitilessly assaulted a good man in a state of intolerable suffering—a theology which in his inmost soul he felt was false. In rebelling against the theology he verged, as is often done in the seething times of the soul when it is called upon to modify its beliefs, too closely on rejecting God with the theology.

#### BILDAD'S SPEECH.

The next person in the debate and introduced in Cap. VIII. is Bildad. Unlike the adroit Eliphaz, Bildad is of coarse fibre. He has no prefatory compliment to make. On the other hand, he rudely and impatiently assails Job, likening his unchecked utterances to windy bluster.

"How long wilt thou speak such things,

And the words of thy mouth be a mighty wind?"

Bildad repeats the time-worn arguments on the subject of suffering. The source of all his sorrow is his lack of purity and uprightness (verse 6). He makes the usual accusation of the pietist against the thinker—pride in his own knowledge. Let him show becoming humility—go back to the fathers and learn of them what they have searched out. The modern form of Bildadism might be readily improvised somewhat as follows: "This body, by virtue of

its delegated authority, stamps with emphatic disapproval all utterances contained in the speech not in harmony with the standards."

What is this testimony of the fathers?—this, viz., that every effect has a cause, all results are consequent upon definite antecedents.

"Can the rush grow up without mire,  
Or the reed-grass without water?"

Just as the rushes and the reeds wither when the hot sun and winds overtake them, so the wicked man when confronted by the search-rays of divine justice. Let him repent:

"Then will his mouth be filled with laughter  
And his lips with joyful shouting."

Job in reply to Bildad's speech acknowledges all that he has said of God's might and of human inability to enter the lists with him. In a passage pregnant with power and rising to poetic sublimity he proceeds, himself, to declare God's omnipotence.

"He removeth the mountains and they know not  
Who overturneth them in his wrath.  
Who shaketh the earth from her place,  
So that its pillars do tremble.  
Who speaks to the sun, and it shineth not,  
And layeth his seal upon the stars,  
And stretcheth out the heavens by Himself,  
And walketh on wave-crests of the sea.  
Who created the Bear, Orion, and Sirius,  
And the treasure houses of the South.  
(Where the meteoric stars are hidden)  
He hath done great things that are unsearchable,  
And wonderful things without number."

Job is no more able to see Him when He passes by, than the mountains to note who shake them. No one need teach Job lessons on God's omnipotence and supremacy. He knows his power, and he knows that in the face of it he is helpless. *Eloah* does not withdraw his anger, and what can his puny strength do when the ancient demons who fought with the great dragon were with her compelled to bow before Him?

It is this omnipotent power which Job admits (as Prometheus

admitted the unlimited might of Zeus), which constitutes his despair. Submission to the tyrannous oppression is necessary, for "Who can say to Him: What doest thou?" He will not even allow him his breath, but filleth him with bitterness. It is not a question of merit or demerit, of piety or wickedness in such a case. God is irresponsible, and defenceless mortals have no appeal. Guilty or innocent—it is all alike to Him.

"Though I were right my mouth *must* condemn me,  
 Though I am innocent he maketh me perverse ;  
 I am innocent—  
 I trouble not for my soul,  
 I despise my life.  
 It is all one, therefore, I say  
 The innocent as the wicked he destroyeth ;  
 If the scourge slays suddenly,  
 He laughs at the trial of the innocent."

There is a fiendish delight even in this despotic and evil government. Yes ; God is omnipotent and He employs his omnipotence unscrupulously, and, therefore, the protesting of his innocence is useless. The idea here is not that of his friends and the usual idea of the Old Testament, viz.: that the omniscient may see evil even where there is a consciousness of innocence. This idea of absolute power ending in scrupulous tyranny is a distinct outcome of Jewish Calvinism—that idea of God which compares him with the potter and man with the clay in his hands which he moulds, uses, or breaks at will. When human freedom is submerged in the infinite, then in the face of ill God never can be other than despotic. Job says that God's acts are not determined by justice. He even shows favor to the wicked and *a fortiori* evil for the good.

The remaining part of the speech is tantamount to an accusation that He has created him and preserved him for a treacherous purpose, and it closes by referring to his birth with which his injustice began, and defiantly tells God to withdraw from him and to let him have "a little comfort" before he goes hence to dark Hades.



## ELIPHAZ AND BILDAD COMPARED.

Let us look for a moment at the character of the interlocutors, for these are evidently chosen as types, otherwise the whole argument would have been more easily presented in a dialogue between two. We saw that Eliphaz approached Job as a courteous and well-bred gentlemen. He politely asks, as he enters upon discourse, whether Job would be grieved if he ventured to speak with him, and his first words are words of sincere congratulation. That which he had to say was drawn chiefly from his own experience, observation, and a revelation specially vouchsafed to him. The ideas he advances are all in support of his narrow dogma, but they are presented with as little harshness, perhaps, as was consonant with the strength of his convictions. If there was sore affliction, it undoubtedly had a cause which God in His omniscience could see though Job could not. A man might and ought indeed to feel happy under affliction, for it proceeds from benevolence and issues in exaltation. He casts a halo of glory over Job's future, if Job will but patiently submit.

There is no crudity here,—no unnecessary severity. We cannot help remembering that Eliphaz was from Temen, which, as we learn from other parts of the Old Testament, was the home of wisdom, a region blest with generations of cultured gentlemen. Eliphaz acts and speaks in full harmony with his antecedents of birth and privilege. While there seemed no necessity for severe language, he used none. In contrast with him we saw Bildad *the Shuhite* whose native place is unknown. He is a man from some obscure part who possesses none of Eliphaz's fine intuitions and exhibits none of his graces of good-breeding. His first words are grossly impertinent. He tells Job that he is a violent blusterer. He starts out with a series of provoking and insinuating *ifs*. *If* his children were all dead, they deserved it. God knows that. *If* he would seek God. *If* he were pure, instantly God would awake for him. Eliphaz reasoned from his experience and from his religious visions which he held to be revelations. Bildad taunted him with

accusations of pride and smote him with tradition. Eliphaz and Bildad, alike agreeing in their dogma, declare that suffering does not come uncaused. "Affliction does not come out of the ground," says Eliphaz. "The rush cannot grow without mire," retorts Bildad. They hold the same faith and are equally zealous in its defence, but how differently they approach their task. Bildad, it is true, had heard before speaking, and Eliphaz had not, Job's vehement arraignment of the Almighty and his titanic defiance of Him as an unscrupulous spier of men. But does this explain the difference between them, the one courteous and kind, the other offensive and vulgar, or must we remember, first of all, that Eliphaz was a Temanite, and Bildad a Shuhite? Bildad has all the narrowness of Eliphaz's creed and none of his urbanity, and intellectually he is a very mediocre character. I think we will not make a mistake if we credit the poet with a purpose in bringing these discernibly different characters upon the stage. Eliphaz is a representative of high birth, good breeding, cultured intellect,—an aristocrat, if you will, from Teman. Bildad represents the low-born wanting in those finer flavors of spirit which are won by persons of less favorable antecedents only when gifted by nature with fine perceptions and large mentality. He stands for the mass of the intellectually mediocre.

That Bildad was fitted to represent this class is, I think, clearly discernible from his speeches. They are for the most part stale platitudes, threadbare phrases without any stamp of individuality. Rusticity is writ large upon him. His range of thought is limited to rushes, and papyrus, and spider's webs in his first speech. His vision is confined to beasts, tents, gins, snares, and brimstone in his second. He speaks out of his past, and his tortoise brain exhausts itself in the end in a vapid valedictory of *ten* lines in which he says nothing which had not been infinitely better said before. Unfortunately his class is large. We are thankful to the poet who cut him off with *six verses* in his last speech, when he began to drivel about the unclean thing a *woman-born* man is, and to find his real counterpart in squirming worms, his perfect analogue in putridity, and worm-breeding putridities at that. His speech, Cap.

xxv. 6, is the only place in the Old Testament where the word *rimma* is metaphorically applied to man. The word means primarily that which is rotten, and is then applied to the *worms generated in putrid flesh*. Bildad may have had sterling qualities, but despite the pure air of the desert and the company of refined associates, the scent of vulgarity is on his garments, and his mind remains a monotonous and dreary waste. It was the penetration of artistic genius that made him an advocate of the old creed.

#### ZOPHAR THE NAAMATHITE.

This third interlocutor, who appears for the first time in Cap. XI., is less obscure than Bildad and evidently has better antecedents. He has some sublimity of thought and is naturally touched with a greater feeling of kindness. In point of character and ability he stands between Eliphaz and Bildad. He shares the universal conviction of the divine unfathomableness and human incapacity to understand the divine ways. But one-third of his speech is a poem of promise and consolation. His first words are an arraignment of Job for his vain and idle utterances. He has rendered a hasty verdict of injustice against God, and without comprehending his own limitations acted as judge and acquitted himself by denying impurity both in life and doctrine. Bad as his case has been if God should declare all the evidence he would see that his offences were not all weighed. Job cannot expect to know the real standing of the case, because he cannot explore the infiniteness of divine wisdom.

"Canst thou discover the secret of *Eloah*,

Canst thou find out the perfection of *Shaddai*?

It is higher than heaven, what canst thou do?

Deeper than Sheol, what canst thou know?"

Zophar's reasoning is this: The divine wisdom transcends all human knowledge. The divine acts are based upon divine wisdom; therefore the causes of the divine act, which produces suffering, cannot be humanly comprehended. But they lie clear to view in the transcendent knowledge of God. Zophar has hope, however, for the most foolish and violent.

"Even a vain man may come to understanding,  
And the wild ass' colt may be tamed."

Therefore he, too, counsels repentance with promise of restoration :

"If thou prepare thine heart,  
And stretchest out thine hand toward Him.  
If iniquity be in thy hand, cast it forth,  
And let not wickedness dwell in thy tents.  
Even then shalt thou lift up thy face without spot."

God knows; man does not; submit, therefore, and repent, *for guilty you must be*. This is the *subauditur* that runs all through these illogical arguments.

#### JOB'S REPLY.

Job has now heard his three friends, and they have all asserted *his guilt*. They have appealed to natural law to prove that every effect has a cause. "Trouble does not spring out of the ground," Eliphaz said. "The rush does not grow up without mire," said Bildad. Tradition and experience, they say, connect sin and suffering as unholy cause and effect. Eliphaz and Zophar dwell upon God's omniscience, suggesting that He sees the sin of which Job is, perhaps, unconscious, but which nevertheless has caused his suffering.

Job insists in his reply that though his friends have spoken at length, they have mistaken metaphors for arguments and speech for wisdom. All they have said about natural law and divine omniscience, Job knows as well as they.

The whole course of reasoning has been in a circle. When analysed it is simply: Here is suffering. Suffering is always the result of sin. Therefore Job sinned. Job denies it, but that does not alter matters. Job does not know all that God knows. Their minor premiss is an assumption, but it is precisely this minor premiss that constitutes the whole question in debate. Job insists that his case disproves it, and, therefore, as a general proposition it must be abandoned.

According to Job they have haughtily laid claim to a superior

wisdom and contributed nothing to the solution of the perplexing problem. They have merely exhausted his patience with irrelevant statements and the commonest platitudes. And Job answered and said (Cap. XII-XIV.):

"No doubt ye are the people,  
And wisdom shall die with you.  
But I have understanding as well as you.  
Who knoweth not such things as these?"

The whole creation rises up to teach them.

This conceit of wisdom on their part is nothing less than scornful reproach and cowardice. He is indignant and wounded by their trifling truisms which he has heard *ad nauseam*. They have been sheer mockery. But such is the way of the world.

"Contempt for misfortune from those who are at ease,  
A thrust for them whose feet are unsteady."

More than this, God gives prosperity to the wicked and leaves robbers to dwell in peaceful tents. What remains then of their doctrine? Facts plain and palpable disprove it. The facts of nature prove divine wisdom and power. The hand of the Lord is visible in created things. Yea, "speak to the earth and it shall teach thee." But the question of a moral and beneficent and just power, these facts do not prove. Omnipotent power does not prove divine justice. Is God freed from suspicion, Job tacitly asks (15-25), when you consider how he uses his power?

"He turneth judges into fools,  
He looseth the chains of kings (put on rebellious captives),  
And puts a rope around their own waists.  
He leaves priests (who serve Him) to be spoiled.  
.....  
He taketh away the understanding of the aged.  
He increaseth nations and destroyeth them.  
Lo! mine eye hath seen all this,  
Mine ear hath heard and understood!  
What ye know, I know,  
I am not inferior to you.

Eliphaz had referred to his experience: "According as I have seen, they that plowed iniquity and sowed trouble, reaped the



same." If that is all, Job says, he has looked with the one eye that sees but half the world. Instead of there being strict justice in the moral government of the world, facts point to a malignant power and divine caprice. To bolster up the case for God by specious arguments, is proof, not of the spirit of piety, but of falsehood. The moral law forbidding respect of persons does not exclude God. They are false witnesses self-subpœnaed on God's behalf. They must be conscious of prejudice in His favor, "forgers of lies," therefore,

"Shall not His excellency make you afraid,  
And His dread fall upon you?"

Job in these utterances proves himself, sceptic, pessimist, doubter as he is, the only truly religious one of the number.

In Cap. XIII., 13, in view of the worthlessness of their defence, he prays that they may leave him alone. With the intolerable weight of his sufferings there is a necessity of utterance, and utter himself he will, come what may. He will maintain his ways before him, though he knows he will slay him, and that there is no hope. (Not—"though he slay me, yet will I trust him.")

We have here one of the sublimest affirmations of the rights of conscience. Job measured the might of Omnipotence. It awed him, but it did not overwhelm him. There is something within, Job feels, that has a divinity of its own with which to face almighty power, viz., a conscience at peace with itself,—an unassailable rectitude. "My ways in His face will I justify." The thought of a moral victory elevates him for the moment above his suffering. God is addressed (verse 17 ff.) and the demand is made that his case be heard. He has prepared his statement and it must be heard at the peril of death. In the presence of deity he declares his contention: "I know that I am righteous." If God prefers the suit he will appear as defendant. It matters not.

"Call thou and I will answer;  
Or let me speak, and answer thou me."

He demands that God shall show cause for treating him as guilty and that He shall come out into the light.

"Tell me what is my transgression and my sin,  
Wherefore hidest thou thy face  
And holdest me for thine enemy?"

Job is entitled to know what he is suffering for. But of course this cannot be, for God is punishing Job for the forgotten and unconscious sins of his youth. Rank injustice this, but it does not stand alone. God has put his feet in stocks and indulged Himself in exquisite refinements of cruelty, and has drawn a line about his feet so that he cannot move. And yet what is he—his body full of ulcerous sores—he is like a moth-eaten garment. Surely an unequal contest! Then comes a revulsion of feeling induced by the thought of omnipotent power venting itself on a defenceless creature done to death, and there is a reversion to the old pessimistic view of life. He dwells in Cap. XIV. almost fondly upon its vanity and brevity, just as one sometimes morbidly enjoys a great grief. Man's life is a fleet shadow, a frail flower. He has not even the hope of inanimate nature:

"For there is hope even for a tree,  
If it be cut down it may sprout again,  
.....  
But the strong man dieth and passeth away,  
And man expires, and where is he?"

At this point a ray of light breaks half way through the darkness. What if a man may live after death! What if God should choose to hide Job in dark Sheol for a time and then bring him back to light? How gladly, in that case, would he wait there like a soldier on guard till his relief came! For a moment it is not only a possibility; it is a certainty to be looked for. In the conflict between God's anger, which was bringing him to Sheol, and His love the latter would be victorious.

"Thou wilt call and I shall answer thee,  
For the work of thy hands wilt thou have desire."

It is a fascinating but baseless thought. It flashes for a moment upon Job, and swiftly the thought is gone. Suddenly grim despair seizes him again. His despondent mood returns and he sees in the destructive processes of nature a symbol of the ruin of

human hopes, of that hope that like a gleam of sunshine had just slanted across the vision of his dream :

"But, the mountain falling is destroyed,  
And the rock is moved from its place ;  
The water weareth away stones.  
The rainstorm sweeps away the soil.  
So the hope of man hast thou destroyed."

The awakening even for a time of this hope shows us that Job still clings to his belief in God. Despite the freedom of his complaint, his unconcealed scepticism aroused by his own condition, and the insoluble enigmas of life, there is in the deeper under-swell of his thought a personal trust.

Chapter XIV. closes the first cycle of the book. A careful reading will detect a contrast not only between the views expressed on the subject discussed, but also between the range of the speaker's thoughts. Among the friends Eliphaz is *facile princeps* ; of the other two Zophar is superior to Bildad. But none of them shows the same range of knowledge and variety and virility of speech so characteristic of Job's rebuttals. Intellectual scepticism, where it is sincere, implies, first, ability to weigh argument, power of analysis. It often implies, as here, a poetic sense which perceives a truth as the seer although it may fail to formulate it in definite propositions. And, secondly, it has the freedom, if perfectly honest, of fearlessness. It naturally issues, therefore, in originality of thought, cogency, and versatility. Definitely prescribed belief on the other hand, of any form, sets bounds both to the thought and the imagination. It works towards sterility and monotony. No man can "by taking thought" be a *sceptic* any more than he can add a cubit to his stature. None of Job's friends could be other than they were. They might have ceased to be religious, but they could not become religious sceptics.

#### SECOND CYCLE OF SPEECHES (Chap. 15-21). ELIPHAZ.

The old arguments are repeated. Eliphaz's orthodox zeal has now forced his suave manners into the background. Every age has been an inquisition age—the instruments of torture differ, that

is all. Here barbed and burning words are used to extort a confession of penitence from the guiltless. It is doctrinal zeal making the tender hearted cruel. Eliphaz knows that his manner has changed from its first mildness. In verse 11 he refers to "the word that was gentle with thee"—his previous speech. He now borrows phrases from the vulgar Bildad and asks Job if his belly has been filled with the East wind. He harps as Bildad did upon the uncleanness of man born of woman. He falls back again upon tradition as to the invariable connexion between sin and suffering. Sarcastically he asks Job :

"Wert thou the first of men to be born,  
And wert thou begotten before the hills ?  
Dost thou have audience in the Counsel of Eloah,  
And dost thou seize upon wisdom for thyself ?"

You act like a man who had a monopoly of wisdom. Yet all the gray-haired and the aged, men older than thy father, are on our side. He charges Job with turning his spirit against God—he the abominable and corrupt, who "drinketh iniquity like water." He demands attention and then proceeds to restate his view, suffering is the destined lot of the wicked. Knowing that Job had lost all his children, and that the fire consumed his flocks, and the Sabaeans and Chaldeans had fallen upon his oxen and camels, he makes a pitiless thrust at the end,

"The company of the wicked shall be barren,  
And fire consumeth the tents of bribery."

#### JOB'S REPLY.

These vain words do not assuage Job's grief. In Cap. XVI. he wonders why his friends wish to speak at all, seeing they have nothing to say which is pertinent to the case. He could speak as they do and shake his head at them if places were changed. Their severity has outdone itself. Swiftly flashes the thought upon him that they are irresponsibly used by Jahwe who has chosen them as His instruments of attack.

"*El* hath delivered me to the ungodly,  
And into the hands of the wicked hath cast me.

I lived in peace, but he hath broken me to bits,  
 Seized me by the neck and dashed me to pieces.  
 He hath set me up for his target.  
 His arrows encompass me about.  
 He poureth out my gall upon the ground.  
 He breaketh me with breach upon breach.  
 He runneth upon me (as upon) a giant.

. . . . .  
 My face is foul with weeping,  
 And on my eyelids is the shadow of death,  
 And yet there is no wickedness in my hands."

This statement of conscious innocence redeems his trust in God, who is the witness of his innocence.

"Even now, behold my witness is in heaven,  
 And he that voucheth for me is on high."

In Chapter XVII. he asks for protection from his "friends," and this must come quickly, for his end is near.

#### BILDAD'S SPEECH (Cap. XVIII.).

Bildad's speech is briefly summed up in a comparison of Job to a wild beast caught in a trap and tearing itself in fury. He asks tauntingly whether Job thinks the earth is going to be changed for his sake, or the rock removed from its place. Does he expect God to make a special law *for him*, one, forsooth, that would give him liberty to sin and escape the universal consequence. The gist of it is, that if Job is suffering, it is because he walked into the trap.

#### JOB'S REPLY (Cap. XIX.).

is vehement. He had replied to Eliphaz that had he been in their place, "the solace of his lips would have assuaged their grief." Now, he tells Bildad they have insulted him now ten times. Even if their view were correct, it did not justify their hardened opposition to him. This, then, is the inference to be drawn: "Know you that God hath overthrown me, and taken me in his net." Consequently when he makes his appeal for justice, no one gives judgment. God for some reason treats him with violence and hatred, and the hosts of God, with evil purpose, surround his tent. Breth-



ren and acquaintances He has estranged from him. Kinsfolk and familiar friends have forgotten him; his servants heed him not; his wife avoids him, and even children despise him. All that remains to him is life, and that is the misery of it. The fierce and brutal antagonism of his consolers and his utter abandonment produced the conviction that it was all from God. In the unequal contest, then, where were his friends?

"Pity me, pity me, O my friends,  
For the hand of the Lord hath smitten me."

It is when he has reached this conviction that his affliction is from God that his confidence mounts highest, that ultimate justice will prevail. God, in other words, is saved out of the wreck of Job's old faith *by Job's own sense of justice*. God is never abandoned by Job, because "the pure in heart see God." They do more than see Him, they create Him, as human love transmutes its object into its own ideal.

The latter part of this nineteenth Chapter contains the finest and most unflinching declaration of Job's faith in justice. He had just wished that his protestations of innocence might be written in letters of lead in solid rock,—a lasting rock-inscription for future generations to read. He sees something better, however, and more abiding, God himself will be his vindicator.

"But I know that my vindicator liveth,  
And as the last will He arise over the dust,  
And behind my so mangled skin,  
And without my flesh (which is wasted away) shall I see God,  
Whom I shall see favourable to me,  
And mine eyes shall behold and not as an oppressor."

In this passage Job is not thinking of a *future* life. He is anticipating, despite his present tried and mocked condition, the vindication which ultimately comes when Jahwe appears. The A. V. and R. V. both transfer the hope of Job here to a future state, but only by a misinterpretation and mistranslation. "For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth: And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet

in my flesh shall I see God, whom I shall see for myself and mine eyes shall behold and not another."

#### ZOPHAR'S SECOND SPEECH (Cap. XX.).

Zophar dwells upon the unstable character of the wicked man's prosperity. He talks, as it were, in parable of a rapacious man of power suddenly left destitute and destroyed.

"Knowest thou this, since the first,  
Since man was set upon the earth,  
That the joy of the wicked is short,  
And the gladness of the corrupt but a twinkling," etc.

In this joy of the wicked, Zophar is referring to Job's hope, just expressed, of vindication. Job in reply, Cap. XXI., for the first time in this cycle of the arguments meets these assertions, that the wicked always get their deserts, with a direct denial. He forbids the premises, from which they are so bent on drawing their conclusions. Zophar does not see that it is the converse of the proposition that he needs to prove, nor does Job call attention to it; but the proposition, that the wicked are invariably punished, Job denies.

"Why do the wicked live,  
Become old, yea, mighty in power?  
Their seed is established with them,  
And their offspring before their eyes."

Their houses are safe, their flocks increase, they make merry, enjoy wealth, and die without pain. Job admits that there are opposite cases, where they are overtaken by calamity. But this is precisely the point. The wicked prosper, and the wicked are destroyed. Therefore a man's fate is independent of his goodness or badness. The universal law they wish to establish is declared void by these opposing facts.

#### THIRD CYCLE OF SPEECHES (Caps. XXII-XXXI.).

We have seen that Job in his reply, at the close of the second cycle, met the contention of his friends, that wickedness always issues in suffering, with an absolute denial. He then substantiated

his position by reference to facts which not only defy contradiction but are matter of common observation,—facts which run clean athwart their orthodox tenets and establish the idea, not of an unvarying principle of government, but the opposite. Job charges his friends with lack of candor, and courage to acknowledge the truth, with prejudice in God's favor to whom they were showing the same kind of slavish preference as they might to some powerful client who was listening behind the screen.

In the first cycle they dwelt upon God's omniscience. Job showed that he fully appreciated human limitations, and acknowledged the inscrutable character of divine wisdom, by excelling them in forcible expression of it. But he showed also the irrelevancy of *omniscience* in the debate and its inapplicability to the solution of the mysterious riddle of his own suffering and human existence under such conditions.

In the second cycle they dwelt upon his providence in government, and Job denied their conclusions. In the third cycle Eliphaz begins by telling Job that God in His treatment of men is not influenced by any regard He has for Himself, God is quite superior to and independent of man's regard. "Is it any pleasure to God that thou art righteous?" God may demand worship, obedience, and submission, the content of righteousness according to their ideas, but in His sublime exaltation He is superior to it. This is an idea wholly antagonistic to ancient thought, not only among the Jews but also among extra-Israelitish peoples. In Euripides Hippolytus, e. g., Aphrodite, the Goddess begins the prologue :

"Known among men and not unnamed, am I,  
The goddess Kypris, and in heaven as well,  
Of all who dwell between the Atlantic bounds  
And Euxine sea and look upon the sun,  
Those I advance who reverence my power,  
And those who proudly scorn me I bring to grief;  
(Exactly the view of the three friends)  
*For this is natural even for the gods*  
*To take delight in honors from mankind."*

When Eliphaz takes the opposite view here it is a concession to Job's higher view of deity—that divine transcendence which

makes God's acts inscrutable. Eliphaz's thoughts of God are momentarily enlarged. He acknowledges a perfection of being calm and unconditioned in its infinitude. Quick as a flash Eliphaz draws the conclusion: If God enters into dealings with man it must be for man's sake. And, for piety God would not afflict, therefore, it must be for sin. In this third cycle, since the other considerations failed to move Job to a confession, Eliphaz is driven to the desperate resort of openly assailing him as a *heartless and inhuman sinner*. Previous insinuations are framed into definite impeachments. But Eliphaz, true to his character, even here, seeks to take the sting out of his accusations by enticing promises partly of a worldly nature, partly spiritual. Job should in the end exult in the chiefest of philanthropic joys, and become a saviour to those who were not innocent. At the same time he has accused him specifically of oppression of the poor and the naked, of callous-hearted treatment of the widow and the orphan; he has acted as though God could not see through the thick clouds. This he alleges is a part of Job's creed. Hence the enormity of his crime can be compared only to the evil way of the wicked race of giants who lived before the Flood, and filled the earth with deeds of violence; he asks:

"Wilt thou keep to the old way  
Which wicked men have trod,  
Who were cut down before their time,  
Whose foundation was poured out as a river?  
Who kept saying to *El*, 'Depart from us,'  
And 'What can *Shaddai* do for (or to) us?'"

With the exception of Bildad's interjection of a few words the indictment of the *friends* against Job is ended. The opposing evidence, to speak in the language of the courts, is all in and Job proceeds with his defence until Jahwe appears to sum up the merits of the case and pronounce the verdict.

#### JOB'S REPLY.

Job passes over in contemptuous silence and conscious superiority the alleged crimes laid to his charge. In Chap. XXIII.

Job begins with a wish that he could find God and bring his case before his judgment-seat and plead with arguments the righteousness of it. He knows that he would come forth as tried gold. But that is a vain hope.

"I go forward, but he is not there,  
And backward, but I cannot perceive him."

Even if he could reach him he would not get a just decision from this omnipotent and irresponsible power.

"He willeth and who can prevent him ?  
He doeth what his soul desireth  
And he will accomplish my fate,  
Therefore, I am terrified in his presence,  
I perceive and am in dread of Him."

Further, if God foresees all human times and fates, why do not men who claim to know Him have some knowledge of His ways? His own experience proves that they do not, and this enforced ignorance is tacitly held to be an act of injustice.

Job next passes to a long description of wicked men's ways as his mind reverts to the main thesis. He recites at length their oppression of the poor and helpless, yet God doth not impute it to their folly. Often they come to an undesirable end at last, it is true, but in the main God giveth them security, and when they die they die as others. Who, he defiantly asks, will disprove his words, and prove him false? Job has added nothing whatever here to the progress of thought.

Bildad then attempts a reply. The main point is the old hackneyed one of man's impurity and God's omnipotence. Job does not deny the latter. On the other hand he breaks forth into a masterly panegyric of God's wisdom and power in Cap. XXVI.

The thought of this omnipotence, as often as Job dwells upon it, forces upon him the consideration of his own relation to it. He feels his puny insignificance before this majesty of power, but he feels, also, within himself the might of a pure and therefore undismayed conscience. He is consequently willing to take oath in God's name that so long as breath is in his nostrils he will not perjure his soul by a plea of guilty.



"While my breath remaineth in me  
 And the spirit of God in my nostrils,  
 My lips shall not speak iniquity,  
 And my tongue shall not utter falsehood.

(The meaning here is not as vulgarly understood: "I will continue to live a righteous life.")

God forbid that I should justify you,  
 Till I die will I not forsake mine integrity.

My heart will not reproach me so long as I live."

From verse 7 to the end of Chapter XXVII. Job turns upon his friends whom he regards as enemies and ranks with the wicked. His description of the fate of the wicked which follows is inconsistent with what he has said before. Previously he said that a wretched doom often does dog the heels of crime; but he held that this was no necessary or invariable consequence (Cap. XXI.). Now he apparently speaks as though there were no exceptions. We can hardly attribute to him such a rapid revolution in thought. The wicked man that he is here threatening is the wilful *perverter* of the truth. Before, he spoke of the general class of sinners. Here he is specifying more particularly the unrighteous and godless, using the same word for unrighteous as we find, e. g., in Lev. 15, where it is used of "perverting judgment," and the same word for "godless" as occurs in Zeph. 3:3, where it is set in direct antithesis to the clear and open judgment of Jahwe.

For the *wicked perverter of truth* there is no forgiveness. This is the unpardonable sin, and his "friends" have been found guilty. They have denied his integrity and accused him of all manner of sin in the interest of their narrow dogma. Without any evidence of wickedness they have assumed him to be guilty from the first, and, at the last, they have charged him with specific crimes. Their conscience must be their accuser, and God will be their judge.

"Terrors shall take hold upon him,  
 And (God) shall cast on him and not spare."

In Job conscience found its apotheosis. The one class of sinners upon whom the shafts of God's anger will be unerringly hurled is the desecrator of this Holy of Holies.

All along they have threatened Job with divine judgment. Job now pronounces the anathema of God on them.

Almost all interpreters regard this passage as directly antagonistic to Job's previous position consistently held from the beginning, and it is commonly regarded as an interpolation. On the contrary, I think that a legitimate interpretation shows it to be in complete harmony with Job's view of the moral demands of conscience. Against that inner spirit of truth no word spoken would be forgiven. This was the sin of his friends in the interest of an old orthodoxy.

#### CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT.

At this point the discussion of the book ends. Chap. XXVIII. is in the nature of a conclusion. The ever-recurring question of the ages, the reconciliation of human suffering with God's omnipotence and justice, has been discussed. The old Hebrew dogma has been found by inference to be unsupported by the facts. It not only is utterly inapplicable in the case of Job, it fails of support in countless other cases well attested by common experience. How, then, does the case lie? It belongs to the sphere of mystery into which human wisdom cannot enter. The whole question of existence in view of its unhappiness has been raised with the particular question and the answer is nowhere to be found, but with God himself—with Him alone is wisdom. The conclusion of this book, so far as it aims at solving life's mysteries, might be stated in the words of Lewes's *Life of Goethe*: "The mystery of existence is an awful problem, but it is a mystery, and placed beyond the boundary of human faculty! Recognise it as such and renounce. Knowledge can only be relative, never absolute. But this relative knowledge is infinite, and to us infinitely important. Happiness, ideal and absolute, is equally unattainable. Renounce it. The sphere of active duty is wide, sufficing, ennobling to all who strenuously work in it." It is the conclusion of *Faust*:

"Nach drüben ist die Aussicht uns verrannt;

Thor! wer dorthin die Augen blinzelnd richtet,

Sich über Wolken seines Gleichen dichtet!

Er stehe fest und sehe hier sich um ;  
 Dem Tüchtigen ist diese Welt nicht stumm.  
 Was braucht er in die Ewigkeit zu schweifen !  
 Was er erkennt, lässt sich ergreifen.  
 Er wandle so den Erdentag entlang ;  
 Wenn Geister spuken, geh' er seinen Gang ;  
 Im Weiterschreiten find' er Qual und Glück,  
 Er ! unbefriedigt jeden Augenblick."

Here, too, with Job practical duty and practical truth must take the place of speculative and absolute truth. Theoretical wisdom is unsearchable. Life's mysteries are insoluble. Practical wisdom is open to all.

"The fear of the Lord is wisdom,  
 And to avoid evil is understanding."

The point to be noticed in this conclusion is that Job makes ethical duty a categorical imperative,—the law of life absolute and unconditioned by considerations of reward and punishment. This Chapter (XXVIII.) gives the most vigorous presentation of the wisdom and claims of ethical duty.

From here on Job seems to be casting back again over the course of his thoughts and to be making a rapid survey of his life. This naturally induces some of the old moods, and some of the former ideas are reiterated. He calls to mind the days of his prosperity and wishes he "were as in the months of old when God watched over him, and His lamp shined upon his head,—when the Almighty was yet with him, and his children were round about him." He recalls his past integrity, his unselfish and benevolent life, and his hope when he said :

"I will die in my nest and reckon my days as the sand."

In Chap. XXX. he contrasts those happy days with his present misery. Then princes once held their breath in his presence. Now men who are the offscouring of the earth—no better than savage troglodytes—hold him in derision.

In Chap. XXXI. he sums up his defence with a reiteration of his innocence. He wishes God would weigh him in a balance, as the Egyptian soul was weighed by Thoth. Then would the feather

weight of justice proclaim his integrity. Besides freedom from sins of unchastity, oppression, lying, fraud, avarice, he claims purity in worship. He has never kissed his hand to his mouth when he has seen the sun walking in its splendor and the moon marching in its greatness. Had he indulged in these heathen idolatries then had he denied his God and would have been guilty. Before the judgment seat he stands with unbowed head and conscience calm. We look back upon this sublimest spirit of literature challenged to love, and we obey. We turn to the tragedy of life misunderstood by would-be friends and guides, and we see afresh the sad meaning of those fine but truthful words :

"Innocence seethed, in its mothers milk,  
And charity setting the martyr aflame."

The case is ended with Cap. XXXI., and Job appeals to the Almighty for the verdict. Caps. 38-41 contain the answer. The speeches of Elihu which intervene and to which Job makes no reply are undoubtedly a later interpolation.

The reason these speeches of Elihu were introduced was probably because the readers to whom they are due felt (as is indicated in the introduction to them, Cap. 32 : 3) that the attempt of the three friends to justify the ways of God were a signal failure. After Elihu's speech Job is silenced. Elihu's theodicy is little in advance of that of the friends. The corrective element of suffering is more distinctly brought out. The author of the poem evidently did not feel that there was much to be said in favor of this argument, and, therefore, omitted it for the most part from the "friends" speeches.

The angelology, especially the idea of *one* mediating angel which represents the later stage of thought, is distinctly prominent in Cap. XXXIII.

#### JAHWE'S REPLY.

In Jahwe's reply, he says to Job : "Gird up thy loins like a man, I will question and thou shalt answer me." The poet thus connects the answer with Job's previous challenge, in which Job said that it mattered not how the case was conducted—who took the place of plaintiff, who of defendant. Job had propounded a

great many questions himself. Now question after question is put to him to which he can give only a negative reply. At the end Job says :

"Behold I am of small account ;

What shall I answer thee,

I lay mine hand upon my mouth.

Once have I spoken, and I will not reply,

Yea twice, but I will proceed no further."

God speaks again out of the whirlwind and Job is reproved for his vehement invective, which, it is intimated, implied an assumption of omniscience. The most awe-inspiring objects of nature are rapidly brought before him. In them God's power is manifest, and by contrast his own impotence is emphasised. Job thus attains not to a new view but a greatly enlarged view of the divine omnipotence and unsearchableness. Notwithstanding his previous lofty conceptions of the divine attributes he fell far short of truly estimating them. Of this Job is now convinced. He acknowledges that much that he has said has been without knowledge. At the end he is made to repent of his rashness of speech, *but not of previous sin as the cause of his trouble*. On the other hand, God speaks to Eliphaz, saying : "*My wrath is kindled against thee and thy two friends, for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath*. Job is justified and restored to double his prosperity. The names of his daughters are intended to express his new-found joy. Jemimah means "door," Keziah "sweet perfume," and Keren-happuch "rouge and stibium bottle." Peace, delight, and beauty are the attendants of his later life.

#### JOB'S REPENTANCE.

What is Job's repentance? After reading the speech of Jahwe we are a little surprised at the verdict. We are prepared to hear sentence pronounced against Job. God did not demand repentance of Job, however, neither does he deny his integrity. His own conscience has never admitted guilt. Thrice in the epilogue Jahwe says : "*My servant Job hath spoken of me the thing that is right*." Jahwe's commendation of Job is not for repentance, but for his



fearless candour and truthful attitude with respect to Jahwe. The friends are condemned because they were not truthful. They with their narrow creed had probably serious doubts about it, or much as they had to say of his omnipotence and providence they assumed that their theory was coextensive with the requirements of the case concerning which they were ignorant, thus narrowing God to a creed. Job's scepticism grew out of his inability to comprehend God. The friends even when they dwelt upon the divine majesty spoke without true religious reverence. In their assumption of a higher adequate knowledge and truth they proved their lack of both. Job's arguments, therefore, in so far as they were a protest against the possibility of reducing God and his acts to the measure of human theories, such as the prevailing Hebrew doctrine of divine providence as exemplified in the prevalent belief in a divine retribution manifest in all suffering, showed the higher reverence and reached the higher truth, negative though it was. But Job, on the other hand, was too self-centered in his thought. Through Jahwe's speech his views are enlarged—God's care and providence extend throughout the whole world of life—the universe is his care. Job's thoughts of self and personal suffering are minified in the presence of this enlarged conception of God and the universe of which he is only a part. God and life remain to him more inscrutable than ever. His repentance is not demanded, but the new vision produces the conviction that he had spoken vehement words where he should "have laid his hand upon his mouth."

JAMES A. CRAIG.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

## MYTHS IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

THE life-histories of animals, from the primordial germ-cell to the end of the life-cycle ; their daily, periodical, and seasonal routines ; their habits, instincts, intelligence, and peculiarities of behavior under varying conditions ; their geographical distribution, genetic relations and ecological interrelations ; their physiological activities, individually and collectively ; their variations, adaptations, breeding and crossing,—in short, the *biology* of animals, is beginning to take its place beside the more strictly morphological studies which have so long monopolised the attention of naturalists. The revival of interest in general life-phenomena, and especially in the psychical activities of animals, takes its date from Darwin's epoch-making work. The phenomenal insight which this great naturalist brought to the study of animal instinct and intelligence illuminated the whole subject and prepared the way for the development of a new science, commonly designated "Animal Intelligence ; or, Comparative Psychology." That mind and body must have been evolved together and under the same natural laws was the conclusion destined to become the corner-stone, not only of biology, but also of rational psychology.

Darwin's views triumphed, as all the world knows ; but while his ideas have been generally accepted, his method, the real secret of his success, has had too few followers. Darwin's method was to prepare himself for his problem by long-continued and close examination of all its details and bearings. He was no hustler on the jump for notoriety, no rapid-fire writer ; but a cool, patient, indefatigable investigator, counting not the years devoted to prelim-

inary work, but weighing rather the facts collected by his tireless industry, and testing his thoughts and inferences over and over again, until well-assured that they would stand. Such a method was altogether too laborious and searching to be imitated by students ambitious to reach the heights of comparative psychology through a few hours of parlor diversion with caged animals, or by a few experiments on domestic animals. We are too apt to measure the road and count the steps beforehand. Darwin allowed the subject itself to settle all such matters, while he forgot time in complete absorption with his theme. Neglect of Darwin's example in this respect has been unfortunate for both general animal biology and the coming science of comparative psychology. An examination of a few typical cases in recent literature may help make us more heedful of Darwin's example, and more reserved in announcing observations and conclusions which have not passed through the furnace of verification and repeated revision.

One such case<sup>1</sup> is furnished in a recent volume on *Animal Intelligence*, by Mr. Wesley Mills of McGill University. It is a case of

#### ALLEGED FEIGNING IN SQUIRRELS.

As the subject of feigning is one of great interest, as the method of treatment is especially instructive from the point of view before defined, and as the observations are presented as a contribution to comparative psychology, the case is entitled to special attention, and I shall, therefore, make it the leading subject for examination. The author stimulates interest in his communications by announcing that they give two examples in which feigning was strikingly manifested; and in another place he speaks of them as among the most typical cases of such behavior ever recorded.

After reading these observations through and through with care and in the full expectation of finding every promise fulfilled, I have to confess my inability to discover any satisfactory evidence

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<sup>1</sup> The selection of this case, it may be hardly necessary to say, was due to its nature and fitness for the purpose in view. It would not be fair to judge of the book as a whole from this small part. The book contains much interesting matter and will doubtless be widely read as it deserves.

of feigning. Naturally, I am disappointed and surprised, and all the more so as it seems to me that Mr. Mills himself must be credited with all the feigning he has ascribed to his two chickarees; that is to say, the supposed feigning is a misinterpretation. Whether I am correct or not, an examination of Mr. Mills's observations cannot fail to be of interest. The subject of animal intelligence has scarcely yet emerged from the mythical state, and no part of the subject is in a more hopeless tangle of misinterpretation than the so-called feigning of animals. It must be said to the credit of Mr. Mills that he has kept his observations apart from his interpretations, and he has thus made it possible for the reader to draw his own conclusions.

A few instances to illustrate how easily people allow themselves to be misled in regard to animal intelligence and to draw conclusions from evidence supplied largely or wholly from the imagination, may put us in a more cautious frame of mind for interpreting the behavior of Mr. Mill's squirrels.

*A Horse Protects His Master from the Tusks of a Savage Boar.*

"George Howard, nineteen years of age, who has been employed on the farm of George Lent, about a mile outside of the city on the Buffalo road, is at the Homeopathic Hospital, suffering from injuries inflicted on him by a hog. That young Howard is not a subject for the coroner instead of the hospital surgeon is due to the fact that a horse which has been a great favorite of Howard and is greatly attached to the boy, kicked the enraged hog away as the brute was about to fasten its teeth in the boy's throat. The horse has always been looked upon by Farmer Lent as a remarkably intelligent member of the equine family, but he is now considered a wonder, and had the farmer not himself witnessed the act of the horse, he would never have believed that an animal could display such intelligence.

"The hog which made the attack on Howard was a large and particularly ugly brute. He broke out of his pen yesterday afternoon, and made a rush for the barn. The door was open and young Howard, who had just placed his favorite horse back into his stall

after a careful grooming, was just starting to go out of the door when the enraged hog entered with a rush. The brute made a savage attack on the boy, and, fastening his teeth on the calf of the leg, tore and lacerated the flesh. Howard fell back into the stall and close to the feet of the horse he had just groomed.

"The hog was springing at the throat of his prostrate victim when the horse raised his hind feet and gave the hog a kick which sent him ten feet and caused him to squeal with pain. Mr. Lent, who had been attracted by the screams of the boy, was just entering the barn door as he saw the horse kick the hog off the prostrate body of the boy."

This account from the *Rochester Union and Advertiser* appears to be entirely reliable, so far as the circumstances are concerned; but these, it will be seen, do not justify the conclusion that the horse kicked the hog in order to protect the boy. The hog was probably kicked without a thought of the boy. The fright of the horse would cause it to kick in its own defence, and we are thus left without the slightest evidence of any altruistic motive in the act.

*Story of the Dog-Fish (Amia Calva) and Its Young.*

The following statement is taken from George Brown Goode's *Natural History of Useful Aquatic Animals* (pp. 659-660). It is a quotation from a Dr. Estes, but Mr. Goode indorses it as a part of "the best description of the habits of the fish."

Dr. Estes says:

"I come now to mention a peculiar habit of this fish, no account of which I have ever seen. It is this: While the parent still remains with the young, if the family become suddenly alarmed, the capacious mouth of the old fish will open, and *in rushes the entire host of little ones; the ugly maw is at once closed, and off she rushes to a place of security, when again the little captives are set at liberty.* If others are conversant with the above facts, I shall be very glad; if not, shall feel chagrined for not making them known long ago."

It is true that the old fish (the male) will sometimes open wide his mouth when approached, as if threatening an attack. It is also true that the swarm of young will suddenly disappear at any



slight disturbance in the water, and after an interval of some minutes of quiet reappear at or near the place of disappearance.

At the moment of alarm and disappearance of the young, the old fish rushes off a short distance, stirring up the mud as he leaves. If the observer keeps perfectly quiet for some minutes, the parent fish may often be seen returning very slowly and cautiously so as not to be seen. Soon after he reaches the place in which the young are concealed at the bottom, they begin to gather about him and renew their feeding on small aquatic animals abundant in the grass along the shore.

Dr. Estes had seen the old fish open its mouth, and the young disappear as the fish dashed away. He had seen the young again with the parent fish, not far from where they were first observed. He did not take the trouble to find out how the young escaped from sight, and jumped at the conclusion that they had taken refuge in the mouth of the old fish. What a wonderful tale, and how strange that a conscientious observer could so completely humbug himself! Now this is no exceptional case; it is one of the most common occurrences, and that, too, even among men of high standing in science.

Let us now take an example from the comparative psychologist, who always has on hand an unlimited supply of this kind of material.

#### *The Story of the Insane Pigeon.*

This story, which is taken from *The Mental Evolution of Animals* (p. 173) by Mr. Romanes, has been thought worthy of translation into German by Karl Gross in his *Spiele der Thiere*. The case was reported to Mr. Romanes by a lady, and is given in her own words:

"A white fantail pigeon lived with his family in a pigeon-house in our stable-yard. He and his wife had been brought originally from Sussex, and had lived, respected and admired, to see their children of the third generation, when he suddenly became the victim of the infatuation I am about to describe.

"No eccentricity whatever was remarked in his conduct until

one day I chanced to pick up somewhere in the garden a ginger-beer bottle of the ordinary brown-stone description. I flung it into the yard, where it fell immediately below the pigeon-house. That instant down flew paterfamilias and to my no small astonishment commenced a series of genuflections, evidently doing homage to the bottle. He strutted round and round it, bowing and scraping and cooing and performing the most ludicrous antics I ever beheld on the part of an enamored pigeon. . . . Nor did he cease these performances until we removed the bottle; and, which proved that this singular aberration of instinct had become a fixed delusion, whenever the bottle was thrown or placed in the yard—no matter whether it lay horizontally or was placed upright—the same ridiculous scene was enacted; at that moment the pigeon came flying down with quite as great alacrity as when his peas were thrown out for his dinner, to continue his antics as long as the bottle remained there. Sometimes this would go on for hours, the other members of his family treating his movements with the most contemptuous indifference, and taking no notice whatever of the bottle. At last it became the regular amusement with which we entertained our visitors to see this erratic pigeon making love to the interesting object of his affections, and it was an entertainment which never failed, throughout that summer at least. Before next summer came round, he was no more."

Mr. Romanes remarks:

"It is thus evident that the pigeon was affected with some strong and persistent monomania with regard to this particular object. Although it is well known that insanity is not an uncommon thing among animals, this is the only case I have met with of a conspicuous derangement of the instinctive as distinguished from the rational faculties,—unless we so regard the exhibitions of erotomania, infanticide, mania, etc., which occur in animals perhaps more frequently than they do in man."

This pigeon, whose behavior has given it so wide fame as a case of deranged instinct, was undoubtedly a perfectly normal bird; and had Mr. Romanes been familiar with the antics of male pigeons, he would have found nothing in the performances to indicate in-

sanity. I have seen a white fantail play in the same way to his shadow on the floor, and when his shadow fell on a crust of bread he at once adopted the bread as the object of his affection, and went through all the performances described by the lady, even to repeating the behaviour for several days afterward when I placed the same piece of bread on the floor of his pen. If one is looking for insanity in pigeons, let him first know the normal range of sanity, and pay little heed to stories of inexperienced observers who are apt to overlook circumstances essential to a correct understanding of what they report.

It is not improbable that the lady's amusing pigeon at first took the bottle for a living intruder upon his ground, and flew down to it for the purpose of driving it off. Finding it at rest, if his shadow fell upon it, or if his image was even faintly reflected from its surface, he would readily mistake it for a female pigeon, and after once getting this idea and performing before it, the bottle would be remembered and the same emotions excited the next time it was presented. The only value this suggestion can have is, that it is based on a similar case. The lady's observations were incomplete at the critical moment, i. e., at the time of the *first* performance, and it is too late to mend the failure.

The essentials to understanding any peculiar case of animal behavior are almost invariably overlooked by inexperienced observers, and the best trained biologist is liable to the same oversight, especially if the habits of the animal are not familiar. The qualification absolutely indispensable to reliable diagnosis of an animal's conduct is an intimate acquaintance with the creature's normal life, its habits and instincts. Little can be expected in this most important field of comparative psychology until investigators realise that such qualification is not furnished by parlor psychology. It means nothing less than years of close study,—the long-continued, patient observation, experiment, and reflexion, best exemplified in Darwin's work.

Let us now examine

TWO CASES OF SUPPOSED FEIGNING IN SQUIRRELS, AS  
REPORTED BY MR. MILLS.*Case I.* (Pp. 61-62.)

"I was standing near a tree in which a red squirrel had taken up a position, when a stone thrown into the tree was followed by the fall of the squirrel. I am unable to say whether the squirrel was himself struck, whether he was merely shaken off, or how to account exactly for the creature's falling to the ground. Running to the spot as quickly as possible, I found the animal lying apparently lifeless. On taking him up, I observed not the slightest sign of external injury. He twitched a little as I carried him away and placed him in a box lined with tin, and having small wooden slats over the top, through the intervals of which food might be conveyed. After lying a considerable time on his side, but breathing regularly, and quite free from any sort of spasms such as might follow injury to the nervous centres, it was noticed that his eyes were open, and that when they were touched winking followed. Determined to watch the progress of events, I noticed that in about an hour's time the animal was upon his feet, but that he kept exceedingly quiet. The next day he was very dull—ill, as I thought,—and I was inclined to the belief, from the way he moved, that possibly one side was partially paralysed; but finding that he had eaten a good deal of what had been given him (oats), I began to be suspicious. Notwithstanding this apparent injury, that very day, when showing a friend the animal, on lifting aside one of the slats a little, he made such a rush for the opening that he all but escaped. On the third day after his capture, having left for a period of about two hours the sittingroom (usually occupied by two others besides myself) in which he was kept, I was told, on my return, by a maid-servant and a boy employed about the house, that some time previously the squirrel had escaped by the window, and, descending the wall of the house, which was 'rough-cast,' he had run off briskly along a neighboring fence, and disappeared at the root of a tree. When asked if they saw any evidence of lameness, they

laughed at the idea, after his recent performances before their eyes. For several days I observed a squirrel running about, apparently quite well, in the quarter in which my animal had escaped, and I feel satisfied that it was the squirrel that I had recently had in confinement, but, of course, of this I cannot be certain.

"I believe, now, that this was a case of feigning, for if the injury had been so serious as the first symptoms would imply, or if there had been real paralysis, it could not have disappeared so suddenly. An animal even partially paralysed, could scarcely have escaped as he did and show no sign of lameness. His apparent insensibility at first may have been due to catalepsy or slight stunning. But while there are elements of doubt in this first case, there are none such in that about to be described."

Substantially the case is as follows:

1. A stone was thrown at a red squirrel in a tree, the animal fell to the ground apparently lifeless, there was no mark of external injury, but the squirrel *twitched* a little when taken up; it was placed in a box, where it lay upon its side, breathing regularly; after some time it was noticed that the eyes were open, and that winking resulted from touching.

If the squirrel was stunned, as seems probable, the behavior so far would not indicate feigning, so far as I can see.

2. In about an hour's time, the animal was found upon its feet, but it kept quiet; the next day the squirrel looked dull, but *moved as if injured in one side*; it had eaten oats.

I see nothing in all this to raise the "suspicion" that the injury was unreal and feigned.

3. This same day the squirrel tried to escape, when alarmed by the lifting of a slat.

Surely nothing surprising in a wild squirrel well enough to eat, even if it was still suffering from an injury.

4. On the third day after capture, according to testimony of servants, the squirrel escaped through an open window, ran off briskly along a fence, and disappeared at the root of a tree. Servants noticed no lameness.

An animal well enough to make a vigorous dash for liberty the

day before, might well escape in the manner described. The servants' testimony as to the absence of lameness amounts to nothing. The squirrel subsequently seen by Mr. Mills, running about, "apparently quite well," may or may not have been the one he lost. Observe that Mr. Mills does not *know* whether the squirrel was injured or not. There was an appearance of injury and every reason to believe it was real, yet the cause of the injury, if real, and its nature and extent were not definitely known. Mr. Mills asserts that, *if* the injury had been as serious as the first symptoms *implied*, it *could* not have disappeared *so suddenly*. There are too many unknown elements for any positive conclusion. We do not know that the lameness had entirely disappeared at the time of escape; and if it had, there would not seem to have been any remarkable suddenness after three days' convalescence.

In this case nearly every point of critical importance was undetermined, and the author seems to be too little familiar with squirrel behavior.

The second case is claimed to be free from any element of doubt. "A more typical case of feigning than this one," says Mr. Mills, "could scarcely be found."

"A Chickaree was felled from a small tree by a gentle tap with a piece of lathing. He was so little injured that he would have escaped, had I not been on the spot where he fell and seized him at once. He was placed forthwith in the box that the other animal had occupied. He manifested no signs whatever of traumatic injury. One looking in upon him might suppose that here was a case of a lively squirrel being unwell, but events proved otherwise. He ate the food placed within the box, but only when no one was observant. He kept his head somewhat down, and seemed indifferent to everything. When a stick was placed near his mouth he savagely bit at it; but when a needle on the end of the same stick was substituted he evinced no such hostility. He made no effort to escape while we were in the room, but on our going down to dinner he must at once have commenced work, for on returning to the room in half an hour he was found free, having gnawed one of the slats sufficiently to allow him to squeeze through. With the assistance



of a friend he was recaptured, but during the chase he showed fight when cornered, and finally, as he was being secured, I narrowly escaped being bitten. He was returned to his box which was then covered with a board weighted with a large stone. Notwithstanding, he gnawed his way out through the upper corner of the box during our absence on one occasion shortly afterwards.

"I think a more typical case of feigning than this one could scarcely be found."

The essentials are as follows:

1. A Chickaree, knocked from a tree with a piece of lathing, was captured and caged as before. Why, "one looking in upon him might suppose that there was a case of a lively squirrel *unwell*," is not explained. A very important point, but with no more information, we are unable to judge whether the squirrel was feigning or Mr. Mills imagining. If the animal was merely quiet through fear, as seems most probable from there being no further description, who that is familiar with squirrels would have surmised that it was feigning sick?
2. The squirrel did not eat when one was watching it. Perfectly natural. Fear would prevent.
3. It kept its head "somewhat down," and seemed indifferent, but when a stick was placed near its mouth it bit at it savagely. Mr. Mills seems to regard this as evidence of feigning indifference or sickness. If such behavior is feigning, Mr. Mills is a true discoverer.
4. The squirrel made no effort to escape while Mr. Mills was present, but did get free when left alone for half an hour at dinner-time. Such evidence of feigning has a decidedly entertaining side, to say the last. The squirrel seems to be the cleverer fellow every time, for he is serious while the observer thinks he is fooling. Who has not seen a squirrel hide behind a branch of the trunk of a tree to escape being seen by a person approaching? Is keeping *quiet* under such circumstances *feigning* quiet? If a confined squirrel, alarmed at our presence, sits still while we are watching him, but tries to get free when left alone, is there any deception in his behavior except what we ourselves invent?

5. The squirrel was recaptured, but showed fight when cornered, and Mr. Mills narrowly escaped being bitten. *Mirabile dictu!* A good bite would have been the best feint of all. Mr. Mills's good luck was an untold loss to comparative psychology.

6. "The squirrel was returned to its box, and a board weighted with a large stone placed over it. *Notwithstanding* he gnawed his way out through the upper corner of the box during our absence on one occasion shortly afterwards."

A large stone on a board to keep the animal in, can only be taken as another feint on the part of Mr. Mills, for of course he did not expect thus to prevent gnawing out. The size of the stone did not fool the squirrel, whoever else was taken in.

Further, on p. 71, Mr. Mills comes to the question of what is essential to feigning death or injury. "It is to be remembered," says the author, "that in these cases the animal simply remains as quiet and passive as possible. . . . It is within the observation of all that a cat watching near a rat-hole, feigns quiet. . . . A great part of the whole difficulty, it seems to me, has arisen from the use of the expression 'feigning death.' What is assumed is *inactivity* and *passivity*, more or less complete. This, of course, bears a certain degree of resemblance to death itself."

Darwin carefully compared the appearance of death-feigning insects and spiders with that of the really dead animals, and the result was, as he says, "that in no one instance was the attitude exactly the same, and in several instances the attitude of the feigners and of the really dead were as unlike as they possibly could be." (See Appendix to Romanes's *Mental Evolution in Animals*, p. 364.)

Romanes (p. 308) states this result in less cautious language: "All that 'shamming dead' amounts to in these animals is an instinct to remain motionless, and thus inconspicuous, in the presence of enemies."

Mr. Mills makes the conclusion still broader, assuming that the *essential* thing in feigning is *quiet*. That, even in the case of insects, quiet is not the distinctive character of feigning seems evident when we remember that the non-feigning state may be one of as

perfect quiet as that of the feigning state. The mere passivity does not of itself discriminate between these two very different states; in other words, it does not give us the criterion of either state. The essential thing is not a non-differential element, common to the two states. The "essential" must give us the difference, and enable us to distinguish clearly between the normal state of rest and the so-called feigned condition. The quiet of an animal at rest and that of the same animal feigning death, are two very different things; otherwise we should have no use for the term "feigning" as a means of distinction. In one case the quiet is perfectly normal and signifies only a state of rest; in the other it means an *assumed* or *induced* condition, as the result of disturbance and alarm.

The cause, the conscious purpose or the blind adaptation, and the external appearances are all essentially unlike in the two cases. Look at the beetle at rest on the branch or leaf of a tree, and at the same beetle after it has dropped to the ground, alarmed by some unusual jar, lying as it fell, motionless, on its side or back. Is the quiet now the same as before? or is it as different as calm unheeding composure and the stupor of terror, or the stillness deliberately maintained to escape discovery? Whether cataleptic or voluntary, the so-called feigned quiet has no fundamental likeness with the quiet of normal rest. There is only a deceptive outward semblance, which speedily vanishes on closer comparison.

In the quiet of a cat before a rat-hole, we have quite a different phenomenon, and one to which the term feigning seems to me to have no legitimate application. There is no fear, no involuntary suspension of activity, no attempt to imitate a state of death, or to falsify appearances in order to escape enemies. The quiet is deliberately maintained, not on account of alarm, but to avoid giving alarm to her intended victim; not to elude but to capture, the rat. The cat is not surprised, but she hopes to surprise the rat. She has the same end in view when she stalks a bird, keeping behind some intervening object that hides her from view. Here the cat is in motion and glides on with manifest satisfaction in her advantage; and if she is feigning, she is certainly not feigning quiet. It must be evident, I think, that if feigning does not properly char-

acterise the *action* of the cat in this case, it cannot properly define the *inaction* in the other.

Returning to his "feigning squirrels" (p. 72), Mr. Mills tells us more explicitly what he understands by feigning in their case.

"These little animals were naturally led, under the unwonted circumstances of their confinement, to disguise, in an extraordinary degree, their real condition, and even to imitate an unusual and unreal one. The mental process is a complex of instinct pure and simple, with higher intellectual factors added, and the cases of these squirrels, thus feigning, are among the clearest that, so far as I am aware, have ever been recorded."

This leaves no doubt that Mr. Mills believes he saw something more than feigning quiet in his squirrels. "*Disguise of the real and imitation of the unreal*," is what Mr. Mills claims to have seen, and what I have failed to find any satisfactory evidence of in the reports he has given. In fact, the observations seem to me to indicate no feigning at all on the part of the squirrels, and to show very clearly that Mr. Mills failed to get reliable data at just the most critical points. It is the old failure of anecdote psychology.

If it be true, as I think will be generally admitted, that comparative psychology is a science of the future; and if at present it is only a part of general biology, it follows that any attempt to soar to "the nature and development of animal intelligence," except through the aid of long schooling in the study of animal life, is doomed to be an Icarian flight.

C. O. WHITMAN.

CHICAGO, ILL.

## BIOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS.

IN CONSIDERING the relation of science to metaphysics, assuming that each has a place in the scheme of human endeavor, I have urged the essential importance of distinguishing as clearly as possible the sphere of the one from the sphere of the other. No doubt such delimitation of subject-matter involves definitions of the terms "science" and "metaphysics" which are not universally accepted. Ambiguity on such a vital point would, however, be fatal. It is therefore essential that the exact meaning I attach to these terms should be stated, and if necessary restated, with clearness and frankness. The sphere of science, then, in the somewhat restricted sense I here advocate, is the universe of phenomena. The man of science deals with the realities of experience. Accepting these realities as data, the primal mode of origin of which, if they have such a mode of origin, it is not for him to consider, he traces the changes that they undergo, generalises the results, and gives them clear expression in terms of related antecedence and sequence. For him any event is explained when the conditions of its manifestation are laid bare, when its antecedents have been traced, and when it is referred to its appropriate category in the scheme of natural occurrences. On the other hand the sphere of metaphysics is that of noumenal existence; of the underlying cause of the observed sequences of phenomena; of the *raison d'être* of the universe which science has done so much to explain in terms of antecedence and sequence. Thus regarded science and metaphysics are nowise antagonistic; they are complementary the one to the other. But though the man of science can afford to ignore

metaphysics, the metaphysician cannot afford to ignore science; for science provides him with the data of which it is his endeavor to render a final account. Whether man as a rational being can afford to ignore either is a matter of opinion.

Now it will no doubt be said that if this delimitation be accepted, the sphere of science, though it includes physical science and biology, fails to embrace mental science, psychology, ethics, æsthetics, and logic. Nothing, however, could be further from my intention than to suggest a delimitation which does anything of the sort. The data of mental science are, no less than the data of physical science, provided in and through experience. The perception of an object is every whit as much part of the realities of experience as the object of perception. Indeed they are the same item of experience regarded from different points of view. As I have before urged it is only by the analysis of experience that we distinguish its objective from its subjective aspect. And though it may to some sound strange to claim the data of mental science as part of the universe of phenomena, yet I shall endeavor to make good this claim in my next essay. For the present it must suffice to say that the phenomena which we group under the head of mind are included in the sphere of science which deals with them in terms of related antecedence and sequence, just as it deals with the phenomena which we group under the head of matter in similar terms. The sphere of science thus has two hemispheres—physical and mental respectively. The more clearly we distinguish them the better. For when idealism attempts to explain physical changes in terms of sensation or perception; and when materialism attempts to deal with mental states as the product of physical antecedents, there is no end to the confusion that results.

Even when this source of misunderstanding has been removed, there still remains a further criticism of the usage suggested. For "the study of the ultimate grounds of all knowledge and of all science of whatsoever kind—the science of *Epistemology*" is excluded. This *scientia scientiarum* which forms the subject of Dr. St. George Mivart's volume on *The Groundwork of Science* can find no place, it will be said, in the proposed scheme of delimitation. I



believe, however, that it does find its true and legitimate place in the sphere of metaphysics. It deals, not with observed moves among the pieces on the chequered chess-board of experience, but with the question how there comes to be a game to be played, and, when this is settled, how the knights and pawns are moved each with a distinctive path across the board. This is a very different problem: one so different that it is well to distinguish it by name. Of course, if it be granted that the problems are different we may still broaden our definition of the term science so as to include them both. But it may be urged that finer and therefore sharper distinctions in terms are often helpful to clearer distinctions in thought. And if we can more readily keep our problems in separate intellectual pigeon-holes by thus giving them quite different labels, much confusion may be avoided, and precision of thought may be fostered.

In my last essay I discussed the question of vitalism in some of its aspects, and no doubt said many things which failed to carry conviction. Had they been generally admitted the saying of them would have been a work of supererogation. The essence of my contention was this: that if we grant to the vitalist all that he claims to have established, if we admit that living matter presents us with phenomena which are observed nowhere else in the known universe, these phenomena must be accepted as part of the data which it is the business of the man of science to elucidate in terms of related antecedence and sequence. If as man of science he be unable to explain in these terms the mode of genesis of the phenomena in question this may be because he has reached the limits of scientific interpretation; and there he must leave the matter, and pass on to other problems. If on the other hand he invoke the conception of vital force not as the physical antecedent but as the underlying cause of the phenomena, let him do so frankly in the name of metaphysics and not of science. Metaphysicians will welcome any suggestions which he has to make in their special field of work. But they will remind him that not here only in the field of vital phenomena, but throughout the whole realm of nature, are there diverse manifestations of Force, as the cause of phenomenal

changes; and that no matter where we probe beneath the surface of experience we find the variously selective modes of influence of this Force. The frosted pattern on the window-pane presents, in a different form, the same metaphysical problem as the fern frond to which it presents a superficial resemblance. If once the appeal be made by the man of science to metaphysical causes he must realise that not only here but everywhere are they in ceaseless operation.

The sketch of vitalism that was presented dealt only, however, with certain properties of living matter on which some stress has of late been laid. I purpose in this essay to take a somewhat wider survey of biological facts and their interpretation. From whatever point of view we regard the problem of life, we see in the simplest living organism a theatre in which the atomic and molecular characters enact a drama nowhere enacted in just this way on any inorganic stage. There is a continuous give and take both of matter and energy which is scarcely so much as hinted at elsewhere; there is a unified sequence of changes constituting a less or more complex life-history; and there is through the process of reproduction a continuous stream of sequence, of much wider range in time. In place of the short life-history of the individual, we have the indefinitely longer life-history of the species. These phenomena are so central for biology that it will be well to make them the starting-point of our further consideration of life-problems.

It is a familiar fact that so simple an organism as the *Amœba*—a mere speck of protoplasmic foam—presents in miniature, and in a far less complicated form than is found in the higher animals and plants, all the life-processes which are commonly regarded as essential. Here in the first place is that assimilation of congruous substances, food and oxygen, thus intimately incorporated with its protoplasm, which is one of the distinctive marks of all life. And here too is that not less distinctive process of partial disintegration. Only through disintegration of its substance does protoplasm give indications of its vital activity. In its absence there would be no sign of life. On the other hand, complete disintegration would result in decomposition, the mark not of life but of death. Between these extremes lies the mean of vital activity, shown in its essential

features as clearly in the amoeba as in man. Partial disintegration provides for change, the concomitant of activity, and for continuity preserving individual identity; while it renders necessary the process of assimilation by which the loss due to partial disintegration is made good, and by which through incorporation new substance is caught up into the stream of continuous individuality.

Is it a matter for wonder that the cause of these phenomena, seen in a microscopic speck of living matter, has been regarded as "a mystery transcending naturalistic conception; as an alien influx into nature, baffling scientific interpretation." And yet I believe that this attitude of mind is due, partly to a misconception of the function of scientific interpretation, and partly to influences arising from the course pursued by the historical development of scientific knowledge. The function of science is to formulate and to express in generalised terms the related antecedences and sequences which are observed to occur in protoplasm. This can already be done with some approach to precision and accuracy. There is at any rate little reason to doubt that this goal of scientific endeavor can be reached by an extension and refinement of scientific method. But the cause of the phenomena does not fall within the purview of science; it is a metaphysical conception. It is no more (and no less) a "mystery" than all causation throughout the universe of phenomena is a mystery. And if it be said that the origin of life on our planet cannot be expressed in scientific terms of related antecedence and sequence, this may be either admitted or denied according to the sense in which the words are to be taken. It must be freely admitted that we do not know the physical antecedents of the first speck of living matter that appeared on this earth; but it must not be admitted that this honest confession of ignorance implies that there were no such physical antecedents. It may be admitted that when life first appeared new modes of the interaction of material particles occurred; new data were afforded for science to deal with in accordance with its method of interpretation; but it must not be admitted that this necessarily implies an "alien influx into nature." Neither science nor metaphysics now believes in any such alien influx. There is nothing alien introduced

into nature from without; all the influences at work are inherent in the fibre of her being. Or, if this metaphysical assumption be not accepted, if the doctrine of occasional influxes from without be an article of faith, it should surely be applied consistently. There are thousands of chemical compounds, each with a distinctive group of physical properties, found thus combined nowhere else in nature, which took their origin under appropriate conditions at successive points of time during the slow cooling of the earth. There may even have been a time in the long ago past, when the elements were still held separate in the fervent heat of the planetary vapor, when compounds had not yet had their origin in the history of this part of the solar system. If this be so, there must have been an epoch in evolution when these new data emerged for science to deal with, just as there was a later epoch in evolution when other new data, those presented by life, emerged in an analogous manner.

If the mystery of life, therefore, be said to baffle scientific interpretation, this is because it suggests problems with which science as such should not attempt to deal. The causes of vital phenomena (as of other phenomena) lie deeper than the probe of science can reach. But why is this sense of mystery especially evoked in some minds by the contemplation of life? Partly, I think, because the scientific interpretation of organic processes is so recent and in many respects so incomplete. People have grown so accustomed to the metaphysical assumptions employed by physicists and chemists when they speak of the architecture of crystalline forces and the selective affinity of atoms, they have been wont for so long to accept the "mysteries" of crystallisation and of chemical union, that the metaphysical causes have coalesced with the descriptions and explanations of science, and the joint products are now, through custom, cheerfully accepted as "natural." Where the phenomena presented by protoplasm are in question, this coalescence has not yet taken place; the metaphysical element is on the one hand proclaimed as inexplicable on naturalistic methods of interpretation, and on the other hand denied even by those who talk glibly of physical forces. But in due course of time this, too,

will be commonly accepted as perfectly natural; and the battle will rage elsewhere.

Returning now to our amœba, in addition to the primary characteristics of concomitant or alternating integration and disintegration in a continuous and unified sequence, there are other secondary phenomena which are either the direct outcome of the primary characteristics or are intimately associated with them. Disintegration is associated with movements which, even in so lowly an organism, are to some extent in adaptation to the needs of its simple mode of life; and it gives rise to products, some of which must be got rid of as useless if not deleterious but some of which may be utilised to prepare the food for assimilation. It also under special conditions may give rise to a tough substance forming a protective layer or coat around the protoplasm. Thus by its life-processes the amœba produces excretions, that is to say waste products to be got rid of, and secretions, that is to say disintegration products which may serve a useful purpose. Lastly (for only certain leading features need be enumerated) the amœba presents the phenomena of reproduction in their simplest expression. A specialised part of the protoplasm, the nucleus, divides into two portions. According to some biologists the peculiar function of this nucleus is to control the reproductive process, using this phrase in a broad sense. What are the antecedent conditions which determine its division we do not fully know; but we do know that the division is the visible and seemingly related antecedent of a further change—the splitting of the whole amœba into two, which henceforth lead a separate life. This reproductive process is, however, so essential and so peculiar to life that it cannot be regarded as of secondary importance. It must take rank with the concomitant integration and disintegration as a primary characteristic. It opens the way to a divergence of continuous lines. It is distinctive of living matter and does not find a parallel in the inorganic world.

Attached to the stems of weeds and other bodies, may be found another microscopic organism which is also like the amœba a dweller in water. This is the Bell-animalcule or vorticella. Shaped like a translucent wine-glass on a long stalk it shows a very marked

advance in structure on the *amœba*. Whereas the *amœba* has no definite mouth but can take in food-particles at any part of its substance, the vorticella has a funnel leading inwards towards its central substance. The rim of the wine-glass and the orifice of the funnel are provided with delicate waving cilia, so called because they resemble microscopic eyelashes composed of transparent living matter. Their constant movements set up currents in the water which draw in the minute fragments of animal or vegetable matter which serve for food and which, passing to the narrow end of the funnel, burst through into the inner substance of the vorticella. This substance like that of *amœba* exhibits the balanced processes of assimilation and disintegration. But, apart from the orderly play of the cilia, the movements are more clearly adaptive. On any sudden jar, or the introduction of an irritant, the long-stalk suddenly coils up through the contraction of a central fibre, the rim of the wine-glass is turned in, the cilia disappear from view and the expansive end becomes contracted and bunched up. There is a band-shaped nucleus, which in preparation for the reproductive process divides, half passing into each of the two individuals into which the vorticella shortly afterwards splits. But there is also observable from time to time a different process. Free swimming forms are budded off from the vorticella (with nucleus division) and these unite with other stalked individuals, the two nuclei fusing to form a new combined nucleus. And after this, the multiplication by the ordinary process of fission (or splitting into two individuals) goes on more rapidly and with increased vigor. So that vorticella exhibits a higher degree of differentiation both of structure and of orderly movements; it shows a process of conjugation, or fusion of nuclei preparatory to reproduction,—a process only occasionally observed in *amœba*; and, in general, exemplifies a more complex sequence of changes, constituting its life-history, and more delicate and definite adaptation of protoplasmic response to surrounding conditions.

Now if we place side by side on the same slip of glass an *amœba*, a vorticella, and the fertilised ovum or egg-cell of a rabbit, and examine them under a microscope of moderately high magni-



fyng power, we should probably say that the ovum is far more like the amœba than is the vorticella. And yet the rabbit's ovum somehow inherits the power of developing, under appropriate conditions in the maternal uterus, into so wonderfully complicated an organism as that known to zoölogists as *Lepus cuniculus*, a name which sums up peculiarities of structure which it would take a large volume adequately to describe. In some way, which at present we only dimly understand, that little speck of protoplasm, a very pin-point of life, bears the impress of changes wrought on the continuous stream of living substance throughout long ages of geological history. We may wonder how so much potentiality can possibly lie hidden in so little substance—according to some biologists in only a part of the nucleus of the egg—yet, in truth, there is nothing here which is not in principle involved in the fission of the lowly amœba. The essential characteristic of life, on which all this depends, is protoplasmic continuity. This it is which so links the chain of sequence that we may believe, by a legitimate exercise of the faith with which after all science is so abundantly endowed, that changes wrought upon this continuous line of protoplasm so many ages ago still tremble and thrill through its substance to-day. And if we realise that the germinal substance from which the little rabbit develops is (omitting reference to fertilisation) just a little bit of the very same germinal substance from which its mother was in like manner developed, it would be surprising indeed if it grew up into anything very different from that mother.

At the same time though, regarded from the standpoint of science, there are present just the conditions which would give the requisite continuity to form an abiding basis for a prolonged series of antecedent and sequent changes, yet the necessity for assuming some underlying cause, immanent in the fertilised ovum, through the operation of which the sequence in any given case is manifested—this necessity seems to be pressed home on the metaphysician with unusual force. The man of science does and should regard this as outside the problem he sets before himself for solution. But in denying the presence of any such underlying cause, should he

do so, he seems to be going beyond his province, and to be overstepping the limits of his boasted agnosticism.

The embryo rabbit is sheltered and nourished within the uterus of its mother and even after birth lies hidden from its enemies and is further nourished and fostered within the burrow. But the frog's spawn which floats on the water of the pond from which we obtained *amœba* and *vorticella* is not thus nourished or protected. Each of the little dark beads, within the jelly-like collection of transparent spheres, is a fertilised egg. The frog, like the rabbit, belongs to that extensive and diverse group of animals in which a number of separate or loosely connected particles of living matter are associated together. In the protozoa where the particles or cells have an independent existence the method of reproduction is the separation of a part of that cell for the continuance of the race. In the metazoa to which the frog and the rabbit belong, where there is an aggregation and integration of cells into a complex group with differentiation of function among the many constituent units, we have the distinction into two broadly contrasted groups, —body-cells and germ-cells. The body-cells are classified according to their physiological function into those which subserve the processes of nutrition, respiration, excretion, and so forth. To the germ-cells nature entrusts the essential rôle of reproduction and the continuance of the race. According to modern interpretation the body-cells cannot give origin to germ-cells; but it is the essential function of germ-cells, in normal process of development, to give origin to the body-cells of offspring in succeeding generations. Whether the body-cells can in definite ways influence the germ-cells so as to impress upon them, and thus render hereditary, characters which they have themselves acquired, is a question under discussion. In any case, whereas a germ-cell, fertilised in many cases though not in all, by union with another cell produced by a member of the opposite sex, gives rise not only to the bodily framework and diverse tissues of the embryo but also to the germ-cells which may in due course play a similar rôle; the body-cells, though they may divide and subdivide to form other like units, do not, when once fairly started on their special career, give rise to

germ-cells capable of reproducing the whole organism. And eventually death is as distinctively their heritage, as continuity of life is the heritage of those which are the bearers of the germinal substance. What we have specially to note, however, is that, notwithstanding the multiplicity of amoeba-like units which are associated together to build up the frog, the organism still retains such unity as to justify us in speaking of it as a single individual; and that each germ-cell, duly fertilised, carries on the torch of life which is extinguished by death, throughout the rest of the unity which we term the frog.

The fertilised ovum of the frog contains within the meshes of the network of protoplasm of which it is composed a certain amount of food-yolk, and in the early stages of development this affords material for the protoplasm to assimilate. The nucleus divides and subdivides again and again, and the protoplasm splits into a great number of separate or loosely connected units,—the cells. These gradually differentiate and group themselves into the organs and tissues. During these early stages the frog does not feed; the food-yolk contained in the ovum provides sufficient material for the assimilation of the protoplasm of the differentiating cells,—which do not part company and go each on its own way as in the amoeba, but remain associated, merging their individualities in that of a compound organism, each ministering to the others and being ministered to by them for the common good of their joint product. But ere long the minute tadpole is hatched, attaches itself by suckers under the chin to the jelly-like substance in which the eggs were imbedded, or to bits of decomposing animal or vegetable matter, and feeds by means of horny jaws. It obtains oxygen from the water through the instrumentality of gills, and swims like a fish by movements of its tail. Its mode of life, its modes of feeding, breathing, and so forth, are well nigh as different from those of the parent frog as they can be. But all the time it is undergoing changes which gradually fit it for its later life. Lungs and limbs are developing, though for some time they are useless. And so the metamorphosis goes on, until at last, the legs having grown apace, the head and jaws having undergone marked changes, the limbs

having acquired a considerable size and some strength, the tail having shrunk to a pointed stump, by a final shedding of the skin the tadpole becomes a frog, and with some further alterations of the relative proportions of its parts, reaches the adult stage of its not uneventful life-history.

Such being in brief outline the facts—which are indeed sufficiently familiar—let us consider their scientific interpretation. They unquestionably present us with a chain of related antecedents and consequents linked into an orderly, consistent, and unified series, marked by a continuity of sequence not less than a diversity of phases. It is in some respects convenient to distinguish among the antecedents those which lie within and those which lie outside the organism; to regard the former as the distinctively vital or essential causes of change, and the latter as the environing or conditioning causes; the environing series having less of direct continuity than the vital. Thus we say that the development at this or that stage proceeds in due course if the conditions are favorable; and that, if the continuity along the developmental line fail and life ceases, this is not due to any lack of causal antecedents in the essentially vital series, but rather to a failure of the contributory aid afforded by the appropriate conditions. We may even say that a cause adequate to produce the effect is present but not the conditions under which alone this cause can be effectual. Convenient as it may be, however, from the biological point of view, to make this distinction—nay, justifiable as it is for the student of life to regard the inner vital cause as essential and the environment as to some extent accidental and merely permissive; still from the broader standpoint of logical scientific interpretation the causal antecedent is to be regarded as the totality of related phenomena which pass insensibly into that other totality of related phenomena which we call the sequent effect. In this way the whole series of events which constitute the life-history of the frog could with adequate knowledge be expressed in terms of related antecedence and sequence; and such expression, when duly generalised by the correlation of this with other life-histories, would afford an adequate

and satisfactory explanation of such phenomena from the standpoint of science.

Even supposing this were done, however, there still remains behind a question which would present itself to the metaphysician, though the man of science may be content to ignore it (nay, more, as man of science should resolutely exclude it, as non-scientific). That question would present itself in some such form as this: What is the underlying cause of the sequence which we observe? In other words: Why does this sequent effect issue from that antecedent cause?

Does the theory of biological evolution give an answer to this question? No, it does not. And the more thoroughly it realises its function, the more averse will it be to the pretense of doing so. It does, however, give answers—admittedly imperfect answers, it is true,—to the questions: By what steps has this life-history come to be what it is? What scientific causes have been at work? How has adaptation to environment been reached? I do not propose to discuss these answers; save one, and that very briefly. It is well known that organisms can accommodate themselves to their surrounding conditions, often by acquiring some modification of structure or habit. These are inherited, say some, and the adaptations we see are in large degree the accumulated results of such inheritance, each generation adding a little to the store. According to this answer, then, adaptation is reached by the inheritance of acquired characters. Its efficacy is denied in many quarters, it being contended that the supposed mode of inheritance is unproven. The second answer is summed up in the word selection, or in the phrase "survival of the fittest." This need not here be illustrated. A third answer makes appeal to a principle of orthogenesis; and concerning this answer a few words will not here be out of place.

Professor Eimer has told us through the pages of *The Monist* that orthogenesis is "definitely-directed and law-conforming evolution." He says further that "There is no chance in the transmutation of species. There is unconditioned conformity to law only. Definite evolution, orthogenesis, controls this transmutation. It can lead step by step from the simplest and most inconspicuous be-

ginnings to ever more perfect creations, gradually or by leaps; and the cause of this definite evolution is organic growth." But he also says that the evolutionary advancement of a group of individuals takes place when "they are more sensitive than their fellows to the outward influences that condition the transmutation"—the outward influence referred to being "climatic and nutritional conditions." And again we are told that "the main factor that conditions and promotes the formation of species is the activity, the continued use of certain organs." Now for those who desire carefully to distinguish between scientific and metaphysical causes, these statements of Professor Eimer seem to afford material for analysis. I do not feel equal to the task; but I would urge those who accept orthogenesis, or any form of the doctrine of determinate evolution, seriously to undertake it. Presumably (I speak with hesitation) organic growth as a cause of definite evolution is our old metaphysical friend, Life or Vital Principle. In any case it does not appear much more helpful from the scientific point of view to say that organic growth is the causal antecedent of evolution than to say that evolution is the causal antecedent of organic growth. Organic growth and evolution are for science the group of phenomena of which we seek to understand the conditioning antecedents. What is meant by unconditioned conformity to law under the conditions of climate, nutrition, and exercise, I do not presume even to hazard a guess. The phrase "definite evolution" might, one would suppose, be strictly paralleled by the phrase "definite transmutation"; but, in that case, how definite evolution can control transmutation presents a puzzle unless it is a round-about way of saying that evolution or transmutation is self-controlling. The word chance would seem to be so used as to imply an absence of "conformity to law" (an implication which Darwin expressly excluded); whereas it should mean conformity to law the particular application of which in the given case eludes our powers of discrimination. Those who have been laboring for a generation to formulate the laws of evolution can hardly be expected to accept the qualification "law-conforming" as specially distinctive of orthogenesis.



It may be said that these are mere verbal criticisms. Let us then go to the heart of the matter. If underlying orthogenesis there is assumed an internal force causing organisms to shoot into certain forms, this is, *quid* force, a metaphysical conception, and should be frankly stated and regarded as such. In this way the polar forces which control the building of crystals should, I have urged, be stated and regarded. But crystallographers as students of science have done something more than the believers in orthogenesis have yet accomplished, or indeed show hopeful signs of accomplishing. For quite apart from any assumption of underlying forces, they have formulated the laws of crystallographic phenomena, as phenomena, in a way which amply satisfies the requirements of scientific interpretation. Has anything of the sort, even making full allowances for the complexity of the subject-matter, been done by the believers in orthogenesis or determinate evolution? The suggestion that development ceases or halts at certain stages in an apparently arbitrary manner, the observation that the markings of lizards seem to replace one another in the direction from behind forwards, the partial or total disappearance, broadening, and fusion of the fundamental bands on some butterflies' wings, the curious effects of temperature on the colors of lepidoptera, the effects of salinity on certain brine-shrimps, and other cases of apparently definite and determinate transmutations *per saltum*, even granting that the changes of structure are, strictly speaking, hereditary,—these are matters of interest which demand fuller investigation of their antecedent conditions. But can we at present extract from them, after the method of science, anything like broad, stable and widely accepted generalisations—generalisations which force themselves on the acceptance of all who study the facts in a careful, patient, and systematic manner? I think not. I see no *a priori* objection to orthogenesis. On the contrary, it seems reasonable to suppose that since inorganic matter runs into definite forms—simply as a matter of observation—so should organic matter tend to run into *its* definite forms. But reasonable as it may be from the *a priori* point of view, there seems remarkably little *a posteriori* evidence capable of scientific generalisation.

And till such is presented, biologists will be well advised to treat with that scepticism, which is the foster-mother of conviction, the suggestions of orthogenesis. And until the scientific position is secure, the metaphysical conception which underlies it partakes to the full of its insecurity. In any case any confusion of the scientific and metaphysical problems, of orthogenesis as an observed fact, and an underlying vital principle which causes it, will, I am convinced, do nothing but darken council and lead the unwary into logical pit-falls.

Reverting then to the life-history of the frog and steadily regarding it from the point of view of biology; granting too all that the most strenuous advocate of the distinctly Darwinian principle can claim from our fund of belief, and adding the results of such additional coöperating factors, orthogenetic or other, as the labors of biologists may place on a sound and logical footing; we may extend the chain of antecedence and sequence into a past that is dimly remote. No matter where we examine the series of events—no matter where we bisect its length by a plane cutting athwart the occurrences of any assignable moment of time, we find that these occurrences are the natural outcome of those which immediately preceded. Whatever metaphysics may have to say, science is assuredly right in holding firmly to its ideal,—the explanation of this as of other life-histories in terms of related antecedence and sequence, every stage in the long and complex process exemplifying the strictest relation of physical and biological cause and effect.

And what more can one desire! the Darwinian enthusiast will exclaim. Given variations of structure and habit, the causes or antecedents of which are ideally ascertainable, if not yet ascertained; given an extravagant output in offspring decimated again and again by the attacks of enemies and the incidence of adverse conditions so that only a favored and well-adapted few survive; given hereditary transmission by which the favorable adaptations to the stern conditions of life are handed on to successive generations and adding other possible coöperating factors, what elements in the problem presented for our study by a given organism remain unsolved, if not actually at all events ideally, by the method of sci-

ence? Or rising from the particular organism to the generalised principles of biology, when the perfected science of the future shall have said its last word, when we can not only confidently affirm that the totality of life and its conditions to-day is the natural outcome of the life and its conditions of yesterday and will surely give rise to the life and its conditions of to-morrow, but can as confidently describe in all its detail the assemblage of antecedents which constitute the cause and the assemblage of consequents which we name the effect, and can formulate the relationships of the one to the other,—what more remains to be learnt? The problem will be completely solved. No doubt this is only the ideal end to which science is slowly but surely advancing. That we have not reached the ideal is no answer to the claim of science,—which is in effect not that we have solved, but that we can thus solve, and completely solve, the problem of life.

To which the metaphysician will reply that with the supposed extension of our knowledge science will indeed have solved the problem which legitimately lies within its sphere. That problem is: Given life and its environment to describe in particular cases the sequence of events presented by individual development and racial evolution, and by generalising the results so reached to afford a scientific explanation of the phenomena. This is a magnificent problem, and one well worthy of the intellect of Darwin and of his followers. The results so far obtained call forth our sincere admiration and augur well for yet further advances in biological knowledge. But when science shall have said its last word and put the finishing touches on the picture elaborated with so much skill and care, there will still remain the fundamental data of biology presenting another problem with which metaphysics must attempt to deal. When the riddle of development and of evolution shall have been answered in terms of science, the riddle of life will still remain unsolved and insoluble in these terms. The question, What is life? will then as now press for an answer. Such is the counter-claim of the metaphysician.

Now in considering the validity of this claim it must first be asked whether the word *life* is used in quite the same sense by man

of science and metaphysician. For if not, there is no limit to the cross-questions and crooked answers which may—which indeed often do—exasperate us by their futility. Let us endeavor clearly to distinguish. As used by the man of science the term *life* comprises an observable sequence of phenomena. We can neither say that life is caused by the phenomena nor that the phenomena are the cause of life. The term is used not with a causal but with a descriptive signification. For the sequence itself is just that which characterises what the biologist terms life. From the strictly biological point of view this group of natural sequences *is* life; and though he may speak of them as the phenomena *of* life, all that is meant by this expression is that this or that particular phenomenon falls within the group to which the term vital is properly applicable. This is a perfectly legitimate and logical position. So in like manner is gravitation a term under which are comprised certain observable movements of inorganic masses. When we say that the fall of a stone to the earth is one of the phenomena of gravitation, what is meant is that this particular fact falls within a certain group. From the strictly physical standpoint the phenomena are neither the cause nor the product of gravitation. For gravity as a cause of motion is a metaphysical conception. Nor are certain other phenomena, those which are studied by the zoölogist, from the strictly biological standpoint either the cause or the product of life. They are simply grouped under this heading.

On the other hand, when the metaphysician uses the term *life*, he has in view the hidden cause or *raison d'être* of the phenomena which the biologist describes under this heading. Let us hear what he has to say in favor of the assumption that such a cause exists. First of all, from a general point of view he urges, as we have seen, that not only has every sequent state a correlative antecedent, but the sequence itself must have a cause. When pressed, however, to lay bare the grounds of this assertion, the metaphysician can only reply that this is a universal postulate of reason; or in other words, that apart from such an assumption the sequence is inexplicable. When further pressed, he is forced to assume that this underlying cause is itself uncaused,—is self-existent. Why

then, it may be asked, should we not stop a stage short of that which the metaphysician postulates, and assume that the phenomenal sequence is itself uncaused and self-existent? To which the metaphysician replies: Because the self-existence of phenomena is unthinkable. Is not this, however, some will ask, a verbal quibble? We are led, on the Socratic method, to admit that the observed facts are termed phenomena; we are then bidden to note that the word "phenomena" is equivalent to "appearances"; and having thus fallen into the trap, we are asked by the metaphysician whether they must not logically be appearances of an underlying force which causes them to appear. But there is surely something stronger in the metaphysician's contention than a skilful manipulation of words, more ingenious than ingenuous. The argument really turns not on the use of words but on the nature of experience. Firmly as we may believe in the practical realities of experience and in the orderly sequence of phenomena, we seem forced to confess (*pace* Dr. St. George Mivart) that these practical and proximate realities are only the expression for sense and the scientific knowledge founded thereon, of the ultimate reality which lies beneath and behind them—of which they are the expression or manifestation. In any case, for those—and few modern thinkers will be excluded from their number—who are unable to accept the hypothesis that phenomena are self-existent, there only remain the alternatives of metaphysical agnosticism and of some sort of metaphysical assumption. Either the mode of origin of phenomena is unknowable and may therefore be ignored, or they are caused by some sort of noumenal existence, the nature of which metaphysics may strive to elucidate.

This being in outline the general thesis for which the metaphysician contends he claims that any such elucidation which he attempts should be regarded, not as antagonistic to the assured results of scientific research, but as supplementary to them. Now science in dealing with phenomena is impressed not only with the rich and multifarious diversity of the cosmos but with the fact that it is a cosmos, exhibiting at any rate so much unity as to render broad generalisations applicable to wide stretches of the extensive territory to be surveyed. Metaphysics accepts from science the

principle of analysis by which the intersecting strands of the complex web of phenomena are disentangled or traced, across the world-canvas, and the principle of synthesis by which the trend common to groups of strands is expressed in natural law. And although metaphysics tends to lay more stress on the unity of the cosmic cause than on the diversity of manifestation ; although it regards analysis as but a means to the ultimate end of synthesis, yet it does not here diverge widely from science in its broader and more philosophical aspect. For science, too, ever strives towards unity of interpretation and aims constantly at a broader and more comprehensive synthesis, to which end its most minute analysis is but an effective means.

Passing now to matters of greater detail metaphysics utilises the work accomplished by science in its analysis of phenomena. Accepting the Newtonian theory of gravitation as applicable to a wide and homogeneous group of observed facts, it urges on the one hand that these facts are inexplicable unless force is assumed as a cause of motion, and on the other hand that this assumption should be regarded as frankly metaphysical, begging thinkers in general and physicists in particular to distinguish carefully between the antecedences and sequences of scientific interpretation and their causes as lying behind or beneath the phenomenal veil ; imploring them to place in different categories "force" the mathematical expression of rate of change and "Force" of which this change is the phenomenal expression. So, too, in all cases of interpretation in the wide field of inorganic nature. So long as the chemist deals with combinations, reactions, and dissociations in terms of antecedence and sequence he is stating facts of observation, and by generalising them rises to the laws of chemical change. But when he invokes chemical attractions and affinities, not as the expressions of observed reactions but as the cause of chemical phenomena, he is consciously or unconsciously dipping into metaphysics. So long as the man of science describes the facts and conditions of crystallographic synthesis and bases his generalisations thereon, he is concerned with matters which admittedly fall within his province. But when he invokes the play of crystalline forces to account for



the phenomena he is a metaphysician *malgré lui*. For it is the province of metaphysics to search for the causes of which phenomena are the manifestation in experience. Custom has, however, in large degree sanctioned these metaphysical assumptions. And when chemists and physicists talk of their chemical and physical forces as the cause of the attractions or repulsions they observe, few are found to enter a word of protest. It is otherwise when vital phenomena are under consideration. If so much as a hint is expressed of vital force as the cause of physiological phenomena, chemists and physicists who have been talking and writing freely of chemical and physical forces are among the first to be up in arms and are ready to slay with weapons of sharpest scorn the vitalist as a traitor to the cause of science. It is in vain for him to urge that it is only *quod* metaphysician that he is a vitalist, or that, as man of science, he is content to be a student of phenomena as such. He is branded as a heretic; and his good deeds will scarcely atone for his false faith.

But there are degrees of heresy. There is the heretic who sins rather in word than in thought; and there is the heretic of deeper dye whose mind is fatally perverted. The former is he for whom vital force is merely a convenient expression for the combined action in subtle relations of chemical and physical forces. The latter—he whose case is past praying for—assumes a special mode of causal activity superadded to the play of the chemical and physical forces which he assumes to be also in operation. But if we are to admit any reference to metaphysical forces it is difficult to see what *a priori* grounds there are for rejecting his assumption of a special mode of force-operation in vital phenomena, that is to say, so long as special modes of operation are admitted in dealing with the phenomena of gravitation, cohesion, electrical and chemical actions, crystalline synthesis, and so forth. It would almost seem as if some students of inorganic nature believe that they have worked out a scheme of the forces in operation, and are prepared to proclaim: "Thus far you may go in metaphysical assumption and no farther. *Our* metaphysical assumptions (often, by the way, not recognised as such) are orthodox and admissible; any others are

heterodox and altogether damnable." Such an *a priori* attitude savors so strongly of dogmatism that it may be set on one side for the ultramontane pulpits of pseudo-science.

A position deserving of more respectful consideration is taken up by those who urge that there is nothing in the observed facts of biology to justify the assumption of the special operation of a distinctively vital force. Here the metaphysician must accept the data afforded to him by science. He must study at first or second hand the observed phenomena and endeavor to determine whether chemical and physical forces adequately account for them without remainder. He in turn must studiously avoid dogmatism; and even if there seem to be a remainder must invoke a specially vital force only as an hypothesis, the final necessity for which time alone can decide.

Now the question thus suggested is really an exceedingly difficult one to answer. For if vital processes are, as many contend, due to the subtle and intricate interaction of those forces whose simpler and less compounded action is familiar in the inorganic world, this very complexity, precluding, as it does, effective analysis under the conditions presented by the living organism, may be held sufficient to account for any apparent idiosyncrasy in the resultants. On the other hand those who take a different view and contend that in addition to complex physical and chemical reactions, admittedly present, there is a remainder for which these forces fail to render an adequate account, may urge that this complexity serves merely to hide from all but the most searching scrutiny the essentially vital changes with which they are associated. And here lies the peculiar interest and value of the contention so ably put forward by Professor Japp in the address on which I ventured to comment in the last essay. For he there urged that life-products have certain optical properties which imply a selective agency of a kind otherwise unknown,—of a kind which cannot reasonably be attributed to the interaction of forces familiar to the student of chemistry and physics. If this contention be well founded, we have, as Professor Japp points out (though he must not be held responsible for this way of putting it) just the kind of

evidence which is held by the metaphysician to justify the assumption of a special vital principle.

But even suppose that criticism and further knowledge render the conception of a specially differentiated vital force untenable, and demonstrate that life-processes owe their peculiarity wholly to certain intricate interactions of chemical and physical forces, it must again be pointed out that the existence of these forces is a metaphysical assumption, and that the term vital may still be conveniently applicable to the peculiarity of this particular mode of interaction which is found nowhere else in nature.

Let us, however, leaving generalities, bring the question down to the level of the practical experience, of, let us say, the embryologist who is dealing with the development of the chick in the egg. First, there is the series of changes in the nucleus of the ovum, the orderly marshalling and splitting of microscopic rods of deeply staining substance, and all the subtle attractions and repulsions involved in the maturation of the reproductive cell; next there is the further series of changes accompanying the union of sperm-nucleus and egg-nucleus in the process of fertilisation when the attractions have all the appearance of being highly special in their nature and peculiar not only to life but to this particular phase of life. Then there is the repeated division of the new combined nucleus and the formation of the superficial patch of delicate skin-like tissue known as the blastoderm; and following this the gradual differentiation of cell-products into the three layers from which all the organs and tissues are formed by further differentiation of structure with physiological division of labor. We need not follow the familiar stages of development in detail, the origin of blood-vessels and blood-cells, the formation of the axial supporting rod or notochord, the establishment of the central nervous system, the outgrowth of efferent and the ingrowth of afferent nerve-axes, the development of sense-organs, the setting aside of patches of relatively undifferentiated cells in the lining of the body-cavity for reproductive purposes, the differentiation of the kidneys and their ducts and the closely associated ducts of the reproductive system, all the orderly outgrowths from the alimentary tube with the formation of lungs,

liver, and pancreas, the establishment of cartilage and its conversion into duly related bones, the production by the skin of claws, beak, and down-feathers, and in general all the differentiations of cell-structure and cell-products which, under appropriate conditions of warmth and moisture, accompany the passage from the relatively simple egg into that marvellous going concern which emerges as a chick.

Now we must once more distinguish, even at the risk of wearisome reiteration, between the scientific explanation of these phenomena and the metaphysical implications which they may (or may not) suggest. Granted that the whole series of changes is an orderly sequence; granted that a full knowledge of any one stage would enable us accurately to predict the next stage on the basis of previous experience; granted that an adequate study of this and many other particular cases of development would enable us to formulate the generalised results of the knowledge gained by experience in the form of embryological laws; granted that by yet further extension of our knowledge the whole, on deeper analysis, could be expressed in terms of the movements of material particles, atomic or molecular; granted that the laws of the character and rate of these movements could be duly formulated; granted finally that the whole series of evolutionary changes, stretching back into a dim and remote past, could be summed up and presented to the eye and the intellect of science; then the whole problem would be completely solved from the strictly scientific standpoint without the introduction of a single metaphysical assumption. We are indeed at present far enough off from any such complete solution; but any objection based on such grounds may be ruled out as not to the point. If the groundwork and foundations of our science are secure—and this groundwork is (again *pace* Dr. Mivart) not composed of metaphysical assumptions but of the data and laws of experience—such a solution may be foreseen, if never reached, by carrying the curve of scientific progress to its ideal limit. Here science reaches the end of its tether. Its range is surely wide enough to satisfy the hungriest of scientific appetites. But the intellect of man is omnivorous and not to be satisfied. It says: "Notwithstanding this

rich table of knowledge you set before me, I still have a craving for another kind of food,—the reason of it all; what makes the particles move as we see them move; what drives the wheels of life, as it drives the planets in their courses; what impels the egg to go through its series of developmental changes; what hurries on the frog through its strange life-history?" Now, the answer of metaphysical agnosticism to all this is simply: We don't know; which is an honest confession of ignorance. The answer of the scoffer is: I don't care; which sounds strange from the lips of a rational being. The answer of the metaphysician at the present stage of our inquiry is, Force. This Force is assumed to be self-existent. Phenomenal sequence is regarded as the effect; noumenal Force the cause. It is pure assumption and may be safely disregarded by the man of science as such.

But if we introduce the conception of Force at all; if we speak of physical and chemical forces, let us be consistent and assume the omnipresence of Force throughout the universe of phenomena. The development of the egg, not less than the fall of a stone or the formation of a chemical compound, must be attributed to Force in general and to the play of forces in detail. Whether the sequence of embryological changes, hinted at rather than described above, necessitates a special manifestation of Force, termed vital, or a special mode of synthesis, which may also be termed vital, or simply expresses the resultants of a complex interaction of forces familiar in the inorganic sphere, we will not attempt to determine. The scientific data on which alone metaphysics can base its conclusions are insufficient. This, however, we may affirm: that if the conception of Force be introduced in any form, it is introduced as a metaphysical assumption; and if there be a special vital force, or a specially vital combination of inorganic forces—that is to say, differential modes of manifestation of the self-existent Cause—there is nothing here that may not be paralleled in other parts of the realm of nature. But, in the interests alike of science and of metaphysics, let us above all things distinguish carefully the problems of the one from the problems of the others.

BRISTOL, ENGLAND.

C. LLOYD MORGAN.

## FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE'S UEBERMENSCH.

PHILOSOPHY in its narrow sense has come to-day to comprehend a great deal. It embraces not only the sciences that the university world considers, to which the last generation has added physiological psychology, but also such speculative results as transcend the circumscribed bounds of human knowledge and constitute systems whose purpose it is to satisfy the needs of a manifold human life. The investigations of the former may have enduring worth, as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, or Lotze's *Metaphysics*; the latter, however, are wholly dependent on the *Zeitgeist*. When the latter meet the demands of the age that gives them birth, they immediately find an enthusiastic reception, and the fame of their promulgator reaches the remotest ends of the earth. Think of Hegel in the thirties and forties. However, just as soon as the character of the age changes, the new world-deliverer who appeared to bring humanity the light of salvation sinks into oblivion, and the deepest problems that fill the human breast remain in insoluble darkness. Every great world-movement in the philosophy of life is followed with the regularity of nature itself by an opposing movement. Hegel gave way to Schopenhauer, and Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, whose philosophy may be considered the dominant philosophy of the last decade of the new German Empire.

In the fifties, when a period of political tyranny resulting from the revolutionary movement of 1848 oppressed Germany, and the people lapsed into a state of hopeless despondency, the pessimism of Schopenhauer, which had thus far been ignored, was welcomed in almost every German home. By many the question whether life



was worth living was answered with an emphatic negative. Germany lent an attentive ear to the words of the great Frankfort prophet, who belittled existence and praised non-existence as the only happy condition. "Why this farce of life," he asked, "which on a small scale is a comedy and on a large scale a tragedy?"

However, the character of the age changed. As a result of the glorious victory over France, the despondency of the national mind was dissipated, and the consciousness of the individual regained its supremacy. The new German Empire sprang into existence, and in all fields of human endeavor there was a marvellous awakening. Is it any wonder that under conditions so radically altered an apostle of negation could no longer obtain a hearing? The Germans had gained the courage to affirm life, and looked hopefully into the future. The new German Empire demanded a philosophy which extolled this world, teaching that it was a place where the highest development might be attained. The intellectual giant Nietzsche, with his wonderful power of intuition discerning the needs of his age, an age characterised by restless, nervous, unceasing activity, affirmed life to the negation of all else. He advocated that the individual should be true to self, that is, should sacrifice the world on the altar of self. The non-ego must serve the ego, and the ego should dare to have no restraints.

Friedrich Nietzsche, son of a minister, was born in 1844 near Naumburg, a little city in the Prussian province of Saxony. The distinguished father died when his son was quite young, thus leaving the latter to develop in the freest manner under the tender influences of a loving mother and an affectionate sister. He was a marvellously precocious child. The work of his boyhood days was prophetic of the great rôle he was to play in the philosophy of the new German Empire. He himself tells us that when only thirteen years old he took hold of the problem of evil. "In an age," he says, "when thoughts on childhood's diversions and the Architect of the universe alternate in the undeveloped intellect, I dedicated to this problem my first literary effort, my first philosophical essay. If you would know my solution of this problem, I will own that I gave God the honor of making him Father of evil." When only

twenty-four he became professor of classical philology in Basel, a Swiss university. However, his work had been and was still to be greatly interrupted by poor health. He many times suffered excruciating pain in his eyes and head, and was finally compelled to withdraw temporarily from the university. He went to Sorrento, a health resort, in the hope of finding there a cure; however, he was disappointed. Often the supremest wish of his life was that death might come and give him a speedy release from his torment. Instead of sparing his intensely nervous nature that it might have a chance to recuperate, he resigned himself entirely to the developing of his ideas: he worked incessantly. Even during the progress of the Franco-Prussian war, the unparalleled enthusiasm and jubilation of his victorious people left him absolutely unmoved in the retracy of his Alpine home, where he sat buried in his meditations on the fascinating problems of Greek and Roman culture.

In 1874 he was obliged to resign his professorship. His health had grown so much worse that he was incapacitated from performing the duties which his chair imposed upon him. Still, even in the most trying moments of his suffering, something spurred and goaded him to reveal that which a long time had lain fermenting in the depths of his fiery intellect. He, the incurable invalid, who endured pain as few have been compelled to suffer, became so intoxicated by the beautiful dreams of his fervid imagination that he grew almost oblivious of his bodily torment. His phantasy held before him in perfected form the ideal of a more highly developed, superior man, the *Uebermensch*, whom in the 'Eighties he introduced with subtle and irresistible eloquence to the world.

In his books, particularly *Morgenröte* (1881), *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882), *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883-84), *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1886), *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (1887), *Götzendämmerung* (1889), he infused his fiery soul, coined his life's blood. "Of all that has been written," he says, "only that is worth while which has been written with blood. Write with blood, and you will realise that blood is spirit." He created a language of his own, over whose powers he wielded uncontrolled dominion. His words, which are winged with inspiration, reveal not only the sparkle and

heat, but also the fire of a great personality. "They rival painting in rendering nature, and music in reproducing sound." His style is characterised by idiomatic beauty, refined delicacy, epigrammatic sparkle, and subtle eloquence; it is the incarnation of his mighty individuality. Thoughts crowded irresistibly on his fertile mind, which in the first fire of inspiration, directly after they had arranged themselves, he put into tangible form. However, this flood of thoughts, the product of an overworked intellect, finally undermined the philosopher's nervous system. In 1889 the catastrophe came. The incurable invalid lost his mind, and had to be taken to the Jena insane asylum.

It was largely hatred of decadent humanity, with its low aims and ideals, that led Nietzsche to portray a higher type of man. He gives a picture of our present age that borders on caricature, an age which he claims fosters only degenerate human beings and destroys in their incipency all movements that give promise of greatness. There is a complete absence of individuals, we are told, that have the ability to dominate the masses. Everywhere we find only the average man, *das zahme Haustier, ein Stück Heerdenvieh*, who has no will of his own, but is submissive to the great majority. Everywhere exist proletarian instincts, which render the development of a really superior nature an impossibility.

"Bad air, bad air," exclaims our philosopher with emphasis. In bad air only herd instincts can exist; all strong and healthful instincts are destroyed. Consigned by birth to surroundings which mean degeneration and death, we are greatly handicapped; but there is no reason why we should not strive to create a new environment, wherein we might breathe the pure air of a higher and fuller life. Unfortunately, our cowardly consciences forbid our doing this. We suffer from satiety, weariness of self, and grow sick because of the imbecility of our wills: all the result of cowardly consciences. Disease of conscience, the greatest and most lamentable affection from which humanity has never recovered, deprives us of the courage to affirm life joyously and of the power to act nobly. It is the radical evil of our civilisation, whose infected atmosphere sees only proletarian instincts thrive. Those who might

develop into superior men suppress higher instincts, do the will of the majority, and are contented if in the course of a lifetime they gain, as a result of careful management, a good pastureland, on which they may graze in peace during their last days.

To rid ourselves of the faults of our modern culture, Nietzsche proposes to do nothing less than to create a new system of morals: there shall be an *Umwertung aller Werte*. A great, strong, superior man shall take the place of the world's *fin-de-siècle* imbecile. Time was when the decadent weaklings of to-day quickly succumbed in the struggle of existence, and when our false system of morals had no significance. Nietzsche refers to the civilisations of Greece and Rome, which represent the realisation of his ideals. It was first Nietzsche's intention to resurrect the Greek and Roman worlds, and on them, as a basis, to establish a new culture, a sort of second Renaissance. Among the Greeks and Romans the ideas conveyed by the words "good" and "evil," morally considered, were quite different from those of to-day. That was good which was strong, healthy, powerful, arbitrary, selfish, cruel: such one had to be to be a master, a high type of man. That was evil which was weak, sickly, humble, miserable, unhappy: such was the slave, the low type of man. Nietzsche admired particularly the old Romans because they said to the world, "The will of Rome be done," and it was done. Here genuine greatness was to be found; here was to be found the proper way of regarding things.

However, the slaves of the ancient world revolted, overcame the masters whom they had feared, and a directly opposite system of morals came into existence: Christianity succeeded Heathenism. It was an awful insurrection in the moral world, an insurrection in which the instincts of the weak triumphed over the instincts of the strong. Through Christianity the slaves took the most fearful revenge on their masters. The whole moral world assumed another aspect. All ethical notions grew to be different from what they had been under the rule of the masters. Good meant only that which arose from weakness: fear, humility, self-denial. These became the virtues of the new system of morals. All that before had been considered good was, according to the new code of morals,

considered evil, and *vice versa*. Thus the world became filled with despair. All consciousness of joy was suppressed. The Christian doctrines gained dominancy. To the weak, life was a burden, and they sought consolation in anticipation of future happiness. Existence they considered naught: in itself it meant nothing; it needed another and better life to make it complete. Those who were promised the haven of rest, the joys of a more perfect world, were the weak. The strong would have difficulty in gaining entrance. The result was that the virtues arising from weakness were sought and considered the end of human endeavor. On the other hand, the virtues arising from strength were suppressed, and the tame *Haustier* man was bred. During the Renaissance the lofty ideals of life cherished by the ancient Greeks and Romans again showed signs of gaining realisation; but with the democratic movement of the Reformation the vulgar instincts and impulses of the masses gained the upper hand. The Revolution also was a genuine plebeian movement, which saw the triumph of proletarianism. Of the few men of modern times whom Nietzsche would call really great, Napoleon is the most perfect representative of the *Uebersch.*

Nietzsche hates Christianity, with its odor of plebeianism, with its prayerful and penitential atmosphere, with its hypocritical air of humility and self-abnegation, all of which are an indication of weakness. He calls the religion of the humble Nazarene the greatest example of counterfeiting the world has produced. Its system, based on love, is the direct cause of the degeneration of the strong and the elevation of the weak. Christianity, as well as every other system of belief and morals that savors of proletarianism, must be overcome. The weak must perish because they hinder the development and delay the coming of the *Uebersch.* Instead of slave morals we must have master morals; instead of the rule of the many, the rule of the few; instead of a high proletariat and low aristocracy, a low proletariat and high aristocracy. Let the masses sink as low as they will; the classes must be highly bred. Occasionally there arises from the quagmire of plebeianism a Napoleon, whose will becomes the will of his age. To tell the truth, though, it is always a very fortunate combination of circum-

stances which produces such ideal types, because the world's theory of life is so hopelessly low. When, however, the morals which Nietzsche advocates become humanity's rule of life, then such god-like mortals will constitute the regnant minority.

The *Uebersch* of Nietzsche is a full-blooded, highly-bred man, with sound and healthful instincts and impulses, which he obeys absolutely, regardless of everything.—a man who allows none of the instincts and impulses which nature has given him to degenerate. The development of a regnant will, which shall never be thwarted, and which is the basis of the *Uebersch's* whole being, is the high purpose of this magnificent specimen of the genus *homo*. All of the activities of the intellect are only manifestations of the regnant will. The great philosophies of every age have had only one endeavor, and that is, having made the world a product of thought, to place it into the hands of the will to be moulded. The history of philosophy is the history of the intellect translating itself into the forms of volition.

The *Uebersch* recognises no higher power than himself, be it God or man. He obeys only the dictates of his own nature, does only his own regnant will. There is no God, he says. Belief in a God he declares to be a delusion. If a God exist, so his inner nature tells him, it is a being capable of limitless pleasure. Only the weak consider the voice of conscience the voice of a higher power. The *Uebersch* acts just like a child: he never asks, Shall I do this or shall I do that? but he obeys the dictates of his inner nature and does his regnant will. No code of morals binds him. What are the codes of morals that exist among the civilised nations of the earth? Simply the habits and customs of the great masses. And what, pray, are the habits and customs of the world's proletariat compared with the instincts and impulses of the *Uebersch's* superior mind? The fact is, no existing code of morals could possibly bind the *Uebersch*, because he is *jenseits von Gut und Böse* in the common acceptation of these words. However, he gives good and evil other meanings. Good is to him that which serves life and the regnant will; evil is that which hinders life in its highest development and prevents the free action of the regnant will.



Only when a man obeys the dictates of his inner nature and does his regnant will may his actions be denominated good in the morals of the *Uebersch*. The *Uebersch* makes his will regnant against a world of opposition. He loves conflict because it awakens and strengthens his powers. Pity is to him an unknown feeling. If he were to exercise pity, it would be a sign of weakness, degeneration. All the great civilisations of the past saw in pity an element of weakness.

To the extermination of whatever stands in the way of the *Uebersch*, Nietzsche lends a moral sanction. Thus the *Uebersch* is a sort of beast of prey: he sees in life nothing more, or little more, than appropriating, robbing, overcoming, destroying. In a word, the *Uebersch* is a sovereign individual, who, possessed of boundless power, sacrifices the world on the altar of self. Christ sought to deny self, and sacrificed self that others might live; the *Uebersch* seeks to elevate self and to sacrifice others. Christ sought peace; the *Uebersch* seeks strife. He is supremely happy when he can rise on the dead and wounded bodies of the weak; this strengthens his feeling of cruelty. Christ despised this life, because it is only a probationary period, and reward follows. The *Uebersch* honors this life because he knows no other; to him it may be the means of the highest development, the source of the greatest pleasure.

V This is Nietzscheism. To understand how Germany could produce so great an anarchist in the world of thought, one must know the Germany of the new German Empire. The influence of Nietzsche, the most popular thinker of the present generation, is simply phenomenal, far greater than that of any other widely known world-deliverer since the days of Schopenhauer. In the whole modern international literature echo the resounding notes of the new philosophy of life. Even Ibsen, who must be considered the greatest realist of this age, is a poetic promulgator of many of Nietzsche's teachings. X Among others, four things have worked most potently in creating for Nietzsche a school of votaries who see in their teacher a new world-deliverer: these are the charm of

his style, the beauty of his thought, the greatness of his message, and the magic of his personality.

The right of the individual to obey absolutely all the instincts and impulses of his nature, to make his will regnant, whatever oppose it, to free himself from the habits and customs of our decadent age, to exalt self and the few who can rise, and degrade the many who must succumb that the few may rise the higher,—this is Nietzscheism, these are the claims of the *fin-de-siècle* world, to which Nietzsche has given the most lucid, concise, and powerful expression. Therefore, he who will know the *Zeitgeist* must know Nietzsche, of whom Richard Wagner said: "*O Freund! Genau genommen, sind Sie, nach meiner Frau, der einzige Gewinn, den mir das Leben zugeführt.*"

PYRMONT, GERMANY.  
GERMANTOWN, O.

HEINRICH GOEBEL.  
ERNEST ANTRIM.

## IMMORALITY AS A PHILOSOPHIC PRINCIPLE.

### NIETZSCHE'S EMOTIONALISM.

PHILOSOPHIES are world-conceptions presenting three main features: (1) A systematic comprehension of the knowledge of their age; (2) An emotional attitude toward the cosmos; and (3) A principle that will serve as a basis for rules of conduct. The first feature determines the worth of the several philosophical systems in the history of mankind, being the gist of that which will last, and giving them strength and backbone. The second one, however, appeals powerfully to the sentiments of those who are imbued with the same spirit and thus constitutes its immediate acceptability; while the ethics of a philosophy becomes the test by which its use and practicability can be measured. Our own ideal has been to harmonise these three features, by making the first the regulator of the second and basis of the third. What we need is truth; our fundamental emotion must be truthfulness, and our ethics must be a living of the truth. Truth is not something that we can fashion according to our pleasure; it is not subjective; its very nature is objectivity; but we must render it subjective by a love of truth; we must make it our own, and by doing so our conduct in life will unfailingly adjust itself. Former philosophies made the subjective element predominant, and thus every philosopher worked out a philosophy of his own, endeavoring to be individual and original. The aim of our philosophy has been to reduce the subjective to its proper sphere, and to establish, in agreement with the scientific spirit of the age, a philosophy of objective validity.

Among all the philosophies of modern times there is perhaps

none which in its inmost principle is more thoroughly opposed to our own than Nietzsche's, and yet there are some points of mutual contact which are well worth being pointed out. The problem which is at the basis of Nietzsche's thought is the same as in our philosophy, but our solution is radically different.<sup>1</sup>

Friedrich Nietzsche is a philosopher who astonishes his readers by the boldness with which he rebels against every tradition; tearing down the holiest and dearest things, preaching destruction of all rule, and looking with disdain upon the heap of ruins in which his revolutionary thoughts would leave the world.



FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.

For more than a century Germany has been the storm-center of philosophical thought. The commotions that started in the Fatherland reached other countries, France, England, and the United States, after they had lost their force at home. Kant's transcendentalism and Hegel's phenomenalism began to flourish among the English-speaking races after having become almost extinct in the home of their founders. Prof. R. M. Wenley of the

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<sup>1</sup> For an account of Nietzsche's life and works we refer the reader to the article "Friedrich Nietzsche's Uebermensch," by Drs. Goebel and Antrim in the present number of *The Monist*.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., expresses this truth with his native Scotch wit in the statement which I do not hesitate to endorse, that "German professors when they die go to Oxford."

It is now about time that Schopenhauerianism and Nietzscheanism should reach us. The former has made its influence felt for a considerable time, and the latter is just making its appearance. Schopenhauer has been introduced to Anglo-Saxon readers by Haldane and Bailey Saunders; and Macmillan & Co. are now publishing translations of Nietzsche's works.<sup>1</sup>

Nietzsche represents a type of most modern date. He is a genius after the heart of Lombroso. He is abnormal,<sup>2</sup> titanic in his pretensions and aims, and, breaking down under the burden of his own thought, tragically ends his career in an insane asylum.

The mental derangement of Nietzsche may be an unhappy accident but appears to come as the natural result of his philosophy. Nietzsche, by nature modest and tractable, almost submissive, was, as a thinker, too proud to submit to anything, not even to truth. Schopenhauer had taught him that the intellect, the comprehension of truth, is a mere slave of the will. Truth has a purpose; it must accommodate itself to the self; the self is sovereign; the self wants to assert itself; the self alone has a right to exist; and the self that does not dare to be itself is a servile, menial creature. Therefore Nietzsche preaches the ethics of self-assertion and pride. He is too proud to recognise the duty of inquiry, the duty of adapting his

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<sup>1</sup> Macmillan wisely began with the most noted books of Nietzsche's works, viz., *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Vol. VIII.; *A Genealogy of Morals and Poems*, Vol. X.; and *The Case of Wagner*, *The Twilight of the Idols*, *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, Vol. XI. We hope that the plan of publishing Nietzsche's complete works will not be abandoned.

<sup>2</sup> It is characteristic of Nominalistic thinkers, viz., of all those who do not recognise an objective norm for truth, health, reason, and normality of any kind, to regard the *average* as the sole method of finding a norm. If, however, the average type is the standard of measurement, the unusually excellent specimens, being rare in number, must be classed together with all other deviations from the average, and thus the genius is regarded as abnormal as much as the criminal,—a theory which has found many admirers in this age that is sicklied over with agnosticism, the modern offshoot of nominalism. The truth is that true genius (not the pseudo-genius of erratic minds, not the would-be genius of those who make a failure of life) is uncommonly normal,—I had almost said "abnormally normal."

mind to the world, or of recognising the cosmic order of the universe as superior to his self. He feels bigger than the cosmos; he is himself; and he wants to be himself. His own self is sovereign; and if the world is not satisfied to submit to his will, the world may go to ruin; if it breaks to pieces, it will cause him to laugh only; even if, on the other hand, his self in this conflict is forced to the wall, he will still not suffer himself from very pride to abandon his principle of the absolute sovereignty of selfhood.

Nietzsche's philosophy is unique in being throughout the expression of an emotion,—the proud sentiment of a self-sufficient sovereignty. It rejects with disdain both the methods of the intellect, which submits the problems of life to an investigation, and the demands of morality, which recognise the existence of duty. Nietzsche claims that there is no objective science save by the permission of the sovereign self, nor is there any "ought," except for slaves. He prides himself as "the first Immoralist."

#### NIETZSCHE THE NOMINALIST.

The history of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, according to Nietzsche, is a progress of the idea that objective truth (a conception of "the true world") is not only not attainable, but that it does not exist at all. He expresses this idea in his *Twilight of the Idols*, English edition, pp. 122-123, under the caption "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable," which reads as follows:

"The true world attainable by the wise, the pious, and the virtuous man,—he lives in it, he embodies it.

"(Oldest form of the idea, relatively rational, simple, and convincing. Transcription of the proposition, 'I, Plato, am the truth.')

"2. The true world unattainable at present, but promised to the wise, the pious, and the virtuous man (to the sinner who repents).

"(Progress of the idea: it becomes more refined, more insidious, more incomprehensible,—it becomes feminine, it becomes Christian.)

"3. The true world unattainable, undemonstrable, and unable to be promised; but even as conceived, a comfort, an obligation, and an imperative.

"(The old sun still, but shining only through mist and scepticism; the idea become sublime, pale, northerly, Koenigsbergian.)

"4. The true world—unattainable? At any rate unattained. And being un-



attained also unknown. Consequently also neither comforting, saving, nor obligatory: what obligation could anything unknown lay upon us?

"(Gray morning. First yawning of reason. Cock-crowing of Positivism.)

"5. The 'true world'—an idea neither good for anything, nor even obligatory any longer,—an idea become useless and superfluous; consequently a refuted idea: let us do away with it!

"(Full day; breakfast; return of *bon sens* and cheerfulness; Plato blushing for shame; infernal noise of all free intellects.)

"6. We have done away with the true world: what world is left? perhaps the seeming? . . . But no! in doing away with the true, we have also done away with the seeming world!

"(Noon; the moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; climax of mankind: *Incipit Zarathustra!*")

The reader will ask, "What next?" Probably afternoon and evening, and then in the night the sun, which (according to Nietzsche) grew pale in the morning, will shine again.

According to Nietzsche the universe is not a cosmos but a chaos. He says (*La Gaya Scienza*, German edition, p. 148):

"The astral order in which we live is an exception. This order and the relative stability which is thereby caused, made the exception of exceptions possible,—the formation of organisms. The character-total of the world is into all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a missing necessity, but of missing order, articulation, form, beauty, wisdom, and as all our æsthetic humanities may be called."

In agreement with this conception of order, Nietzsche says of man, the rational animal:

"I fear that animals look upon man as a being of their own kind, which in a most dangerous way has lost the sound animal-sense,—as a lunatic animal, a laughing animal, a crying animal, a miserable animal." (*La Gaya Scienza*, German edition, p. 196.)

Man's reason, according to the consistent Nominalist view, is purely subjective and has no prototype in the objective world. John Stuart Mill regards the theorems of logic and mathematics, not only not as truths, but as positive untruths. He says:

"The points, lines, circles, and squares, which any one has in his mind, are (I apprehend) simply copies of the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience. Our idea of a point, I apprehend to be simply our idea of the *minimum visible*, the smallest portion of surface which we can see. A line, as defined by geometers, is wholly inconceivable. We can reason about a line as

if it had no breadth; because we have a power, which is the foundation of all the control we can exercise over the operations of our minds; the power, when a perception is present to our senses, or a conception to our intellects, of *attending* to a part only of that perception or conception, instead of the whole. But we cannot *conceive* a line without breadth; we can form no mental picture of such a line: all the lines which we have in our minds are lines possessing breadth."

Nietzsche shows his nominalistic tendencies by repeatedly pronouncing the same propositions in almost literally the same words,<sup>1</sup> without, however, acknowledging the school in which he picked up this error.

It is quite true that mathematical lines and circles are human conceptions, but they are not purely subjective conceptions, still less untruths; they are great and important discoveries. They are not arbitrarily devised but constructed according to the laws of the uniformities that dominate existence. They represent actual features of the objective universe, and thus only is it possible that the astronomer through the calculation of mathematical curves can predict the motion of the stars. Reason is the key to the universe, because it is the reflex of the cosmic order, and the cosmic order, the intrinsic regularity and immanent harmony of the uniformities of nature are not a subjective illusion but an objective reality.

When Goethe claims that all things transitory are symbols of that which is intransitory and eternal, Nietzsche answers that the idea of anything intransitory is a mere symbol, and God (the idea of anything eternal) a poet's lie.

Like a mocking-bird, the nominalist philosopher imitates the ring of Goethe's lines, saying:

"Das Unvergängliche  
Ist nur dein Gleichniss.  
Gott der Verfängliche  
Ist Dichter-Erschleichniss.  
Weltspiel, das herrische,  
Mischt Sein und Schein :—  
Das Ewig-Närrische  
Mischt uns—hinein."

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<sup>1</sup>*La Gaya Scienza*, German edition, p. 154; and *passim* in *Menschliches*, etc.

Nietzsche does not believe in truth: "There is probability, but no truth," says he in *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten*, p. 190; and he adds concerning the measure of the value of truth (*ibid.*, Aphorism 4):

"The trouble of ascending mountains is no measure of their height, and should it be different in Science?"

It is true that such words as *long* and *short* are relative, because dependent on subjective needs and valuations. But must we for that reason give up all hope of describing facts in objective terms? Are not metres and foot-measures definite magnitudes, whether or not they be *long* for one purpose and *short* for another? Relativity itself admits of a description in objective terms; and if a statement of facts in objective terms were impossible, the ideals of exact science (as all ideals) would be a dream.

That Nietzsche prefers the abrupt style of aphorisms to dispassionate inquisitions is a symptom that betrays the nature of his philosophy.

While Nietzsche's philosophy is in itself inconsistent and illogical, it is yet born of the logic of facts; it is the consistent result and legitimate conclusion of principles which have been uttered centuries ago and have slowly matured in the historical development of human thought.

The old nominalistic school is the father of Nietzsche's philosophy. A consistent nominalist will be driven from one conclusion to another until he reaches the stage of Nietzsche which is philosophical anarchism and extreme individualism.

The nominalist denies the reality of reason; he regards the existence of universals as a fiction, and looks upon the world as a heap of particulars. He loses sight of the unity of the world and forgets that form is a true feature of things. It is form and the sameness of the laws of form which makes universality of reason possible.

Nominalism rose in opposition to the mediæval realism of the schoolmen who looked upon universals as real and concrete things, representing them as individual beings that existed *ante res*, *in rebus*, and *post res*, i. e., in the particulars, before them and after them.

The realists were wrong in so far as they conceived universals as substances or distinct essences, supposed to be of a more spiritual nature than material things, but after all concrete existences they were said to have been created by God and served him as models for the creation of things, of which they were deemed to be the prototypes and conditions. The nominalists, on the other hand, went too far also in denying the reality of universals and declaring that universals were mere names (*nomina* and *flatus vocis*), i. e., words invented for the sake of conveniently thinking things and nothing else.

At the bottom of the controversy lies the problem as to the nature of things. The question arises, What are things in themselves? Do things, or do they not, possess an independence of their own? Kant's reply is, that things in themselves cannot be known; but our reply is, that the nature of a thing consists in its form; a thing is such as it is because it has a definite form. Therefore "things in themselves" do not exist; but there are "forms in themselves."

Form is not a non-entity but the most important feature of reality, and the pure laws of form are the determinative factors of the world. The sciences of the laws of pure form, logic, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, etc., are therefore the key to a comprehension of the world, and morality is the realisation of ideals, i. e., of the conceptions of pure forms, which are higher, nobler, and better than those which have been actualised.

From our standpoint, evolution is a process in which the eternal laws of being manifest themselves in a series of regular transformations, reaching a point at which sentiency appears. And then evolution takes the shape of progress, that is to say, sentient beings develop mind; sentiments become sensations, i. e., representative images; and words denote the universals. Then reason originates as a reflex of the eternal laws of pure form. Human reason is deepened in a scientific world-conception, and becoming aware of the moral aspect of universality it broadens out into comprehensive sympathy with all forms of existence that like ourselves aspire after a fuller comprehension of existence.

Thus the personality of man is the reflex of that system of eternalities which sways the universe, and humanity is thus found to be a revelation of the core of the cosmos, an incarnation of Godhood. This revelation, however, is not closed. The appearance of the religions of good-will and mutual sympathy is the beginning merely of a new era, and we may expect that the future of mankind will surpass the present, as much as the present surpasses savagery. That is the higher humanity, the over-man, whom we expect.

Nietzsche's philosophy of "immorality" appears on the horizon of human thought as a unique conception which seems to be ushered into this world without any preparation and without any precedence. It sets itself up against tradition. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's immediate predecessor, regarded history as the desolate dream of mankind, and Nietzsche exhibits a remorseless contempt for everything that comes to us as a product of history. Nietzsche scorns not only law and order, Church and State, but also reason, argument, and rule; he scorns consistency and logic which are regarded as toys for weaklings or as the tools of the crafty.

Nietzsche is a nominalist with a vengeance. His philosophy is particularism carried to extremes. There is no unity of existence to him. The god-idea is dead, not only the old metaphysical notion of a God-individual, but also God in the sense of the ultimate ground of being, the supreme norm of the cosmos. His world is split up into particular selves. He does not ask how they originated; he only knows that they are here. Above all, he knows that his own self is here, and there is no bond of sympathy between his self and other selves. Democracy is an abomination to him, and he despises the gospel of love as it is preached by both Christ and Buddha. This is the key to his anti-moralism and to the doctrine of the autonomy of selfhood.

Nietzsche's philosophy might be called philosophical nihilism, if he did not object to the word. He calls it positivism, but it is particularism, or rather an aristocratic individualism which plays in the domain of thought the same rôle that political nihilism plays in Russia. It is the philosophy of protest, and Nietzsche is conscious

of being a Slav in thought and aspiration. Nor does he forget that his ancestors belonged to the nobility. He claims to have been descended from a Polish nobleman by the name of Niëtzki, a Protestant who came to Germany in the eighteenth century as a religious refugee.<sup>1</sup>

He who has faith in truth accepts it as authority; he who accepts truth as authority recognises duty; he who recognises duty beholds a goal of life, he has found a purpose for which life appears worth living; he reaches out beyond the bounds of his narrow individuality into the limitless cosmos. He transcends himself, he grows in truth, he increases in power, he widens in his sympathies.

But, he who rejects truth cuts himself loose from the fountain-head of the waters of life. He may deify selfhood, but his self will die of its own self-apotheosis. His divinity is not a true God-incarnation, it is mere assumption and self-exaltation of a pretender.

Nietzsche's philosophy is more consistent than it appears on its face. Being the negation of the right of consistency, its lack of consistency is its most characteristic feature. If the intellect is truly, as Schopenhauer suggests, the servant of the will, then there is no authority in reason, and arguments have no strength. All quarrels are simply questions of power. Then, there is Might, but not Right; Right is simply the *bon plaisir* of Might. Then there is no good nor evil; good is that which I will, bad is that which threatens to thwart my will. Good and evil are distinctions invented for the enslavement of the masses, but the free man, the genius, the aristocrat, who craftily tramples the masses under foot, knows no difference. He is beyond good and evil.

This, indeed, is the consequence which Nietzsche boldly draws. It is a consistent anarchism, a courageous immoralism, and a proud aristocratism, the ruthless shout of triumph of the victor who hails the doctrine of the survival of the strongest and craftiest as a "joyful science."

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<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche's love of Slavism manifested itself in his childhood, for when the news of the fall of Sebastopol became known, Nietzsche, at that time a mere boy was so dejected that he could not eat and gave expression to his chagrin in mournful strains of verse.



Nietzsche would not refute the arguments of those who differ from him; for refutation of other views does not befit a positive mind who posits his own truth. "What have I to do with refutations," exclaims Nietzsche in the Preface to his *Genealogy of Morals*. The self is lord. There is no law for the lord, and so he denounces the ethics of Christianity as slave-morality, and preaches the lord-morality of the strong which is self-assertion.

Morality itself is denounced by Nietzsche as immoral. Morality is the result of evolution, and man's moral ideals are products of conditions climatic, social, economical, national, religious, and what not. Why should we submit to the tyranny of a rule which after all proves to be a relic of barbarism? Nietzsche rejects morality as incompatible with the sovereignty of selfhood, and, pronouncing our former judgment a superstition, he proposes "a transvaluation of all values." The self must be established as supreme ruler, and therefore all rules, maxims, principles, must go, for the very convictions of a man are mere chains that fetter the freedom of his soul.

#### A PHILOSOPHY OF ORIGINALITY.

Nietzsche accepts the truth of evolution, but he does so for the purpose of protesting against that which exists, as having no right of existence, being the mere incidental product of a development.<sup>1</sup> He believes in evolution and in the higher condition of future progress, but instead of working for a development of the better from the best of the present, which is the method of nature, he shows his contempt for the human and all-too-human, he prophesies a deluge and hopes that from its floods the over-man will emerge whose seal of superiority will be the strength of the conqueror that enables him to survive in the struggle for existence.

Nietzsche has looked deeply into the apparent chaos of life

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<sup>1</sup> One would expect that Nietzsche, being a most one-sided Darwinist who believes in the struggle for life, red in tooth and claw, would look up to Darwin as his master. But Nietzsche recognises no master, and he emphasises this by speaking in his poetry of Darwin as "this English joker," whose "mediocre reasons are accepted for philosophy." See Nietzsche's poems in the appendix to *A Genealogy of Morals*, Eng. ed., p. 248.


that according to Darwin is a ruthless struggle for survival. He avoids the mistake of those sentimentalists who believe that goody-goodyness can rule the world, who underrate the worth of courage at the expense of humility, and who would venture to establish peace on earth by grounding arms. He sees the differences that exist between all things, the antagonism that obtains everywhere, and preferring to play the part of the hammer, he showers expressions of contempt upon the anvil.

And Nietzsche's self-assertion is immediate and direct. He does not pause to consider what his self is or how it originated. He takes it as it is and opposes it to the authority of other powers, the State, the Church, and the traditions of the past. An investigation of the nature of the self might have dispelled the illusion of his self-glorification, but he never thinks of analysing its constitution. Bluntly and without any reflexion or deliberation he claims the right of the sovereignty of self. He seems to forget that there are different selves, and that what we need most is a standard by which we can gauge their respective worth, and not an assertion of the rights of the self in general.

We do not intend to quarrel with Nietzsche's radicalism. Nor do we underrate the significance of the self. We, too, believe that every self has the liberty to choose its own position and may claim as many rights as it pleases. If it cannot maintain them it will be crushed; otherwise it may conquer its rivals and suppress counter-claims; but therefore the wise man looks before he leaps. Reckless self-assertion is the method of brute creation. Neither the lion nor the lamb meditate on their fate; they simply follow their instincts. They are carnivorous or herbivorous by nature through the karma of their ancestors. Man's karma, however, leads higher. Man can meditate on his own fate, and he can discriminate. His self is a personality, i. e., a self-controlled commonwealth of motor ideas. Man does not blindly follow his impulses but establishes rules of action. He thus can abbreviate the struggle and avoid unnecessary friction; he can rise from brute violence to a self-contained and well-disciplined strength. Self-control (i. e., ethical guidance) is the characteristic feature of the true "over-man"; but

Nietzsche knows nothing of self-control; he would allow the self blindly to assert itself after the fashion of animal instincts.

Nietzsche is the philosopher of instinct. He spurns all logical order, even truth itself. He has a contempt for every one who



IN THE PRIME OF LIFE.

learns from others, for he regards them as slaves to other people's thought. He says in his motto to the second edition of his *Gay Science*:

"Ich wohne in meinem eignen Haus,  
Hab' niemandem nie nichts nachgemacht

Und—lachte noch jeden Meister aus,  
Der nicht sich selber ausgelacht."<sup>1</sup>

We wonder that Nietzsche did not think of Goethe's little rhyme, which seems to suit his case exactly:

"A fellow says: 'I own no school or college;  
No master lives whom I acknowledge;  
And pray don't entertain the thought  
That from the dead I e'er learnt aught.'

This, if I rightly understand,  
Means: 'I'm a fool by own command.'"

Nietzsche observes that the thoughts of most philosophers are secretly guided by instincts. He feels that all thought is at bottom a "will for power," and the will for truth has no right to exist except it serve the will for power. He reproaches philosophers for glorifying truth.

Fichte in his *Duties of the Scholar* says:

"My life and my fate are nothing; but the results of my life are of great importance. I am a priest of Truth; I am in the service of Truth; I feel under obligation to do, to risk, and to suffer anything for truth."

Nietzsche declares that this is shallow. Will for truth, he says, should be called "will to make being thinkable." Here, it seems to us, Nietzsche simply replaces the word "truth" by one of its functions. Truth is a systematic representation of reality, a comprehensive description of facts; the result being that "existence is made thinkable."

Nietzsche is in a certain sense right when he says that truth in itself is nothing; for every representation of reality must serve a purpose, otherwise it is superfluous and useless. And the purpose of truth is the furtherance of life. Nietzsche instinctively hits the right thing in saying that at the bottom of philosophy there is the will for power. In spite of our school-philosophers' vain declamations of "science for its own sake," genuine philosophy will never be anything else than a method for the acquisition of power. But this method is truth. Nietzsche errs when he declares that "the

<sup>1</sup> "I live in my own house, have never imitated anybody, and have always laughed at every master who has not laughed at himself."

head is merely the intestine of the heart." The head endeavors to find out the truth, and the truth is not purely subjective. It is true that truth is no good to a man unless he makes it his own; he must possess it; it must be part of himself, but he cannot create it. Truth cannot be made; it must be discovered. Since the scholar's specialised business is the elucidation of the method of discovering the truth, not its purpose, not its application in practical life, Fichte's ideal of the aim of scholarship remains justified.

Omit the ideal of truth in a philosophy, and it becomes an *ignis fatuus*, a will-o'-the-wisp, that will lead people astray. Truth makes existence thinkable, but thinkableness alone is not as yet a test of truth. The ultimate test of truth is its practical application. There is something wrong with a theory that does not work, and thus the self has a master, which is reality, the world in which it lives, with its laws and actualities. The subjective self must measure its worth by the objective standard of truth,—to be obtained through exact inquiry and scientific investigation.

The will for power, in order to succeed, must be clarified by a methodical comprehension of facts and conditions. The contradictory impulses in our own self must be systematised so that they would not collide and mutually annihilate themselves; and the comprehension of this orderly disposition is called reason.

Nietzsche is on the right track when he ridicules such ideals as "virtue for the sake of virtue," and even "truth for the sake of truth." Virtue and truth are for the sake of life. They have not their purpose in themselves, but their nature consists in serving the expanse and further growth of the human soul. This is a truth which we have always insisted upon and which becomes apparent when those people who speak of virtue for its own sake try to define virtue, or determine the ultimate standard of right and wrong, of goodness and badness. We say, that that which enhances soul-growth, thus producing higher life and begetting a superior humanity, is good; while that which cripples or retards those aspirations is bad. Further, truth is not holy in itself. It becomes holy in the measure that it serves man's holiest aspirations. We sometimes meet among scientists, and especially among philologists, men who

with the ideal of "truth for the sake of truth" pursue some very trivial investigations, such, for example, as the use of the accusative after certain prepositions in Greek, or how often Homer is guilty of a hiatus. They resemble Wagner, whom Faust characterises as:

"... a fool whose choice is  
To stick in shallow trash for ever more,  
Who digs with eager hand for buried ore,  
And when he finds an earthworm he rejoices."

Thus there are many trivial truths which are indifferent and the investigation of which is of no account. For instance, whether the correct pronunciation of the Greek letter  $\eta$  was *ee* or *ay* need not concern us much, and the philologist who devotes to its settlement all his life and his best strength is rather to be pitied than admired. Various truths are very different in value, for life and truth become holy according to their importance. All this granted, we need not, with Nietzsche, discard truth, reason, virtue, and all moral aspirations.

Nietzsche apparently is under the illusion that reason, systematic thought, the moral discipline, self-control, are external powers, and in his love of liberty he objects to their authority. Did he ever consider that thought is not an external agent, but a clarification of man's instincts, and that discipline is, or at least in its purpose and final aim ought to be, self-regulation, so that our contradictory thoughts would not wage an internecine war? Thus, Nietzsche, the instinct-philosopher, appears as an ingenious boy whose very immaturity is regarded by himself as the highest blossom of his existence. Like an intoxicated youth, he revels in his irresponsibility and laughs at the man who has learned to take life seriously. Because the love of truth originates from instincts, Nietzsche treats it as a mere instinct, and nothing else. He forgets that in the evolution of man's soul all instincts develop into something higher than instinct, and the love of truth develops into systematic science.

Nietzsche never investigated what his self consists of. He never analysed his individuality. Otherwise he would have learned



that he has received the most valuable part of his being from others, and that that bundle of instincts which he calls his sovereign self is nothing but the inherited heirloom of the ages that have preceded him. In spite of his repudiation of owing anything to others, he is but the continuation of others. But he boldly carries his individualism, if not to its logical conclusions, yet to its moral applications. When speaking of the Order of Assassins of the times of the Crusades, he says with enthusiasm: "The highest secrecy of their leaders was, 'Nothing is true, everything is allowed!'" And Nietzsche adds: "Indeed, that was liberty of spirit, that dismissed even the belief in truth." The philosopher of instinct regards even the adhesion to truth as slavery and the proclamation of truth as dogmatism.

#### NIETZSCHE'S ZARATHUSTRA.

To those who have not the time to wade through the twelve volumes of Nietzsche's works and yet wish to become acquainted with him as he is at his best, we recommend a perusal of his book *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, which is original and interesting, full of striking passages, sometimes flashes of deep truths, then again sterile and unprofitable, or even tedious, and sometimes absurd; but which at any rate presents the embodiment of Nietzsche's grandest thoughts in their most attractive and characteristic form. We need scarcely warn the reader that Zarathustra is only another name for Friedrich Nietzsche and has nothing to do with the historical person of that name, the great Iranian prophet, the founder of Mazdaism.

The quintessence of Nietzsche's philosophy is the "over-man." What is the over-man?

The word *Uebersch* comes from a good mint; it is of Goethe's coinage and served to characterise Faust, the titanic man of high aims and undaunted courage,—the man who would not budge in the presence of hell and pursued his aspirations in spite of the forbidding countenance of God and the ugly grin of Satan. Alexander Tille, the English translator of Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, translates the word *Uebersch* by "beyond-man,"

but beyond means *jenseits*; and Nietzsche wrote *über*, i. e., superior to, over, or higher than, and the literal translation "over-man" appears to be the best. Emerson in a similar vein, when attempting to characterise that which is higher than the soul, invented the term "oversoul," and I can see no objection to the word "over-man."

The over-man is the higher man, the superhuman man of the future, a higher, nobler, more powerful, a better being than the present man! What a splendid idea! Since evolution has been accepted as a truth, we may fairly trust that we all, at least all evolutionists, believe in the over-man. All our reformers believe in the possibility of realising a higher mankind. We Americans especially have faith in the coming of the kingdom of the over-man, and our endeavor is concentrated in hastening his arrival. The question is only, What is the over-man and how can we make this ideal of a higher development actual?

Happy Nietzsche! You need not trouble yourself about consistency. You reject all ideals as superstitions, and then introduce an ideal of your own. "There you see," says an admirer of Nietzsche, "what a splendid principle it is not to own any allegiance to logic, or rule, or consistency. The best thought of Nietzsche's would never have been uttered if he had remained faithful to his own principles."

However ingenious the idea of an over-man may be, Nietzsche carries his propositions to such extremes that in spite of many flashes of truth they become in the end ridiculous and even absurd.

Nietzsche's ideal is good, but he utterly fails to comprehend its nature and also the mode in which alone the over-man can be realised.

Nietzsche's Zarathustra is a hermit philosopher who, weary of his wisdom, leaves his cave and comes to mingle with men, to teach them the over-man. He meets a saint who loves God, and Zarathustra leaving him says: "Is it possible? This old saint in his forest has not yet heard that God is dead!"

In a town Zarathustra preaches to a crowd in the market:

"I teach you the over-man. Man is a something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him?"

"All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the animal than surpass man?"

"What with man is the ape? A joke or a sore shame. Man shall be the same for the over-man, a joke or a sore shame.

"Behold, I teach you the over-man!"

"The over-man is the significance of the earth. Your will shall say: the over-man shall be the significance of the earth.

"I conjure you, my brethren, remain faithful to the earth and do not believe those who speak unto you of superterrestrial hopes! Poisoners they are whether they know it or not.

"Verily, a muddy stream is man. One must be the ocean to be able to receive a muddy stream without becoming unclean.

"Behold, I teach you the over-man: he is that ocean, in him your great contempt can sink.

"What is the greatest thing ye can experience? That is the hour of great contempt. The hour in which not only your happiness, but your reason and virtue as well, turn loathsome.

"I love him who is of a free spirit and of a free heart: thus his head is merely the intestine of his heart, but his heart driveth him to destruction.

"I love all those who are like heavy drops falling one by one from the dark cloud lowering over men: they announce the coming of the lightning and perish in the announcing.

"Behold, I am an announcer of the lightning and a heavy drop from the clouds: that lightning's name is the over-man."

Zarathustra comes as an enemy of the good and the just. He says:

"Lo, the good and just! Whom do they hate most? Him who breaketh to pieces their tables of values,—the law-breaker, the criminal:—but he is the creator.

"The destroyer of moral I am called by the good and just: my tale is immoral."

Zarathustra's philosophy is a combination of the eagle's pride and the serpent's wisdom, which Nietzsche describes thus:

"Lo! an eagle swept through the air in wide circles, a serpent hanging from it not like a prey, but like a friend: coiling round its neck.

"They are mine animals," said Zarathustra, and rejoiced heartily.

"The proudest animal under the sun, and the wisest animal under the sun have set out to reconnoitre.

"They wished to learn whether Zarathustra still liveth. Verily, do I still live.

"More dangerous than among animals I found it among men. Dangerous ways are taken by Zarathustra. Let mine animals lead me!"

Here is a sentence worth quoting :

"Of all that is written I love only that which the writer wrote with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt learn that blood is spirit."

In another chapter on the back-worlds-men Nietzsche writes :

"Once Zarathustra threw his spell beyond man, like all back-worlds-men Then the world seemed to me the work of a suffering and tortured God.

"Alas! brethren, that God whom I created was man's work and man's madness, like all Gods!

"Man he was, and but a poor piece of man and the I. From mine own ashes and flame it came unto me, that ghost, yea verily! It did not come unto me from beyond!

"What happened, brethren? I overcame myself, the sufferer, and carrying mine own ashes unto the mountains invented for myself a brighter flame. And lo! the ghost departed from me!

"Now to me, the convalescent, it would be suffering and pain to believe in such ghosts: suffering it were now for me and humiliation. Thus I speak unto the back-worlds-men."

Nietzsche's self is not ideal but material; it is not thought, not even the will, but the body. The following passage sounds like Vedantism as interpreted by a materialist:

"He who is awake and knoweth saith: body I am throughout, and nothing besides; and soul is merely a word for a something in body.

"Body is one great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a flock and a herdsman.

"Also thy little reason, my brother, which thou callest 'spirit'—it is a tool of thy body, a little tool and toy of thy great reason.

"'I' thou sayest and art proud of that word. But the greater thing is—which thou wilt not believe—thy body and its great reason. It doth not say 'I,' but it is the acting 'I.'

"The self ever listeneth and seeketh: it compareth, subdueth, conquereth, destroyeth. It ruleth and is the ruler of the 'I' as well.

"Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, standeth a mighty lord, an unknown wise man—whose name is self. In thy body he dwelleth, thy body he is.

"There is more reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom. And who can know why thy body needeth thy best wisdom?

"Thy self laugheth at thine I and its prancings: What are these boundings

and flights of thought? it saith unto itself. A round-about way to my purpose. I am the leading-string of the I and the suggester of its concepts.

"The creative self created for itself valuing and despising, it created for itself lust and woe. The creative body created for itself the spirit to be the hand of its will."

One of the best passages in Zarathustra's sermons is Nietzsche's command to love the over-man, the man of the distant future:

"I tell you, your love of your neighbor is your bad love of yourselves.

"Ye flee from yourselves unto your neighbor and would fain make a virtue thereof; but I see through your 'unselfishness.'

"The thou is older than the I; the thou hath been proclaimed holy, but the I not yet; man thus thrusteth himself upon his neighbor.

"Do I counsel you to love your neighbor? I rather counsel you to flee from your neighbor and to love the most remote.

"Love unto the most remote future man is higher than love unto your neighbor. And I consider love unto things and ghosts to be higher than love unto men,

"This ghost which marcheth before thee, my brother, is more beautiful than thou art. Why dost thou not give him thy flesh and thy bones? Thou art afraid and fleest unto thy neighbor.

"Unable to endure yourselves and not loving yourselves enough: you seek to wheedle your neighbor into loving you and thus to gild you with his error.

"My brethren, I counsel you not to love your neighbor, I counsel you to love those who are the most remote."

In perfect agreement with the ideal of the over-man is Nietzsche's view of marriage:

"Thou shalt build beyond thyself. But first thou must be built thyself square in body and soul.

"Thou shalt not only propagate thyself but propagate thyself upwards! Therefore the garden of marriage may help thee!

"Thou shalt create a higher body, a prime motor, a wheel of self-rolling,—thou shalt create a creator.

"Marriage: thus I call the will of two to create that one which is more than they who created it. I call marriage reverence unto each other as unto those who will such a will.

"Let this be the significance and the truth of thy marriage. But that which the much-too-many call marriage, those superfluous—alas, what call I that?

"Alas! that soul's poverty of two! Alas! that soul's dirt of two! Alas! that miserable ease of two!

"Marriage they call that; and they say marriage is made in heaven.

"Well, I like it not, that heaven of the superfluous!"

Nietzsche takes a Schopenhauerian view of womankind, excepting from the common condemnation his sister alone, to whom he once said, "You are not a woman, you are a friend." He says of woman :

"Too long a slave and a tyrant have been hidden in woman. Therefore woman is not yet capable of friendship : she knoweth love only."

Nietzsche is not aware that his self changes and that it grows by the acquisition of truth. He treats the self as remaining the same, and truth as that which our will has made conceivable. Truth to him is a mere creature of the self. Here is Zarathustra's condemnation of man's search for truth :

" 'Will unto truth' ye call, ye wisest men, what inspireth you and maketh you ardent ?

" 'Will unto the conceivableness of all that is,'—thus I call your will !

"All that is ye are going to *make* conceivable. For with good mistrust ye doubt whether it is conceivable.

"But it hath to submit itself and bend before yourselves ! Thus your will willeth. Smooth it shall become and subject unto spirit as its mirror and reflected image.

"That is your entire will, ye wisest men, as a will unto power ; even when ye speak of good and evil and of valuations.

"Ye will create the world before which to kneel down. Thus it is your last hope and drunkenness."

Recognition of truth is regarded as submission :

"To be true,—few are able to be so ! And he who is able doth not want to be so. But least of all the good are able.

"Oh, these good ! *Good men never speak the truth.* To be good in that way is a sickness for the mind.

"They yield, these good, they submit themselves ; their heart saith what is said unto it, their foundation obeyeth. But whoever obeyeth doth not hear *himself* !"

Nietzsche despises science. He must have had sorry experiences with scientists who offered him the dry bones of scholarship as scientific truth.

"When I lay sleeping, a sheep ate at the ivy-wreath of my head,—ate and said eating : 'Zarathustra is no longer a scholar.'



"Said it and went off clumsily and proudly. So a child told me.

"This is the truth : I have departed from the house of scholars, and the door I have shut violently behind me.

"Too long sat my soul hungry at their table. Not, as they, am I trained for perceiving as for cracking nuts.

"Freedom I love, and a breeze over a fresh soil. And I would rather sleep on ox-skins than on their honors and respectabilities.

"I am too hot and am burnt with mine own thoughts, so as often to take my breath away. Then I must go into the open air and away from all dusty rooms.

"Like millworks they work, and like corn-crushers. Let folk only throw their grain into them ! They know only too well how to grind corn and make white dust out of it.

"They look well at each other's fingers and trust each other not over-much. Ingenious in little stratagems, they wait for those whose knowledge walketh on lame feet ; like spiders they wait.

"They also know how to play with false dice ; and I found them play so eagerly that they perspired from it.

"We are strangers unto each other, and their virtues are still more contrary unto my taste than their falsehoods and false dice."

Even if all scientists were puny sciolists, the ideal of science would remain, and if all the professed seekers for truth were faithless to and unworthy of their high calling, truth itself would not be abolished.

So far as we can see, Nietzsche never became acquainted with any one of the exact sciences. He was a philologist who felt greatly dissatisfied with the loose methods of his colleagues, but he has not done much in his own specialty to attain to a greater exactness of results. His essays on Homer, on the Greek tragedy, and similar subjects, have apparently not received much recognition among philologists and historians.

Having gathered a number of followers in his cave, one of them, called the conscientious man, said to the others :

"We seek different things, even up here, ye and I. For I seek more security. Therefore have I come unto Zarathustra. For he is the firmest tower and will—

"Fear—that is man's hereditary and fundamental feeling. By fear everything is explained, original sin and original virtue. Out of fear also hath grown *my* virtue, which is called Science.

"Such long, old fears, at last become refined, spiritual, intellectual, to-day, methinketh, it is called *Science*."

This conception of science is refuted by Nietzsche in this fashion:

"Thus spake the conscientious one. But Zarathustra who had just returned into his cave and had heard the last speech and guessed its sense, threw a handful of roses at the conscientious one, laughing at his 'truths.' 'What?' he called 'What did I hear just now? Verily, methinketh, thou art a fool, or I am one myself. And thy "truth" I turn upside down with one blow, and that quickly.

Of Mankind! Greet Greet!  
 Was Iqvist die kinf M Mavuauf?  
 „ Of Iqvist, of Iqvist—  
 „ Lief kinfu Waim bin ich. —  
 „ Die Malt ist kinf,  
 „ Und kinfu all der Tag gndast.  
 „ Kinf ist ihr Mf—  
 „ Lief — kinfu noch all kinfu kinf:  
 „ Mf Iqvist: Vurguf!  
 „ Noch alle Lief melle (mefkai) —  
 „ — will kinf, kinf (mefkai)!"

NIETZSCHE'S HANDWRITING.

A poem from *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

"For fear is our exception. But courage and adventure, and the joy of what is uncertain, what hath never been dared—courage, methinketh, is the whole prehistoric development of man.

"From the wildest, most courageous beasts he hath, by his envy and his preying, won all their virtues. Only thus hath he become a man.

"This courage, at last become refined, spiritual, intellectual, this human courage with an eagle's wings and a serpent's wisdom—it, methinketh, is called today—"

"Zarathustra!" cried all who sat together there, as from one mouth, making a great laughter withal."


In spite of identifying his self with the body, who is mortal, Nietzsche longs for the immortal. He says:

"Oh! how could I fail to be eager for eternity, and for the marriage-ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?"


"Never yet have I found the woman by whom I should have liked to have children, unless it be this woman I love. For I love thee, O Eternity!"

#### A PROTEST AGAINST HIMSELF.

Nietzsche's philosophy forms a strange contrast to his own habits of life. Himself a model of virtue, he made himself the ad-



AS A PUPIL OF SCHULPFORTA.  
1861.



AS A VOLUNTEER IN THE GERMAN  
ARTILLERY. 1868.

vocate of vice, and gloried in it. He encouraged the robber<sup>1</sup> to rob, but he himself was honesty incarnate; he incited the people to rebel against authority of all kinds, but he himself was a "model child" in the nursery, a "model scholar" in school, and a "model soldier" while serving in the German army. His teachers as well

<sup>1</sup>E. g.: "Bitte nie! Lass dies Gewimmer!  
Nimm, ich bitte dich, nimm immer!"

as the officers of his regiment find not words enough *to praise Nietzsche's obedience.*<sup>1</sup>

Nietzsche disclaims having learnt anything in any school, but there was never a more grateful German disciple. He composed fervid poems on his school—the well-known institution *Schulpforta*, which on account of its severe discipline he praises, not in irony but seriously, as the “narrow gate.”<sup>2</sup>

Nietzsche denounces the German character, German institutions, and the German language, his mother-tongue; he is extremely unfair in his denunciations;<sup>3</sup> but he not only writes in German and makes the most involved constructions, but when the war broke out he asks his adopted country Switzerland, in which he had ac-

<sup>1</sup> Compare *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches* by his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Nietzsche's professors declare that he distinguished himself “*durch pünktlichen Gehorsam*” (p. 3); his sister tells us that she and her brother were “*ungeheuer artig, wahre Musterkinder*” (p. 36). He makes a good soldier, and, in spite of his denunciations of posing, displays theatrical vanity in having himself photographed with drawn sword (the scabbard is missing). His martial mustache almost anticipates the tonsorial art of the imperial barber of the present Kaiser; and yet his spectacled eyes and good-natured features betray the peacefulness of his intentions. He plays the soldier only, and would have found difficulty in killing even a fly.

<sup>2</sup> *Leben*, pp. 90-97.

<sup>3</sup> Nietzsche enjoys it that *Deutsch* (see Ulfila's Bible translation) originally means “pagans or heathen,” and hopes that the dear German people will earn the honor of being called pagans. (*La Gaya Scienza*, p. 176.) A reaction against his patriotism sets in immediately after the war, when he became acquainted with the brutality of some vulgar specimens of the victorious nation,—most of them non-combatants. (See, e. g., *Leben*, II., 1, pp. 108-111.) “Nach dem Kriege mißfiel mir der Luxus, die Franzosenverachtung,” etc., p. 108. “Ich halte das jetzige Preussen für eine der Cultur höchst gefährliche Macht.” Nietzsche ridicules German as barbarous in sound (*La Gaya Scienza*, pp. 138-140), “wälderhaft, heiser, wie aus räucherigen Stuben und unhöflichen Gegenden.” Unique is the origin of the standard style of modern high German from the bureaucratic slang, “kanzleimässig schreiben, das war etwas Vornehmes” (*La Gaya Scienza*, p. 138), and at present the German changes into an “Offizierdeutsch” (*ibid.*, p. 139). Nietzsche suspects “the German depth, “die deutsche Tiefe,” to be a mere mental dyspepsia (see “Jenseits von Gut und Böse,” p. 211), saying, “Der Deutsche verdaut seine Ereignisse schlecht, er wird nie damit fertig; die deutsche Tiefe ist oft nur eine schwere, zögernde Verdauung.” Nevertheless, he holds that the old-fashioned German depth is better than modern Prussian “Schneidigkeit und Berliner Witz und Sand.” He prefers the company of the Swiss to that of his countrymen. (See also “Was den Deutschen abgeht,” Vol. 8, p. 108.)

quired citizenship after accepting a position as professor of classical languages at the University of Basel, for leave of absence to join the German army. He might have had a chance in the Franco-Prussian war to live up to his theories of struggle, but unfortunately the Swiss authorities did not allow him to join the army, and granted leave of absence only on the condition that he would serve as a nurse. Such is the irony of fate. While Nietzsche stood up for a ruthless assertion of strength and for a suppression of sympathy which he denounced as a relic of the ethics of a negation of life, his own tender soul was so over-sensitive that his sister feels justified in tracing his disease back to the terrible impressions he received during the war.

Nietzsche speaks of the king as "the dear father of the country."<sup>1</sup> If there was a flaw in Nietzsche's moral character, it was goody-goodyness; and his philosophy is a protest against the principles of his own nature. While boldly calling himself "the first immoralist," justifying even licence itself and defending the coarsest lust,<sup>2</sup> his own life was as pure as that of a virgin, and he shrunk back in disgust from moral filth whenever he met with it in practical life.

Nietzsche denounced pessimism, and yet his philosophy was, as he himself confesses, the last consequence of pessimism. Hegel declared (says Nietzsche in *Morgenröthe*, p. 8), "Contradiction moves the world, all things are self-contradictory;" "we (adds Nietzsche) carry Pessimism even into logic." He proposes to vivisect morality; "but (adds he) you cannot vivisect a thing without killing it." Thus his "immoralism" is simply an expression of his earnestness to investigate the moral problem, and he expresses the result in this terse sentence: "Moral ist Nothlüge." (*Menschliches*, p. 63.)

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<sup>1</sup> "Unser lieber König," "der Landesvater," etc. See *Leben*, I., p. 24, and II., I, p. 248, "Unser lieber alter Kaiser Wilhelm" and "wir Preussen waren wirklich stolz." These expressions occur in Nietzsche's description of the Emperor's appearance at Bayreuth.

<sup>2</sup> *E. g.*, "Auch der schädlichste Mensch ist vielleicht immer noch der allnützlichste in Hinsicht auf Erhaltung der Art," etc. *La Gaya Scienza*, p. 3 ff.

He preached struggle and hatred, and yet was so tender-hearted that in an hour of dejection he confessed to his sister with a sigh:

"Ich bin so gar nicht zum Hassen und zum Feind sein gemacht!"

Poor Nietzsche! what a bundle of contradictions! None of these contradictions are inexplicable. All of them are quite natural. They are the inevitable reactions against a prior enthusiasm, and he swings, according to the law of the pendulum, to the opposite extreme of his former position.

How did Nietzsche develop into an Immoralist? Simply by way of reaction against the influence of Schopenhauer in combination with the traditional Christianity. Schopenhauer was the master at whose feet Nietzsche sat; he learned from Schopenhauer boldness of thought and atheism; he accepted for a time his pessimism, but rebelled in his inmost soul against the ethical doctrine of the negation of the will. He thus recognised the reactionary spirit of Schopenhauer, whose system is a Christian metaphysics. Nietzsche denounces the ethics of a negation of the will as a disease, and since nature in the old system is regarded as the source of moral evil the idea dawns on him that he himself, trying to establish a philosophy of nature, is an immoralist. He now questions morality itself from the standpoint of an affirmation of the will, and at last goes so far as to speak of ideals as a symptom of shallowness.<sup>1</sup>

Nietzsche must not be taken too seriously. He was engaged with the deepest problems of life, and published his sentiments as to their solution before he had actually attempted to investigate them. He criticises and attacks like the Irishman who hits a head wherever he sees it. Here are the first three rules of his philosophical warfare:


"First: I attack only those causes which are victorious, sometimes I wait till they are victorious. Secondly: I attack them only when I would find no allies,

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<sup>1</sup> See, e. g., *Leben*, I., p. 135, where he speaks of a new "Freigeisterei," denouncing the "libres penseurs" as "unverbesserliche Flachköpfe und Hanswürste," adding, "Sie glauben allesammt noch an's 'Ideal.'"



when I stand isolated, when I compromise myself alone. Thirdly: I have never taken a step in public which did not compromise me. That is my criterion of right action."



THE LATEST PICTURE. After an oil-painting by C. Stoeving.

A man who adopts this strange criterion of right conduct must produce a strange philosophy. His soul is in an uproar against itself. Says Nietzsche in his *Götzendämmerung*, Aphorism 45:

"Almost every genius knows as one phase of his development the 'Catilinary existence,' so called, which is a feeling of hatred, of vengeance, of revolution against everything that is, which no longer needs to become . . . Catilina—the form of Caesar's pre-existence."

Nietzsche changed his views during his life-time, and the Immoralist Nietzsche originated in contradiction to his habitual moralism. He is a man of extremes. As soon as a new thought dawns on him, it takes possession of his soul to the exclusion of his prior views, and his latter self contradicts his former self.

Nietzsche says:

"The serpent that cannot slough must die. In the same way, the spirits which are prevented from changing their opinions cease to be spirits."

So we must expect that if Nietzsche had been permitted to continue longer in health, he would have cast off the slough of his Immoralism and the negative conceptions of his positivism. His Zarathustra was the last work of his pen, but it is only the most classical expression of the fermentation of his soul, not the final purified result of his philosophy; it is not the solution of the problem that stirred his heart.

While writing his *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, Nietzsche characterises his method of work thus:

"That I proceed with my outpourings considerably like a dilettante and in an immature manner, I know very well, but I am anxious first of all to get rid of the whole polemico-negative material. I wish undisturbedly to sing off, up and down and truly dastardly, the whole gamut of my hostile feelings, 'that the vaults shall echo back.'<sup>1</sup> Later on, i. e., within five years, I shall discard all polemics and bethink myself of a really 'good work.' But at present my breast is oppressed with disgust and tribulation. I must expectorate, decorously or indecorously, but radically and for good" [*endgültig*].

The very immaturity of Nietzsche's view becomes attractive to immature minds. He wrote while his thoughts were still in a state of fermentation, and he died before the wine of his soul was clarified.

<sup>1</sup> "Dass das Gewölbe wiederhallt,"—a quotation from Goethe's "Faust."

## ANOTHER NIETZSCHE.

The assertion of selfhood and the hankering after originality make Nietzsche the exponent of the absolute uniqueness of everything particular, and he goes to the extreme of denying all kinds of universality—even that of formal laws (the so-called uniformities of nature), reason, and especially its application in the field of practical life, morality. His ideal is "Be thyself! Be unique! Be original!" Properly speaking, we should not use the term ideal when speaking of Nietzsche's maxims of life, for the conception of an ideal is based upon a recognition of some kind of universality, and Nietzsche actually sneers at any one having ideals. The adherents of Nietzsche speak of their master as "*der Einzige*," i. e., "the unique one," and yet (in spite of the truth that every thing particular is in its way unique) the uniformities of nature are so real and unfailing that Nietzsche is simply the representative of a type which according to the laws of history and mental evolution naturally and inevitably appears whenever the philosophy of nominalism reaches its climax. He would therefore not be unique even if he were the only one that aspires after a unique selfhood; but the fact is that there are a number of Nietzsches, he happening to be the best known of his type. Other advocates of selfhood, of course, will be different from Nietzsche in many unimportant details, but they will be alike in all points that are essential and characteristic. One of these Nietzsches is George Moore, a Briton who is scarcely familiar with the writings of his German double, but a few quotations from his book, *Confessions of a Young Man*, will show that he can utter thoughts which might have been written by Friedrich Nietzsche himself. George Moore says:

"I was not dissipated, but I loved the abnormal" (p. 18).

"I was a model young man indeed" (p. 20).

"I boasted of dissipations" (p. 19).

"I say again, let general principles be waived; it will suffice for the interest of these pages if it be understood that brain-instincts have always been, and still are, the initial and the determining powers of my being" (p. 47)

George Moore is, like Nietzsche, one of Schopenhauer's disciples who has become sick of pessimism. He says:

"That odious pessimism! How sick I am of it" (p. 310).

When George Moore speaks of God he thinks of him in the old-fashioned way as a big self, an individual and particular being. Hence he denies him. God is as dead as any pagan deity. George Moore says:

"To talk to us, the legitimate children of the nineteenth century, of logical proofs of the existence of God, strikes us in just the same light as the logical proof of the existence of Jupiter Ammon" (p. 137).

George Moore is coarse in comparison with Nietzsche. Nietzsche is no cynic; he is pure-hearted and noble by nature; Moore is voluptuous and vulgar; but both are avowed immoralists, and if the principle of an unrestrained egotism be right, George Moore is as good as Nietzsche, and any criminal given to the most abominable vices would not be worse than either.

Nietzsche feels the decadence of the age and longs for health; but he attributes the cause of his own decadence to the Christian ideals of virtue, love, and sympathy with others. George Moore cherishes the same views; he says:

"We are now in a period of decadence, growing steadily more and more acute" (p. 239).

"Respectability . . . continues to exercise a meretricious and enervating influence on literature" (p. 240).

"Pity, that most vile of all vile virtues, has never been known to me. The great pagan world I love knew it not" (p. 200).

"The philanthropist is the Nero of modern times" (p. 185).

Both Nietzsche and Moore long for limitless freedom; but Moore seems more consistent, for he lacks the ideal of the overman and extends freedom to the sex relation, saying:

"Marriage—what an abomination! Love—yes, but not marriage . . . freedom limitless" (p. 168-169).

Moore loves art, but his view of art is cynical, and here too he is unlike Nietzsche; he says:

"Art is not nature. Art is nature digested. Art is a sublime excrement" (p. 178).

Both believe in the coming of a great social deluge. George Moore says :

"The French revolution will compare with the revolution that is to come, that must come, that is inevitable, as a puddle on the road-side compares with the sea. Men will hang like pears on every lamp-post, in every great quarter of London, there will be an electric guillotine that will decapitate the rich like hogs in Chicago" (p. 343).

Ideals are regarded as superstitions, and belief in ideas is deemed hypocritical. George Moore says :

"In my heart of hearts I think myself a cut above you, because I do not believe in leaving the world better than I found it ; and you, exquisitely hypocritical reader, think that you are a cut above me because you say you would leave the world better than you found it" (p. 354).

The deeds of a man, his thoughts and aspirations, which constitute his spiritual self, count for nothing ; the body alone is supposed to be real, and thus after death a pig is deemed more useful than a Socrates. Continues Moore :

"The pig that is being slaughtered as I write this line will leave the world better than it found it, but you will leave only a putrid carcass fit for nothing but the grave" (p. 353).

Wrong is idealised :

"Injustice we worship ; all that lifts us out of the miseries of life is the sublime fruit of injustice.

"Man would not be man but for injustice" (p. 203).

"Again I say that all we deem sublime in the world's history are acts of injustice ; and it is certain that if mankind does not relinquish at once and for ever, its vain, mad, and frantic dream of justice, the world will lapse into barbarism" (p. 205).

George Moore, giving a moment's thought to the ideal of "a new art, based upon science, in opposition to the art of the old world that was based on imagination, an art that should explain all things and embrace modern life in its entirety, in its endless ramifications, be it, as it were, a new creed in a new civilisation . . . that would continue to a more glorious and legitimate conclusion the work that the prophets have begun ;" but he turns his back upon it. It would be after all a product of development ; it would

be the tyranny of a past age, and he says, "as well drink the dregs of yesterday's champagne" (p. 128).

#### NIETZSCHE'S DISCIPLES.

Nietzsche's influence is not limited to the professional circle of philosophers; his philosophy begins to play a part in practical life and has taken hold of a number of souls who protest against the social, the political, the religious, and even the scientific, conditions of our civilisation. Nietzsche is the philosopher of protest, and, strange to say, while he himself is aristocratic in his instincts, he appeals most powerfully to the masses of the people. His views act like dynamite upon restless spirits, and he announces himself as the prophet of a great thunder-storm, an upheaval, the outbreak of a volcano.

Nietzsche may make the evolutionist pause, but he appeals only to the revolutionist. His philosophy is the expression of a would-be Cæsar and will therefore be fascinating to all Catilinas.

Nietzsche's disciples are not among the aristocrats, not among the scholars, not among the men of genius. His followers are among the people who believe in hatred and hail him as a prophet of the great deluge. His greatest admirers are anarchists, sometimes also socialists, and above all those geniuses who have failed to find recognition. Nietzsche's thought will prove veritable dynamite if it should happen to reach the masses of mankind, the disinherited, the uneducated, the proletariat, the Catilinary existences. Nietzsche's philosophy is to those whom he despised most, an intoxicant; they see in him their liberator, and their ear feels tickled by his invectives.

Invectives naturally appeal to those who are as unthinking as the brutes of the field, but feel the sufferings of existence as much as do the beasts of burden. They are impervious to argument, but being full of bitterness and envy they can be led most easily by any kind of denunciations of their betters. Nietzsche hated the masses, the crowd of the common people, the herd. He despised the lowly and had a contempt for the ideals of democracy. Nevertheless, his style of thought is such as to resemble the rant of the leaders of



mobs, and it is quite probable that in the course of time he will become the philosopher of demagogues.

A great number of Nietzsche's disciples share their master's eccentricities and especially his impetuosity. Having a contempt for philosophy as the work of the intellect, they move mainly in the field of political and social self-assertion; they are anarchists who believe that the over-man is coming in labor troubles, strikes, and through a subversion of the authority of government in any form.

The best known German expounders of Nietzsche's philosophy are Max Stirner, Rudolf Steiner, and Alexander Tille.<sup>1</sup> Professor Henri Lichtenberger of the University of Nancy has become his interpreter in France,<sup>2</sup> and Mr. Erwin McCall, the editor of *The Eagle and the Serpent*, in England.

A periodical *Der Eigene*, i. e., "he who is his own," announces itself as "a journal for all and nobody," and "sounds the slogan of the egoists," by calling on them to "preserve their ownhood." *Der Eigene* proposes to "antagonise all ideals of the brotherhood of man in the religious, ethical, altruistic, social, and communistic fields." It decries monopoly in every form, wages war against all democratic programmes, all aspirations of equality, including charity-maniacs in every form and slumming (*Pöbelbeglückung*); it antagonises bureaucracy and all rules. It does not expect social salvation from the socialistic abolition of private property, but from an unimpeded personal appropriation, the realisation of which appears in a free market and the unconditional *laissez faire, laissez passer*.

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<sup>1</sup>A. Tille, *Von Darwin bis Nietzsche*. R. Steiner, *Wahrheit und Wissenschaft; Die Philosophie der Freiheit*; and F. Nietzsche, *ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit*. M. Stirner, *Der Einzige und seine Eigenschaft*. See also R. Schellwien, *Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche*.

Friedrich Nietzsche's life has been published by the philosopher's sister, Frau E. Förster-Nietzsche. A characterisation, disavowed by Nietzsche's admirers, was written by Frau Lou Andreas Salome, under the title *F. Nietzsche in seinen Werken*. Other works kindred in spirit are Schellwien's *Der Geist der neueren Philosophie*, 95, and *Der Darwinismus*, 96; also Adolf Gerecke, *Die Aussichtslosigkeit des Moralismus*; Schmitt, *An der Grenzscheide zweier Weltalter*; Károly Krausz, *Nietzsche und seine Weltanschauung*.

<sup>2</sup>Henri Lichtenberger, *La philosophie de Nietzsche*. Paris, Alcan, 1898.

It expects to attain liberty by strengthening the single individual, which is to build up egoistical communities. It repudiates the plan of revolutionising the masses, and the use of violence. It stands up for the pathfinders in literature and art, for personality, for that which is characteristic.

Another anarchistic periodical that stands under the influence of Nietzsche appears in Budapest,<sup>1</sup> Hungary, under the name *Ohne Staat*, i. e., Without Government, as "the organ of ideal anarchists," under the editorship of Karl Krausz,<sup>2</sup> in German and Hungarian. In England *The Eagle and the Serpent* serves as an exponent of Nietzsche's philosophy. It characterises its own tendency as follows:

"*The Eagle and the Serpent* is a bi-monthly journal of egoistic philosophy and sociology which teaches that in social science altruism spells damnation and egoism spells salvation. In the war against their exploiters the exploited cannot hope to succeed till they act as a unit, an 'ego.'"<sup>3</sup>

A reader of *The Eagle and the Serpent* humorously criticises the egoistic philosophy as follows:<sup>1</sup>

"DEAR EAGLE AND SERPENT,—I am one of those unreasonable persons who see no irreconcilable conflict between egoism and altruism. The altruism of Tol-

<sup>1</sup> Budapest, Hungary, Festung Herrengasse 58.

<sup>2</sup> Herr Karl Krausz and Dr. Eugen Heinrich Schmitt, the Hungarian editor of *Ohne Staat*, have ceased to work in harmony, since the latter changed the title *Allam nélkül* (i. e., Without State) into *Erőszak nélkül* (i. e., Without Violence), with the subtitle *Közlöny Krisztusi Szellemében* (i. e., An Organ in the Spirit of Christ). Dr. Schmitt believes in peaceful, Christian anarchism, which Herr Krausz regards as self-contradictory.

We may incidentally mention that a contributor to *Ohne Staat* reproduced one of the Homilies of St. Chrysostom, in which he harangues after the fashion of the early Christian preachers against wealth and power. The state's attorney, not versed in Christian patristic literature, seized the issue and placed the man who quoted the old Byzantine saint behind the prison bars. In the November issue (1898) Dr. Schmitt mentions the case and says: "Thus we have an exact and historical proof that the liberty of speech and thought was incomparably greater in miserable, servile Byzantium than it is now in the much more miserable and more servile despotism of modern Europe." Does not Dr. Schmitt overlook the fact that in the days of Byzantine Christianity the saints were protected by the mob, which was much feared by the imperial government and was kept at bay only by a nominal recognition of its claims and beliefs?

<sup>3</sup> Address: The Eagle and Serpent Publishing Co., 185 Fleet Street, London, England.

stoy is the shortest road to the egoism of Whitman. The unbounded love and compassion of Jesus made him conscious of being the son of God, and that he and the Father were one. Could egoism go further than this? I believe that true egoism and true altruism grow in precisely equal degree in the soul, and that the alleged qualities which bear either name and attempt to masquerade alone without their respective make-weights are shams and counterfeits. The real desideratum is balance, and that cannot be permanently preserved on one leg. However, you skate surprisingly well for the time being on one foot, and I have enjoyed the first performance so well that I enclose 60 cents for a season-ticket.—ERNEST H. CROSBY, Rhinebeck, N. Y., U. S. A."

In America Nietzsche's philosophy is represented by Ragnar Redbeard who published a book entitled *Might is Right, the Survival of the Fittest*.<sup>1</sup> The author characterises his work as follows:

"This book is a reasoned negation of the Ten Commandments—the Golden Rule—the Sermon on the Mount—Republican Principles—Christian Principles—and "Principles" in general.

"It proclaims upon scientific evolutionary grounds, the unlimited absolutism of Might, and asserts that cut-and-dried moral codes are crude and immoral inventions, promotive of vice and vassalage."

Ragnar Redbeard is a most ardent admirer of Nietzsche, as may be learned from his verses made after the pattern of Nietzsche's poetry. Ragnar Redbeard sings:

"There is no 'law' in heaven or earth that man must needs obey! Take what you can, and all you can; and take it while you—may.

"Let not the Jew-born Christ ideal unnerve you in the fight. You have no 'rights,' except alone the rights you win by—might.

"There is no justice, right, nor wrong; no truth, no good, no evil. There is no 'man's immortal soul,' no fiery, fearsome Devil.

"There is no 'heaven of glory;' No!—no 'hell where sinners roast.' There is no 'God the Father,' No!—no Son, no 'Holy Ghost.'

"This world is no Nirvâna where joy forever flows. It is a grewsome butcher shop where dead 'lambs' hang in—rows.

"Man is the most ferocious of all the beasts of prey. He rangeth round the mountains, to love, and feast, and—slay.

"He sails the stormy oceans, he gallops o'er the plains, and sucks the very marrow-bones of captives held in—chains.

"Death endeth all for every man,—for every 'son of thunder'; then be a lion (not a 'lamb') and—don't be trampled under."

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<sup>1</sup> Published by Adolph Mueller, 108 Clark street, Chicago.

The latest periodicals in the same line are the *I* (which presumably means "*the big I*"), edited by C. L. Swartz, Wellesley, Mass., and *The Free Comrade*, edited by J. Wm. Lloyd, the author of *A Red Heart in a White World*. In their editorial notes these egoists speak of Elbert Hubbard, editor of *The Philistine*, as one of their own, and as "comrade." The truth is that *The Philistine* calls itself "a periodical of protest," but it protests against unkindness and lack of brotherly sentiment, not against rule and logic. Mr. Hubbard's force lies in his satire, which combines two rare qualities, pointedness and good nature, but if he is anything, he is an altruist by instinct, not an egoist. To use Nietzsche's terminology, we should say that "he is one of those shallow heads who still believe in the ideal."

#### CONCLUSION.

Nietzsche is unquestionably a bold thinker, a Faust-like questioner, and a Titan among philosophers. He is a man who understands that the problem of all problems is the question, Is there an authority higher than myself? And having discarded belief in God, he finds no authority except pretensions.

Nietzsche apparently is only familiar with the sanctions of morality and the criterion of good and evil as they are represented in the institutions and thoughts established by history, and seeing how frequently they serve as tools in the hands of the crafty for the oppression of the unsophisticated masses of the people, he discards them as utterly worthless. Hence his truly magnificent wrath, his disgust, his contempt for underling-man, this muddy stream of present mankind.

If Nietzsche had dug deeper, he would have found that there is after all a deep significance in moral ideals, for there is an authority above the self by which the worth of the self must be measured. Truth is not a mere creature of the self, but is the comprehension of the immutable eternal laws of being which constitute the norm of existence. Our self, "that creating, willing, valuing 'I,' which (according to Nietzsche) is the measure and value of all things," is

itself measured by that eternal norm of being, the existence of which Nietzsche does not recognise.

Nietzsche is blind to the truth that there is a norm above the self, and that this norm is the source of duty and the object of religion; he therefore denies the very existence of duty, of conviction, of moral principles, of sympathy with the suffering, of authority in any shape, and yet he dares to condemn man in the shape of the present generation of mankind. What right has he, then, to judge the sovereign self of to-day and to announce the coming of a higher self in the over-man? From the principles of his philosophical anarchism he has no right to denounce mankind of to-day, as an underling; for if there is no objective standard of worth, there can be no sense in distinguishing between the under-man of to-day and the over-man of a nobler future.

Nietzsche is a Titan and he is truly Titanic in his rebellion against the smallness of everything that means to be an incarnation of what is great and noble and holy. But he does not protest against the smallness of the representatives of truth and right, he protests against truth and right themselves, and thus he is not merely Titanic, but a genuine Titan,—attempting to take the heavens by storm, a monster, not superhuman but inhuman in proportions, in sentiment and in spirit. Being ingenious, he is, in his way, a genius, but he is not evenly balanced; he is eccentric and, not recognising the authority of reason and science, makes eccentricity his maxim. Thus his grandeur becomes grotesque.

The spirit of negation, the mischief-monger Mephistopheles, says of Faust with reference to his despair of reason and science:

“Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft,  
Des Menschen allergrösste Kraft,  
So hab' ich dich schon unbedingt.”

Being giant-like, the Titan Nietzsche has a sense only for things of large dimensions. He fails to understand the significance of the subtler relations of existence. He is clumsy like Gargantua; he is coarse in his reasoning; he is narrow in his comprehension; his horizon is limited. He sees only the massive effects of the

great dynamical changes brought about by brute force; he is blind to the quiet and slow but more powerful workings of spiritual forces. The molecular forces that are invisible to the eye transform the world more thoroughly than hurricanes and thunderstorms; yet the strongest powers are the moral laws, the curses of wrong-doing and oppression, and the blessings of truthfulness, of justice, of good-will. Nietzsche sees them not; he ignores them. He measures the worth of the over-man solely by his brute force.

If Nietzscheanism were right, the over-man of the future who is going to take possession of the earth will not be nobler and better, wiser and juster than the present man, but more gory, more tiger-like, more relentless, more brutal.

Nietzsche has a truly noble longing for the advent of the over-man, but he throws down the ladder on which man has been climbing up, and thus losing his foothold, he falls down to the place whence mankind started several millenniums ago.

We enjoy the rockets of Nietzsche's genius, we understand his Faust-like disappointment as to the unavailability of science such as he knew it; we sympathise with the honesty with which he offered his thoughts to the world; we recognise the flashes of truth which occur in his sentences, uttered in the tone of a prophet; but we cannot help condemning his philosophy as unsound in its basis, his errors being the result of an immaturity of comprehension.

Nietzsche has touched upon the problem of problems, but he has not solved it. He weighs the souls of his fellowmen and finds them wanting; but his own soul is not less deficient. His philosophy is well worth studying, but it is not a good guide through life. It is great only as being the gravest error, boldly, conscientiously, and seriously carried to its utmost extremes and preached as the latest word of wisdom.

It has been customary that man should justify himself before the tribunal of morality, but Nietzsche cites morality itself before his tribunal. Morality justifies herself by calling on truth, but the testimony of truth is ruled out, for truth—objective truth—is denounced as a superstition of the dark ages. Nietzsche knows truth only as a contemptible method of puny spirits to make exist-



ence conceivable,—a hopeless task! Nietzsche therefore finds morality guilty as a usurper and a tyrant, and he exhorts all *esprits forts* to shake off the yoke.

We grant that the self should not be the slave of morality; it should not feel the "ought" as a command; it should identify itself with it and make its requirements the object of his own free will. Good-will on earth will render the law redundant; but when you wipe out the ideal of good-will itself together with its foundation, which is truth and the recognition of truth, the struggle for existence will reappear in its primitive fierceness, and mankind will return to the age of savagery. Let the *esprits forts* of Nietzsche's type try to realise their master's ideal, and their attempts will soon lead to their own perdition.

We read in *Der arme Teufel*,<sup>1</sup> a weekly whose radical editor would not have been prevented by conventional reasons from joining the new fad of Nietzscheanism, the following satirical comment on some modern poet of original selfhood:

"'I am against matrimony simply because I am a poet. Wife, children, family life,—well, well! they may be good enough for the man possessed of the herding instinct. But I object to trivialities in my own life. I want something stimulating, sensation, poetry! A wife would be prosaic to me, simply on account of being my wife; and children who would call me papa would be disgusting. Poetry I need! Poetry!' Thus he spoke to a friend, and when the latter was gone continued his letter reproaching a waitress for again asking for money and at the same time reflecting upon the purity of her relations to the bartender whom she had said was her cousin only. . . ."

If marriage relations were abolished to-day, would not in the course of time some new form of marriage be established? Those who are too proud to utilise the experiences of past generations, will have to repeat them for themselves and must wade through their follies, sins, errors, and all their penalties.

Nietzsche tries to produce a Cæsar by teaching his followers to imitate the vices of a Catiline; he would raise gods by begetting Titans; he endeavors to give a nobler and better standard to man-

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<sup>1</sup> May 13, 1899. Detroit, 949 Gratiot Ave.

kind, not by lifting the people higher and rendering them more efficient, but by making them more pretentious.

If the ethics of Nietzsche were accepted to-day as authoritative, and if people at large acted accordingly, the world would be benefited in one respect, viz., hypocrisy would cease, and the selfishness of mankind would manifest itself in all its nude bestiality. Passions would have full sway; lust, robbery, jealousy, murder, and revenge would increase, and Death in all forms of wild outbursts would reap a richer harvest than he ever did in the days of prehistoric savage life. The result would be a pruning on a grand scale, and after a few bloody decades those only would survive who either by nature or by hypocritical self-control deemed it best to keep the lower passions and the too prurient instincts of their selfhood in proper check, and then the old-fashioned rules of morality, which Nietzsche declared antiquated, would be given a new trial in the new order of things. They might receive another sanction, but they would find recognition.

Nietzsche forgets that the present social order originated from that general free-for-all fight which he commends, and if we begin at the start we should naturally run through the same or a similar course of development to the same or very similar conditions. Will it not be better to go on improving than to revert to the primitive state of savagery?

There are superstitious notions about the nature of the sanction of ethics, but for that reason the moral ideals of mankind remain as firmly established as ever.

The self is not the standard of measurement for good and evil, good and bad, as Nietzsche declares in agreement with the sophists of old; the self is only the condition to which and under which it applies. There is no good and evil in the purely physical world, there is no suffering, no pain, no anguish—all this originates with the rise of organised animal life which is endowed with sentiency; and further there is no goodness and badness, no morality until the animal rises to the height of comprehending the nature of evil. The tiger is in himself neither good nor bad, but he makes himself a cause of suffering to others; and thus he is by them regarded as

bad. Goodness and badness are relative, but for that reason they are not unreal.

It is true that there is no "ought" in the world as an "ought"; nor are there metaphysical ghosts of divine commandments revealing themselves. But man learns the lesson how to avoid evil and reducing it to brief rules which are easily remembered, he calls them "commandments."

Buddha was aware that there is no metaphysical ghost of an "ought," and being the first positivist before positivism was ever thought of, his decalogue is officially called "avoiding the ten evils," not "the ten commandments," the latter being a popular term of later origin.

Granting that there is no metaphysical "ought" in the world and that it finds application only in the domain of animate life through the presence of the self or rather of many selves, we fail to see that the self is the creator of the norm of good and evil. We grant also that there are degrees of comprehending the nature of evil and that different applications naturally result under different conditions, we cannot for that reason argue that ethics are purely subjective and that there is no objective norm that underlies the moral evolution of mankind and comes out in the progress of civilisation more and more in its purity.

Nietzsche is like a schoolboy whose teacher is an inefficient pedant. He rebels against his authority and having had but poor instruction proclaims that the multiplication table is a mere superstition with which the old man tries to enslave the free minds of his scholars. Are there not different solutions possible of the same example and has not every one to regard his own solution as the right solution? How can the teacher claim that he is the standard of truth? Why, the very attempt at setting up a standard of any kind is tyranny and the recognition of it is a self-imposed slavery. There is no rightness save the rightness that can be maintained in a general hand-to hand contest, for it is ultimately the fist that decides all controversies.

Nietzsche calls himself an atheist, he denies the existence of God in any form, and thus carries atheism to an extreme where it

breaks down in self-contradiction. We understand by God (whether personal, impersonal, or superpersonal) that something which determines the course of life; the factors that shape the world, including ourselves; the law to which we must adjust our conduct. Nietzsche enthrones the self in the place of God, but for all practical purposes his God is blunt success and survival of the fittest in the crude sense of the term; for according to his philosophy the self must heed survival in the struggle for existence alone, and that, therefore, is his God.

Nietzsche's God is power, i. e., overwhelming force, which allows the wolf to eat the lamb. He ignores the power of the still small voice, the effectiveness of law in the world which makes it possible that man, the over-brute, is not the most ferocious, the most muscular, or the strongest animal. Nietzsche regards the cosmic order, in accommodation to which ethical codes have been invented, as a mere superstition. Thus it will come to pass that Nietzsche's type of the over-man, should it really make its appearance on earth, would be wiped out as surely as the lion, the king of the beasts, the proud pseudo-overbrute of the animals, will be exterminated in course of time. The lion has a chance for survival only behind the bars of the zoölogical gardens or when he allows himself to be tamed by man, that weakling among the brutes whose power has been built up by a comprehension of the sway of the invisible laws of life, physical, mental and moral.

Verily, the over-man will come, although he is not quite so near at hand as one might wish. He is at hand though, but he will not come such as Nietzsche announces him, in the storm of a catastrophe. The fire and the storm may precede the realisation of a higher humanity; but the higher humanity will be found neither in the fire nor in the storm. The over-man will be born of the present man, not by a contempt for the shortcomings of the present man, but by a recognition of the essential features of man's manhood, by developing and purifying the truly human by making man conform to the eternal norm of rationality, humaneness and rightness of conduct.

What we need first is the standard of the higher man; and on

this account we must purify our notions of the norm of truth and righteousness,—of God. Let us find first the over-God, and the over-man will develop naturally. The belief in an individual God-being is giving way to the recognition of a superpersonal God, the norm of scientific truth, the standard of right and wrong, the standard of worth by which we measure the value of our own being; and the kingdom of the genuine over-man will be established by the spread of the scientific comprehension of the world, in matters physical, social, intellectual, moral, and religious.

EDITOR.

## LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.

### FRANCE.

**M.** L. RIBERT, in his *Essai d'une philosophie nouvelle suggérée par la science*, correctly maintains on the one hand that the scientific foundation which alone is capable of furnishing a solid support for a philosophy, was never sufficiently broad until the second part of the nineteenth century; and, on the other hand, that the abortions of metaphysics, even in the hands of the successors of Kant, are in no wise to be attributed to a radical incapacity of reason. He vigorously upholds the powers of the intellect, as supported by a less imperfect science, and seeks in his own turn to erect a new system. M. Ribert's system was "suggested," as the title of his work proclaims, by the teachings of science; it would be less exact to say that it could be deduced from science, and I should express the facts by saying that it rather appeals to science for support than results from it as a natural conclusion. I could not give an epitome of the system in a few lines. M. Ribert reaches his conclusions by a long path which the reader will readily traverse with him, and his conscientious critical labors proclaim him in every sense a man of learning and of merit.

As to the difficulty of passing from the physical world to the moral world, M. Ribert chooses as evidence of the passage, *sensation*, which he carefully distinguishes from all the movements which provoke it, accompany it, or follow it. But how is sensation to be defined? It is, he tells us, the translation of nervous processes into terms of consciousness; that is to say, into a language so absolutely original as apparently to retain nothing whatever of the



text translated, or even to afford any ground whatever for conjecturing it.

As to the *state of consciousness* itself, we must now consider it as the depository of a certain quantity of energy; it is nervous motion transformed. Now, ought not this motion as absorbed by sensation to be found again in sensation in its virtual state? It is in this sense, M. Ribert thinks, that ideas are forces: "They can give back as motion that which they received as motion; but they received it in darkness, and they give it back illuminated by consciousness, which is their very nature." Such conclusions, thinks the author, are alike removed from spiritualism and from materialism. In truth, the metaphysical solution proposed by him involves a dualism; but it is, he says, a rejuvenated dualistic conception. He conceives the universe as the fruit of a compact and indissoluble union, of a profound reciprocal penetration, of *infinite virtuality*, everywhere present, with an innumerable multitude of material elements everywhere distributed. The ultimate secret of the nature of things in this hypothesis is a "fundamental relation" of realities and beings which manifest themselves solely by their action upon one another. This unquestionably is tantamount only to representing the principal forms of existence; the positive aspects of reality still remain to be explained by their help. This M. Ribert attempts to do in the space of several pages. I should not risk saying that he has altogether succeeded, and the least defect of his conception is perhaps the necessity in which he finds himself of invoking the "unrest" and profound "disquietude" of virtuality, etc., and of translating immediately into terms of sensation the original situations from which sensation itself should start.

A problem of this character resembles in some respects the problem which ends a game of chess. The thing required is to solve the problem according to a given situation of the pieces that are left. As to guessing the situations that precede, and inferring the position of the different pieces at the beginning of the contest, this would not be possible for a player who had not conducted the game himself, or to a spectator who is ignorant of the rules of the game. This crude example may enable us perhaps to comprehend

better what the essential difficulties of every metaphysical attempt at explanation is, and how also science alone can render such explanation possible by resolving one after another the well-defined questions which reality presents.

Whatever misgivings one may have with regard to the hypothesis of M. Ribert, it nevertheless is deserving of study at first-hand. Many of the author's ideas upon social problems appear to me correct, and I have read them with sympathy.

The last work of M. DE ROBERTY, *Les fondements de l'éthique, troisième essai sur la morale considérée comme sociologie élémentaire*, does not appear to me to have any well-defined object. It is not well compacted, but it is also one of the best which the author has written, although embarrassed by widely divergent considerations in which the connecting link sometimes escapes the reader. I would call attention to the author's interesting views (1) on art, which M. de Roberty shows to be the apprehension of truths of a certain order selected by the artist; (2) upon the teleological problem,—a problem which has been falsified by the factitious antinomy of cause and effect, which does not prevent finality, that is, cause transformed into purpose or motive of action, from being the characteristic criterion of moral or social existence; (3) upon the general theory of crime, founded upon the essential sameness of the crime and the punishment,—where I shall not follow the author; (4) upon the problem of unity, where he reaffirms anew his monism, the highest expression of which is found for him in what he calls "social psychism,"—the ultimate transformation, if I interpret it aright, of the universal energy; and finally, (5) upon the theory of progress which, like all his other theories, is deserving of both criticism and meditation.

I have spoken several times here of the debate which divides psychologists. Is M. de Roberty a partisan of the psychological school with M. Tarde, or of the determinist, economical school with M. Durkheim? He criticises them both; he reproaches them with not having succeeded in explaining "the necessary movement which carries societies towards unknown destinies." The facts, he

says, which they both invoke as causes,—the bio-social facts on the one hand and the institutions on the other,—are ultimately the results only of the “pure or elementary social phenomenon,” of consolidated groups of facts, of concretions, so to speak. According to M. de Roberty, the hypothesis of an unconscious and unintentional “psychicity,” springing from the mutual contact of the physiological psychivities, and exercising a direct influence upon the formation of our ideas, sentiments, and volitions,—direct agents or immediate causes of social phenomena,—such an hypothesis alone appears to be able to dissipate the darkness which surrounds the strange, mysterious fact of a series of unconscious and involuntary changes due as a totality to such factors as the mobile consciousness and fugitive intention of the passing hour. But is this not tantamount to admitting that the fact of living in societies determines a new state of psychological individuality,—a state which manifests itself by institutions of all orders, by positive phenomena which remain of necessity the subject-matter or object of study of sociology? It does not seem to me possible to understand differently this “psychicity” without making of it an incomprehensible entity.

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The work of M. F. RAUH, *De la méthode dans la psychologie des sentiments*, is a vindication, particularly directed against M. Ribot, of the so-called intellectualist theory of the emotions. I have to criticise this work for being slightly confused, which is probably due to its wealth of details, and for being embarrassed in its terminology, despite its superfluity of definitions, which are in themselves difficult to understand. But this criticism does not prevent us from recognising the great erudition of M. Rauh, the skillfulness of his treatment, and the justice of a number of his criticisms, which afford material for reflexion even when they do not compel conviction. He is wrong, I think, in imputing to all the partisans of the physico-mechanical and physico-chemical theories as he calls them, the intention of subverting the hypothesis of a “psychical virtuality” acting in the economy of the world. The truth is that we

can accept this hypothesis, which is a metaphysical one, without disqualifying ourselves from studying reality as it is actually offered to us, that is of considering psychological facts under the form of a strict dependence upon the moral and psychical order. This way of looking at things has suggested several valuable works. It has put psychologists upon the track of useful researches and fruitful observations. That they have been seized too soon with the ambition of simplifying the facts in order to explain them, that they have chosen with too great complacency this or that order of phenomena as their explanatory principle, I will not deny. But we should not be excessively severe with them on this score. They have brought order into chaos, they have upon the whole disentangled the complex subject-matter of psychology, and have prepared a better field for future discussions.

M. Rauh seems to me to be especially right in his view that in the present state of affairs we should not enunciate systems, but should be contented with "limited syntheses" and "laws of detail," and should thus leave psychology for the time being more free, supple, and undulating, and less abstract. He is again partly right in refusing to admit that the lower explains the higher; but his attitude here ought not to lead us to neglect the analysis of elementary or rudimentary psychological states, genetic studies, and the experiments of the laboratory. Simple descriptions should not be accepted for *total* explanations; nevertheless, it is true that all real knowledge of the higher has the knowledge of the lower for its foundation, and that the intimate bonds existing between natural things cannot be broken without damage.

I suppose that no objection will be made against M. Rauh's view that we clearly conceive and know the phenomena of conscience "under the form of pure psychical forces, of which human feelings furnish the type." Granting that our effort to interpret the world is satisfied by such a conception, has our curiosity to know it been exhausted? Let us continue, then, to work and carefully to systematise our materials, without any concern for metaphysical propositions, which forestall and overleap the immediate problems which it is important to resolve.

I shall make brief mention only of the following works: *Le Catholicisme et la vie de l'esprit*,<sup>1</sup> by M. G. L. FONSEGRIVE, a work which comes to us as a fragment of apologetic demonstration for Catholicism, in the service of which the author has placed his talent as a writer, and his skill and acumen in dialectics and criticism; *Le libre-arbitre*, by M. E. NAVILLE, where an energetic plea is made for the "admission of some element of relative liberty" into the plan of the universe; *La foi morale, et reflets de foi morale*, by M. HARRACA, a notable contribution to the work of the Society for Ethical Culture which may be commended, provided we do not forget that ethics should not be separated from some definite vivifying doctrine, and that the very conduct of life, properly interpreted, involves from the very outset some lofty religious or philosophical conclusion.

*Le rôle social de la femme*, by Mme. ANNA LAMPÉRIÈRE, a little book full of common sense, which has come at the right time. *L'âme du criminel*, by DR. MAURICE DE FLEURY,—a study based upon the facts and data of science, and leading to practical conclusions both for prophylactics and for the suppression of crime.

*L'idéalisme social*, by M. E. FOURNIÈRE,—a work of confiding ardor in which the author takes up again, in the style of the socialist school of which he is a member, the questions of property, family, and state, and of which the directing thought familiar to many modern thinkers is that there are no social fatalities, that without us and beyond us the universe is an act of fatality, that through us and in us it becomes an act of will. *Psychologie du socialisme*, by M. G. LE BON, an important work diametrically opposed to the preceding, full of facts and ideas, of correct form and interesting quotations, in which M. Le Bon shows very well the fundamental error of socialism and the danger of that doctrine for the Latin countries in particular; but to oppose which he knows of nothing else than a negative scepticism, the absence of all ideals, and a submission to the mechanical order of the world, which it is the

<sup>1</sup> Lecoffre, publisher. Where no name is mentioned, the publisher is F. Alcan.

task of man to transform continually into an order of morality and justice.

*L'Ignorance et L'Irréflexion*, by M. GÉRARD VARET, an ingenious and learned thesis for the doctorate; *Nouvelles Études de Mythologie*, by MAX MUELLER, translated by M. LÉON JOB; *La Nouvelle monadologie*,<sup>1</sup> by MM. RENOUVIER and PRAT, which I am permitted to mention merely, despite the importance of the authors and the work.

LUCIEN ARRÉAT.

PARIS.

<sup>1</sup> Colin, publisher,



## CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.

### THE GOD-PROBLEM.—CRITICISM OF AN AGNOSTIC, WITH AN EDITORIAL REPLY.

#### IS DR. CARUS A THEIST?

Dr. Carus recently lectured before the Philosophical Club of the University of Chicago, and on another occasion before the Philosophical Club of the University of Ann Arbor, on "God." This lecture is published in the October *Monist*, of which it forms the most attractive feature.

Even from the standpoint of the Atheist, Dr. Carus opines, "the God-idea remains the most important thought in the history of the world." "It is neither irrelevant nor an aberration, but contains the most important, the deepest and most comprehensive, philosophically the most explanatory, and practically the most applicable truth of all truths." And then Dr. Carus vehemently assails the Agnostic position as he conceives it:

"Agnosticism . . . as a bankruptcy of thought, is not only the weakest, but also the most injurious, philosophy. It is the philosophy of indolence, which, on account of its own insolvency, declares that the most vital questions of man's life, the questions of the soul, the soul's relation to the body, the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, the creation, and the ultimate purpose of being, are beyond the reach of reason."

Especially Dr. Carus discovers a rock of offence in such a "glittering phrase" as "the finite cannot comprehend the infinite." Is Dr. Carus able to "comprehend" infinite space? Apply mathematics to that conception; no reasoning from "mathematical lines" and "mechanical contrivances" will assist such comprehension: we may apprehend what we do not comprehend.

Dr. Carus affirms that there are but two kinds of Agnosticism—"the pious Agnosticism of him who would not allow the light of science to shine upon the problems of religion; and the infidel Agnosticism of the scoffer, who argues that, knowledge on matters of religion being unattainable, we ought to leave religion alone." The latter proposition is offensively worded and loosely phrased. What is "infidel Agnosticism"? Infidel implies "faithless"; does Dr. Carus mean that the "scof-

fer" is "infidel" to Agnosticism? But should such "scoffer" argue that "knowledge of matters of religion [is] unobtainable," that is a faith. To what, then, is even the "scoffer" faithless? The orthodox Christian Theist might describe Dr. Carus's position as "infidel Theism," and we should anticipate an exposure of such misuse of words. "Christian Agnosticism" is an oblique compliment to Agnosticism; "infidel Agnosticism" an illogical offence.

"While even the Atheist's denial will be helpful,"—not *may*, be it noted, but *will*—"the Agnostic position is neither theoretically valid nor practicable, for it leaves all opinions, be they scientific, superstitious, or mere guesswork, on the same level of equal incommensurability." Exactly what is meant by "equal incommensurability" in this connexion is, for us, mere "guesswork." We have a "superstitious" conviction that Dr. Carus is devoutly sincere, but not infallible; that in his aggressive bias against Agnosticism he is not always lucid, any more than discriminating.

We have noted his generous acceptance of the "help" of the "Atheist's denial." Here again he errs. We have not understood "Atheism" to imply absolute denial, but rather as a suspensive negation of theological affirmations. Assuming that "Atheists"—or those who think they are "Atheists"—are committed to denial, "Atheism" has no place in philosophy except as an unphilosophical reliance on borrowing intellectual capital from, and trading on the name of, a non-existent rich relation.

But the god of Carusian Monism is either reaching a loftier height of poetical and ethical ideal, or is emerging from philosophical abstraction into definite affirmation, and is by means of a human soul, whose noble sincerity is indisputable, revealing himself to man through editorial expositions in *The Monist*. Lord Herbert of Cherbury claimed a revelation from God to publish a refutation of a respectfully venerable "revelation." Our suggestion should be obvious.

This is what Dr. Carus publishes to the world:

"God is, further, not an indifferent being to us. He has a personal and private relation to all his creatures, being nearer to every one of them than the beating of their hearts and the neural vibration of their brains. He is in them, and yet different to them, and infinitely high above them. He is their life, their home, whence they start, and the goal whither they travel. God is not like us, but we are like him. He is the light of our life. He is the mariner's compass which guides us, and the anchor of hope on which we rely. Unless we feel his presence, we shall find no peace in the restlessness of this world. Unless we sanctify our lives by the purport which his existence imparts to all life, we can find no comfort in our afflictions. Unless we recognise that our soul is an actualisation of his eternal thoughts, we shall not learn to fight the right way in the struggle for existence. Unless we listen to the still, small voice that teaches us our duties, we shall not obtain that blissful assurance which the childhood of God alone can afford."

This certainty of utterance seems to be inspired by a new conviction. Such new conviction may command our remote admiration if explicitly avowed. Of absolute sincerity in any conviction there is no question. We do not allude to

"abstractions as being empty," nor is Dr. Carus in appeal or rebuke to Agnostics in any sense to be compared to a "missionary" addressing "Zulus, or, in our midst . . . a Salvationist meeting."

To one querist—in what is alluded to as a "lively discussion" at the Chicago Club—who asked if Dr. Carus did "not explain too much," it was counter-queried: "Is it possible to explain too much?" In answer to another question, Dr. Carus alleged that his conception of God "was not only compatible with the Christian conception; it is the Christian conception itself, in its matured and purified form." We ask for more explanation. "Is it possible to explain too much?"

We yield to none in admiration of the splendid and catholic spirit, the lofty ethical inspiration, the oftentimes exactitude of philosophical thought and definition, that we associate with the attractive personality of Dr. Carus. His persistent misconceptions of Agnosticism we have willingly—although regretfully—attributed to unconscious bias, in degree of rebellion against dogmatic delimitation of the knowable. Time was when he appeared as the apostle of science in denial of knowledge other than physical science can yield. And we who have—on this side of the Atlantic—through many years acclaimed his work, despite his petulant upbraiding of Agnosticism, have now the right to ask for "light, more light." Have the "Philosophy of Science," the "Science of Religion and the Religion of Science," evolved a coherent Theistic belief? If not, is it inconceivable that Theists may reasonably assume that the editor of *The Monist* has a god-knowledge he is able to announce. "Is it possible to explain too much?" AMOS WATERS in *The Literary Guide*.

#### IN REPLY TO MR. AMOS WATERS.

Being always anxious to have his views pass through the furnace of criticism, the editor of *The Monist* has republished from *The Literary Guide* of London, England, Mr. Amos Waters's friendly but energetic protest against his "vehemently assailing the Agnostic position." In reply we make the following comments:

I am loath to reopen the debate on Agnosticism, and repeat here only that there are many kinds of Agnosticism. On some other occasion I expressed my approval of the Agnosticism of modesty, which is a suspension of judgment so long as there are not adequate grounds to be had for forming an opinion. But the Agnosticism of modesty is a personal attitude, not a doctrine. As soon as it is changed into a doctrine it becomes the Agnosticism of arrogance. By Agnosticism of arrogance I understand the theory that the main problems of life (viz., concerning the existence or non-existence of God and of the soul, as to the immortality of the soul, and the relation of the soul to the body, as to the origin of life, the nature and authority of morals, etc., etc.) are not within the ken of human comprehension. There is no need of entering now into details, as I have discussed the subject time and again and there is no need of repeating myself.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Hemiles of Science*, pp. 213 ff.; *The Open Court* No. 212; *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 134 ff.; and *Primer of Philosophy*, *passim*.

Mr. Herbert Spencer is the representative Agnostic thinker, and when I criticise Agnosticism, I mean Mr. Spencer's Agnosticism. His Agnosticism is not a mere suspense of judgment but a most emphatic declaration that the mystery of life is utterly incomprehensible, that the substance of the soul (whatever that may mean) cannot be known, that energy is inscrutable, etc., etc. He has of late reiterated his principle in censuring Professor Japp for asserting that organised life cannot have risen from inorganic nature and Mr. Spencer declares expressly that he rejects the opposite view too. He rejects both horns of the dilemma, the affirmation as well as the denial, winding up his argument with these words:

"My own belief is that neither interpretation is adequate. A recently issued revised and enlarged edition of the first volume of the *Principles of Biology* contains a chapter on 'The Dynamical Element in Life,' in which I have contended that the theory of a vital principle fails and that the physico-chemical theory also fails; the corollary being that in its ultimate nature life is incomprehensible."

This high-handed way of condemning the very attempt at solving a problem on the plea that it is insolvable is the Agnosticism which I reject. I know that Mr. Spencer is commonly regarded as the most liberal, progressive, and most scientific philosopher, but I cannot help thinking that he is not. Mr. Amos Waters must not blame me for not joining the liberals in their enthusiastic laudation of Agnosticism; for Agnosticism is to my mind illiberal, anti-scientific, and reactionary in the highest degree.

How does Mr. Spencer know that the main problem of Biology, the question as to the origin of organised life, lies beyond the ken of human knowledge? Judging from the tone of his expositions he is not informed on the present state of things and has not very closely followed the investigations of biologists. And how does Mr. Spencer prove his proposition? He does so in the old fashioned dogmatic way, by quoting scriptures. There is only this difference between him and the theologian, that the latter quotes from the Bible and Mr. Spencer refers to his own writings.

Mr. Amos Waters, I know, understands by Agnosticism the Agnosticism of modesty, a suspense of judgment as to problems as yet unsolved, and I repeat that I gladly join him on that score, but Agnosticism is commonly understood as Mr. Spencer defines it, and whatever admiration we may have for Mr. Spencer personally, for his noble intentions, his studious habits, his industrious collection of interesting materials, his versatility in writing on various subjects, we must not be blind to the truth that his philosophy is wrong in its roots and exercises as baneful an influence as does the religious Dogmatism which it attempts to replace. Its main usefulness consists in stimulating thought and in disquieting the complacent assurance of the old fogies, who imagine themselves in possession of the whole truth.

There are some minor points in Mr. Amos Waters's comments. He says: "We may not apprehend what we do not comprehend."

In my opinion the reverse is true. There are many things which cannot be

apprehended and yet are they quite comprehensible. For instance, there is nothing incomprehensible in infinitude; but we cannot apprehend infinite space. In other words, it is impossible to make anything infinite (i. e., infinite space, or eternity, i. e., infinite time) an object of immediate apperception, to perceive it by the senses; but we can understand it to perfection and there is nothing mysterious about it. That we cannot apprehend any infinitude is as much a matter of course as that in counting we can never count up to infinity, or that we cannot bodily be in several places at the same time. It is a physical impossibility, but there is nothing mysterious about it; nothing that might cause us to turn Agnostic.

Mr. Amos Waters is startled to learn that the God-conception proposed in *The Monist* is "the Christian conception itself in its matured and purified form." This is nothing to be alarmed at, for it is simply the statement of a historical fact. The Christian God-conception has undergone changes. The God of the church authorities who instituted the inquisition is different from the God of the Reformers, and the God of Calvin is no longer the God of the Presbyterians of to-day. My own God-conception has developed from the traditional Protestant God-idea and has been modified under the influence of science, passing through a period of outspoken Atheism, until it was transformed into what some sarcastic but friendly critics of mine have called the God-conception of Atheism—the doctrine of the superpersonal God, which has been set forth at length in the October number of *The Monist* and has become a stumbling block to Mr. Amos Waters.

I am fully satisfied that my article on God is sufficiently clear not to be misunderstood as a pandering to that kind of God-belief which I have unhesitatingly and without any Agnostic suspense of judgment branded as a superstition. Mr. Amos Waters must bear in mind that I have not requested any one to believe in God, but have simply investigated the question of what God must be, if we understand by God that something which moulds the world and shapes the fate of man. I have, however, come to the conclusion, and am becoming more and more convinced, that the superpersonal God, the God of science, the eternal norm of truth and righteousness, is God, indeed; he alone is God. He is what the pagans (including the pagan Christians) have been groping after for ages.

P. C.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

**ELEMENTS OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION. Part II. Ontological ; Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered Before the University of Edinburgh in 1898. By C. P. Tiele, Theol. D.; Litt. D. (Bonon.); Hon. M. R. A. S., etc., Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion in the University of Leyden. In two volumes. Vol. II. Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood and Sons. 1899. Pages, vi, 286. Price, 7s. 6d.**

This second volume of Prof. C. P. Tiele's *Elements of the Science of Religion* is one of the most important books written on the subject. It contains a philosophy of religion which reflects the mature opinion of a philosopher and at the same time gives an appreciation of man's religious attitude such as can be acquired only by personal experience.

All the most important problems of religion are touched upon, its essence (Chapter VIII), its constituents, i. e., its essential features (Chapter I), its origin (Chapter IX), its place in man's spiritual life (Chapter X) and its relation to philosophy (Chapter III). Special chapters are devoted to religious manifestations, worship, prayers and offering (VI), and to religion as an institution, i. e., the Church (VII), further to faith (VI), to the constant element in all conceptions of God (IV), and the relationship between God and man (V).

While we fully agree with the spirit in which Professor Tiele treats the subject and also in the main with his conclusions, we would in some places suggest other terms, which in our opinion would be more striking and comprehensive. Professor Tiele, for instance, regards piety as the abiding characteristic of all religion, considering the Dutch *vroom*, the German *fromm* and the Latin *pius* as practically of the same significance, which expresses "devotion, or consecration," because "it involves the idea of self-dedication and personal sacrifice." But the essence of piety according to Professor Tiele is adoration, and therefore he adds, "the essence of religion is adoration. . . . To adore is to love 'with all one's heart and soul and mind and strength.' To adore is to give oneself with all that one has and holds dearest." We cannot help thinking that this definition is not comprehensive enough and would exclude not only those lower religions which have not as yet a conception of a Deity that deserves adoration, but also the philosophical atheist who re-



jects adoration as unworthy of man. Is for instance Schopenhauer irreligious, or to take a still more flagrant example, is Nietzsche irreligious? In our conception Nietzsche's philosophy (considered purely in its results) is irreligious, as subverting the very basis of all religion, but the instinct that prompted him to write, to denounce morality, to preach the over-man, are decidedly of a religious nature. Yet there is no adoration, there is no self-sacrifice; there is, on the contrary, a bold self-assertion, which stands in a conscious opposition to devotion, to consecration, to self-sacrifice. We propose to replace Professor Tiele's definition of religion as "piety or adoration" by the broader term "conviction." Religion comprises the whole man; it is (as Professor Tiele recognises) emotional in its nature but it is an emotion of definite coloring, which it receives from its intellectual ingredients, consisting of a conception of the world, life's destiny, and duties, etc., etc. An opinion (be it scientific knowledge or mere belief, or a superstition) which ensouls a man as a sentiment prompting him to act in a definite way, is called conviction, and we shall find that conviction is the essential feature of all religions, true as well as false, barbarous as well as civilised, dogmatic as well as scientific or philosophical.

We trust that Professor Tiele would not be disinclined to such a substitution of definitions, for the detailed explanations in which he leads up to his results are the best evidence that he attacks the religious problems in the same spirit as we. What he says, for instance, concerning "the husk and the kernel" (pp. 182 ff.) in appreciating as well as criticising Professor Siebeck is very good and commendable; and so are his remarks regarding the various views concerning the origin of religion. Religion does not originate from morality, it is not a product of reasoning, it is not due to the ideal of perfection; nor is it the yearning of the finite for the infinite; and we expect Professor Tiele to add that religion is always from the most rudimentary beginnings and superstitious customs down to the most recent expressions of philosophers a passion for living up to one's deepest conviction; but Professor Tiele declares "The origin of religion consists in the fact that man has the Infinite within him even before he is himself conscious of it and whether he recognises it or not." Professor Tiele acknowledges that "the doctrine of conscience and sense of duty urgently requires revision," and we have attempted the task in *The Ethical Problem*.<sup>1</sup> We cannot enter here into the details of how conscience originates as a complex of motor ideas, all of them being the composite traces of former impressions, inherited tendencies, instructions, experiences, etc.; but the result is a conviction which asserts itself not always in logical arguments but frequently with the impetuosity of an emotion. Man's conscience is the organ of our religious life, because conscience is conviction.

Professor Tiele finds that the root-idea in every conception of God-head is

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<sup>1</sup> See the chapters "The Growth of Conscience," pp. 119-124; "The 'Is' and the 'Ought,'" pp. 279-284; and "An Analysis of the Moral Ought," pp. 285-295.

power (p. 81), and deems it hardly necessary to add that "in order to stamp a superhuman power as a deity, it should be worthy of adoration."

"Men worship that only which they deem above them. Not the beast of prey, whose claws make them tremble, nor the bloodthirsty tyrant who persecutes them, but those beings alone whom they judge superior to man.

"The power of the evil spirits is indeed greater than their own, but not superhuman, although perhaps we may call it supersensual. The Zarathustrian erects no altars to Ahriman, nor does the mediæval Christian build chapels for Satan, however much they may dread these spirits. The Mohammedan casts stones at Iblis, and our Christian forefathers delighted in popular tales in which the devil was tricked or held up to derision. But to a power which he regards as superhuman man looks up with awe, and he speaks of it with reverence."

This distinction between good and evil powers that are more powerful than man is hardly sufficient, and yet we are inclined to endorse Tiele's view that power alone is sufficient as the characteristic feature of Divinity. But we must bear in mind that power is here used in a specific sense; it is not physical energy, but signifies that which will abide. We may call truth a power in this sense; and also right, justice, righteousness, love, good-will, and even such things as knowledge. The tiger, the tyrant, and other evils which may be conceived as demoniacal, are powers of another kind. They are strength that asserts itself in contradiction to the universal order of nature; they are temporary disturbances only which, when their day has passed away, will have the curse of condemnation imprinted on them. The sway of right and justice is more enduring than physical power; it is that which keeps man in agreement with the cosmic law of the interrelations of living beings.

God is the standard of right. God is not "moral" himself, morality does not apply to him. Individual beings only, God's creatures, are moral or immoral, according to their behavior. If they act in accord with the norm of truth and right they are moral; otherwise they are immoral, and it is this norm which we call God.

God represents the authority of the moral "ought." Thus it happens that the savage's god is as savage as are his ideas of morality. His immoral immolations are, closely judged, moral actions. Thus Professor Tiele is right when he says:

"It is not until a late period that the religiously disposed man strives to express the superhuman character of his gods by ascribing to them ethical attributes. They become the vindicators of law, the rewarders of virtue, the punishers of vice."

This is simply the result of a finer perception of the moral law in the events of human experience. Man's view of the nature of his god or gods is always analogous to his conception of right and wrong, and we could therefore not accept Professor Tiele's opinion, that "the development of the ethical sentiment is a very different matter."

We need not enter into further details, but conclude with a few quotations

from the chapter "Philosophy and Religious Doctrine." Professor Tiele says: "Religion begins with conceptions awakened by emotions and experiences, and "these conceptions produce definite sentiments, which were already present in "germ in the first religious emotions, but which can only be aroused to consciousness by these conceptions; and these sentiments manifest themselves in actions. "But all this is spontaneous, and originally at least it was not the result of conscious reflexion. Reflexion comes on the scene at a later period, on a higher "stage of development, and consciously frames its creed or doctrine of faith."

As to the alleged conflict between philosophy and religion Professor Tiele says: "Their dissensions often arise from misunderstanding, from the confounding of a specific and temporary form of religion with religion itself. Philosophers "oppose religion because they are unable to distinguish it from the conceptions in "which it presents itself to them, or to comprehend that these conceptions are "merely an ephemeral garb; and they do not take the trouble to penetrate to the "ineradicable needs of the human soul which are revealed in these conceptions. "Theologians, laboring under a similar misconception, regard philosophy as an "enemy of religion, because it subjects to criticism the poetic and philosophic "forms, the myths and dogmas in which religion expresses itself, and do not perceive that it thus in reality conduces to the purification and the development of "religion. But the principal cause of these dissensions is a different one. It consists in the difference of development which often subsists between the two. Philosophy continues its researches without intermission. Religious doctrine, on "the other hand—and here I allude not to philosophic theologians and religious "thinkers, but solely to organised communities—remains stationary for long periods. For a long time elapses before the need of revision is felt. Whatever it has "appropriated from philosophy and science, its knowledge of nature and mankind "the physiology and psychology by which its conceptions are connected, all belong "to a period long since elapsed. In this respect, therefore, it lags behind philosophy. In so far as its garb is concerned, it stands upon an obsolete platform. "And, instead of trying to vindicate its position with great persistence, but always "unsuccessfully, and thus injuring rather than promoting religion, it would do "well to bring its conceptions and arguments into harmony with the more accurate "knowledge and clearer insight attained in modern times. Nor in doing so would "it require to abandon a single jot of the essence of belief. Philosophy and religious doctrine must, therefore, ever continue in mutual intercourse. Philosophy "must not be content to criticise religion and faith, or perhaps to condemn them "on account of an obsolete doctrine which may happen once to have been officially "recognised in one communion or another, and accepted by the multitude without "much reflexion, but which has long since been modified by earnest seekers of "religious truth and brought into harmony with the demands of religious souls "and of general spiritual development. Religious doctrine, on the other hand,

"must not come into conflict with what has been ascertained and established in other domains, whether moral, scientific, or philosophical."

From the bottom of our heart we say, Amen! These sentences from one of the most prominent theologians of to-day express exactly the position which we have taken in both magazines, *The Open Court* and *The Monist*, and which we have defended and advanced in all our publications. Whatever disagreements we may have with Professor Tiele in definitions or in the formulation of laws such as determine the development of religion, we know ourselves to be in full sympathy with him concerning the maxims of treating religion, and take the same attitude as to the fundamental principle of theology as a science.

P. C.

TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE MÉCANIQUE CHIMIQUE, FONDÉE SUR LA THERMODYNAMIQUE.

By *P. Duhem*, Professor of Theoretical Physics in the Faculty of Sciences at Bordeaux. Tome III. Les mélanges homogènes; les dissolutions. Large octavo. Paris: A. Hermann. 1898. 380 pages.

Physical chemistry, or at least the mathematical theory of the subject, is known in France as "chemical mechanics." In the present large work by Duhem, it is treated as a branch of thermodynamics, or, rather, as a branch of the general energy theory. The object of the energy theory is to describe the mutual transformations of work and the work-equivalents of effects that are producible by the expenditure of work. Its adequateness to this end makes it the most serviceable method we have for the study of physical chemistry; for chemical phenomena, in their physical aspect, may be regarded as interchanges of work and thermal, electric, and chemical work-equivalents.

A very complete description, in particular, of the more or less complicated states of equilibrium to which chemical changes lead, is supplied by the energy theory. For, a fundamental theorem of the theory assigns the direction in which spontaneous processes proceed under given conditions; and herefrom it is possible to deduct at once the characteristics of the resulting states of equilibrium. The development of the thermodynamic theory of chemical equilibrium is due, in the main, to our countryman J. Willard Gibbs. The labors of Duhem have served to amplify it, and to develop some of its more remote consequences.

In arranging his material, Duhem follows, roughly, the historical order. He presents first the fundamental principles of thermodynamics; then the thermodynamic behavior of single substances, i. e., the phenomena of vaporisation, fusion, the transformation of allotropic forms, and the continuity of liquid and acritical states; and, finally, in the present third volume, the newer theory of the physical behavior of solutions. A fourth volume, yet to appear, is to complete the whole.

This book of Duhem is the first serious attempt that has been made to produce a comprehensive treatise on mathematical chemistry. It is fortunate that the task has been undertaken by so competent a man. And it is a great convenience to the

specialist to have assembled here, in well-rounded form, the results of the many voluminous memoirs that Duhem has published during the past dozen years.

The book, on the whole, has been carefully written. It gives a good general view of its subject; many of its features are new, both in form and in matter; and it gives everywhere evidence of great erudition. One serious objection only is to be made to it: its style is diffuse. The whole thing might have been written in fewer words, and with fewer equations. J. E. TREVOR.

LEÇONS DE CHIMIE PHYSIQUE, PROFESSÉES A L'UNIVERSITÉ DE BERLIN. By J. H. van't Hoff. Translated from the German by M. Corvisy. Première partie: La Dynamique chimique. Paris: A. Hermann. 1898.

Two very important treatises on physical chemistry are now appearing in parts. One of these is Ostwald's enormous *Lehrbuch*, the other is van't Hoff's *Lectures on Theoretical and Physical Chemistry*. Both are written in German; but in the present volume we have a French translation of the First Part of van't Hoff's book. These two authors being, probably, the best known teachers and investigators in physical chemistry, comprehensive works by them on the subject have an unusual interest.

Van't Hoff's book presents substantially its author's lectures at the University of Berlin, but expanded somewhat beyond their original limits. Its subject-matter is assembled in three parts, under the heads, "chemical dynamics," "chemical statics," and "composition and properties of matter." The present first part, on chemical dynamics, treats of "the mutual actions of bodies, chemical transformation, affinity, the velocities of reactions, and chemical equilibria," thus comprising the greater part of what is commonly understood as physical chemistry. The two remaining parts will almost necessarily contain a lot of incoherent details, and a collection of the hypothetical lumber of the subject—"the constitution of matter atoms, molecules, and the structure and configuration of molecules."

In presenting each topic, van't Hoff begins with an experimental study of a concrete example, usually one that has been investigated in his own laboratory; then represents graphically the results that are obtained; and, finally, draws his general conclusion and elaborates its theoretical development. This natural method, together with the clearness with which the book is written, are certain to make it what its author intended it to be: "An aid to those who wish to assimilate the recent achievements of physical chemistry." J. E. TREVOR.

CALCUL DE GÉNÉRALISATION. By G. Oltramare, Doyen de la Faculté des Sciences de l'Université de Genève. Paris: Librairie Scientifique. A. Hermann, rue de la Sorbonne 8. 1899. Pages, 191.

The present work is one belonging to higher analysis, and will claim the attention of advanced mathematicians and logicians only. *The Calculus of Generalisation*, which is the name that Dr. Oltramare has given to his science, is con-

cerned with the representation of uniform functions under a symbolical form such that the principal operations to which functions may be subjected, as differentiation and integration, can be effected by means of a simple algebraical analysis which is very easily manipulated. He claims for his Calculus the establishment of general formulæ for the determination of definite integrals, of which Cauchy has given several examples; the establishment of formulæ for the transformation of series into definite integrals; its easy application to the integration of equations; and so forth, and so forth. The author contends that his methods bear the same relation to higher analysis that logarithms do to arithmetical computation, diminishing in many cases the difficulties of differentiation and integration. And he further believes that his discipline ought to find an important place in the curriculum of higher mathematical study. μ.

KANT UND HELMHOLTZ. Populärwissenschaftliche Studie. Von *Ludwig Goldschmidt*, Ph. D., Mathematischem Revisor der Lebensversicherungsbank für Deutschland in Gotha. Hamburg und Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss. 1898. Pages, xvi+135. Price, 5 M.

Students of epistemology will find this booklet of Dr. Goldschmidt to be one well worth perusal. Though making no pretence to being more than a popular discussion, it has many solid merits. Dr. Goldschmidt is consulting actuary of the National Life Assurance Association of Germany, in Gotha, is an enthusiastic Kantian, and remarkably well versed in the literature of the Kantian epoch. He upholds the Kantian theory of space against the attacks of the modern metageometricians, impugns the theory that the axioms of geometry are empirical in character, and adopts the Kantian theory of *a priori* judgments in its entirety. With all his great admiration for Gauss, Riemann, and Helmholtz, he yet claims that their achievements must be subjected to the analytical tests which the Sage of Königsberg established for all knowledge.

The mere suggestion of a parallel between Kant and Helmholtz brings with it the most varied philosophical implications; and the applicability of the parallel to the problems now engaging attention in the theory of knowledge is directly evident. μ.

PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGISCHE ERKENNTNISTHEORIE. Von *Dr. Theodor Ziehen*, Professor in Jena. Jena: Gustav Fischer. 1898. Pages, 105. Price, M. 2.80.

It is no easy task to follow Professor Ziehen through the labyrinth of his arguments let alone to condense the results of his epistemological investigations. It is difficult to argue with a man to whom the terms "psychical," "conscious," and "real" or "actually existing" are identical and in whose philosophy "extra-psychical non-psychical objects have no existence." Professor Ziehen reduces sensations and perceptions to two components, "the reduction-ingredient" so called, and "the  $\nu$  component," the latter being a learned name for the epistemological



part which the sentient subject plays, consisting of the physiological factors from the sensory apparatus to the cortex of the brain. No exception need be taken to many stilted propositions which might easily be reduced to very simple truisms, except on the ground that they will mystify unsophisticated readers. The book is the attempt of a psychologist to free himself from metaphysicism; he seems to have succeeded only to the degree of having relabelled the old and naive conceptions of natural laws as relations of psychical components and has after all fallen a prey to agnosticism, for Ziehen declares that the ultimate ego [whatever that may mean] lies without the pale of cognition.<sup>1</sup> We grant that students may be benefited by the mental gymnastics of this book, nor do we deny that many perplexing propositions turn out to be quite acceptable when the author's definitions are carefully heeded, but we believe that directer methods would have led to clearer results and several problems would be recognised as much simpler than they appear through the spectacles of a learned professor. Instead of trying to get rid of metaphysics, the time seems to be ripe for us to bethink ourselves of its true and proper significance.

495.

EXPERIMENTAL MORPHOLOGY. Part Second. Effect of Chemical and Physical Agents upon Growth. By Charles Benedict Davenport, Ph. D., Instructor in Zoölogy in Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1899. Pages, vi+228. Price, \$2.00.

The *Experimental Morphology* of Dr. Charles Benedict Davenport is concerned with the development of the individual "regarded as a complexus of processes rather than a mere succession of different forms"; that is to say, it is concerned with *organic* growth as distinguished from *evolutionary* growth, or differentiation. The central idea of the work is that ontogeny is a series of reactions to chemical and physical agents. It is essentially a digest of the published observations which have been made on this subject, but gives special attention to the results and methods of those investigations which have a quantitative value. The first part dealt with the effect of chemical and physical agents upon *protoplasm*, discussing (1) protoplasmic movements, (2) growth, (3) cell-division, and (4) differentiation. The present, or second, part deals with the effect of chemical and physical agents upon *growth*. The student will find the work to be a complete *index raisonné* of the subject, giving not only the literature but a systematic and critical exposition of the main upshot of that literature. The present part is divided into ten chapters, entitled as follows: (1) Introduction: On Normal Growth; (2) Effect of Chemical Agents Upon Growth; (3) The Effect of Water Upon Growth; (4) Effect of the Density of the Medium Upon Growth; (5) Effect of Molar Agents Upon Growth; (6) Effect of Gravity Upon Growth; (7) Effect of Electricity Upon Growth; (8) Effect of Light Upon Growth; (9) Effect of Heat on Growth; and

<sup>1</sup>The passage runs as follows, "das letzte Ich, welches als beharrende höchste Instanz das definitive Erkennen leisten könnte, erreichen wir nicht."

(10) Effect of Complex Agents Upon Growth, and General Conclusions. The index is complete, and the general arrangement of the work admirable in every detail. Despite its enormous practical importance, the theory and systematic study of growth have been generally neglected by the text-books, and in view of this fact the author believes that he has supplied a real want in the literature of biology and of biological economics. He has not neglected the theoretical side, and has especially pointed out the direction in which new and fruitful investigations are to be pursued. Altogether the work is one which will claim the interest even of the general student.

μ.

ABHANDLUNGEN DER KAISERLICHEN LEOPOLDINISCH-CAROLINISCHEN DEUTSCHEN AKADEMIE DER NATURFORSCHER. 70. Band. Mit 21 Tafeln. 71. Band. Mit 8 Tafeln. Halle, 1898. Buchdruckerei von Ehrhardt Karras in Halle a. S. Für die Akademie in Commission bei W. Engelmann in Leipzig.

Printed in large folio and averaging 400 pages each, these volumes constitute a really monumental piece of typography, and not too much praise can be bestowed upon the lavish and elegant manner in which they have been illustrated. The monograph of Dr. Frobenius, in the 70th volume, on the figureheads of boats of the Kamerun natives, and that of Dr. Zopf, on the diseases produced by parasitic fungi in lichens, are accompanied by as fine specimens of colored heliograph printing as we have ever seen, and a like commendation is due to the plates of the geometrical monographs on the history of trigonometry, by Braunmühl, in the 71st volume. We append a list of the contents of the two volumes. They consist of solid and original contributions by men of the first rank in the scientific world, and certainly deserve a place in the large libraries of the world.

Contents of Volume 70: (I.) L. Frobenius. Der Kameruner Schiffsschnabel und seine Motive; (II.) W. Zopf. Untersuchungen über die durch parasitische Pilze hervorgerufenen Krankheiten der Flechten (Erste Abhandlung); (III.) H. Hallier. Indonesische Acanthaceen; (IV.) W. Zopf. Untersuchungen über die durch parasitische Pilze hervorgerufenen Krankheiten der Flechten (Fortsetzung); (V.) C. Grevé. Die geographische Verbreitung der jetzt lebenden Perissodactyla Lamnungia und Artiodactyla non ruminantia.

Contents of Volume 71: (I.) A. v. Braunmühl. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Trigonometrie; (II.) A. v. Braunmühl. Nassir Eddîn Tûsi und Regiomontan; (III.) W. M. Kutta. Zur Geschichte der Geometrie mit constanter Zirkelöffnung; (IV.) L. Satke. Ueber den Zusammenhang der Temperatur aufeinander folgender Monate und Jahreszeiten; (V.) F. Schilling. Geometrisch-analytische Theorie der symmetrischen *S*-Functionen mit einem einfachen Nebenpunkt; (VI.) E. Schröder. Ueber zwei Definitionen der Endlichkeit und H. Cantor'sche Sätze; (VII.) E. Schröder. Die selbständige Definition der Mächtigkeiten 0, 1, 2, 3 und die explizite Gleichzähligkeitsbedingung; (VIII.) A. Löwy. Ueber bilineare Formen mit konjugirt imaginären Variablen; (IX.) E. Hammer. Vergleichung einiger

Abbildungen eines kleinen Stücks der ellipsoidischen Erdoberfläche (Karte von S.-W.-Deutschland). μ.

MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENTS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW:

Vol. II., No. 4, *Animal Intelligence. An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals.* By *Edward L. Thorndike, A. M.*, University Fellow in Psychology, Columbia University. The Macmillan Co., New York and London. 1898. Pages, 109. Price, \$1.00.

Vol. II., No. 5, *The Emotion of Joy.* By *George Van Ness Dearborn, A. M., M. D.*, Sometime Assistant in Philosophy in Harvard University. The Macmillan Company, New York and London. 1899. Pages, 70. Price, 75 cents.

These two brochures are the latest additions to the series of "Monograph Supplements" published by the *Psychological Review*. The first is an experimental study of the associative processes in the minds of animals, and according to the author's claim "is the beginning of an exact estimate of just what associations, 'simple and compound, an animal can form, how quickly he forms them, and how 'long he retains them. It has described the method of formation, and, on the 'condition that our subjects were representative, has rejected reason, comparison 'or inference, perception of similarity, and imitation. It has denied the existence 'in animal consciousness of any important stock of free ideas or impulses, and so 'has denied that animal association is homologous with the association of human 'psychology."

The second monograph was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a degree of doctor of philosophy in Columbia University. It seeks "to outline 'a description of the Emotion of Joy in both its aspects, psychical and physical; 'to set forth what the emotion 'feels like,' and to point out the chief concomitant 'bodily movements, strains and postures, and to explain, as far as may be, by 'what biological principles these are what they are seen to be." μ.

PSYCHOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ÜBER DAS LESEN. Auf Experimenteller Grundlage. By *Benno Erdmann* and *Raymond Dodge*. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer. 1898. Pages, viii, 360. Price, 12 M.

The present exhaustive psychological study of reading on experimental bases is the result of the collaboration of a young American investigator, Dr. Raymond Dodge, and his teacher, Prof. Benno Erdmann, formerly of Halle and now of Bonn. It is the outcome of experimental researches conducted in 1894-1895, in Halle, by Professor Erdmann, who then gave utterance to the desire of having a special apparatus devised for the investigation in question. This want was supplied by Dr. Dodge, by whom the succeeding experiments were carried out with great mechanical skill. In the broad compass of 360 pages the authors review all the previous investigations on the subject, and then pursue their own experiments

and researches with respect to every special aspect of that enormously complicated physiological, psychical, and intellectual process which goes by the name of "reading."

KOMIK UND HUMOR. EINE PSYCHOLOGISCH-ÄSTHETISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG. By *Theodor Lipps*. Hamburg and Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss. 1898. Pages, viii, 264. Price, 6 M.

The basis of the present work was a series of essays which Professor Lipps wrote some years ago in the *Philosophische Monatshefte* on the psychology of humor. The author has laid greatest stress on the psychological side of his subject, and left the artistic and historical aspects to the specialists of other departments. There are eighteen chapters. The author enters very thoroughly into the literature of his predecessors, Hecker, Groos, Kräpelin, Wundt, Huymans, Lazarus, Vischer, Mélinaud, Herckenrath, and others. In the second part of his book, he enters upon a thorough-going analysis of the subject-matter of his inquiry, and reaches the conclusion that the feeling of the comical arises when some percept image, or idea makes, or appears to make, pretensions to grandeur, and at the same time fails to make this pretension, or appears to be unable to make it. The author distinguishes three principal species: first, all things, persons, or events, are *objectively comical*, with respect to which we experience the contrast between what is grand, important, or impressive, and what is relatively small, insignificant, or trivial. Secondly, only the activity of a person is *subjectively comical*, or witty. Wit is an expression of the human personality; men *make* jokes. Thirdly, the *naïvely comical* is both objective and subjective at once. It always involves the contrast of two points of view—that of the person criticising and that of the naïvely comical person criticised. The predecessors of Lipps had emphasised the contrast of the positive and negative aspects which is inherent in all humor, but Lipps has gone into this question more thoroughly from the psychological point of view and more precisely studied its character and delimitations.

VERSUCH EINER DARSTELLUNG DER EMPFINDUNGEN. By *Walter Przibram*. Vienna: Alfred Hölder. 1898. Pages, 28. Price, 1.40.

Mr. Przibram died before the publication of his work, and the task of its editorship was left to his brother, Mr. Hans Przibram. This little book was conceived by the author as an attempt to prepare the way for a rigorous mathematical treatment of pure psychology. It treats of the sensations as immediately given; that is to say, as purely psychological and neither as psycho-physical nor as physiological facts; and endeavors to marshal these facts into a mathematical system of formulæ which will furnish a complete description of the single sensations, and shall admit of discussion for special cases. The sensations are represented in arithmetical formulæ as "sects" (*Strecken*), or limited portions of straight lines (the formula being  $mi^n$ ), where the threshold of consciousness is the origin of the sect,

the quality of the sensation the direction,  $i''$ , and the intensity of the sensation the magnitude,  $m$ . The simple elementary constituents of sensations are represented by the directions of the coördinates of the rectangular coördinate system, or the dimensions of space; every two contrary constituents finding their natural place in the contrary directions of the coördinates in the same dimension. As in the notation for the radii of circles, imaginary expressions are used, and by appropriate extensions the system made applicable to constructions of as many dimensions as are necessary. A simple constituent of sensation is representable as a direction of a dimension  $\sqrt{(i'')^2}$ , and every kind of ratio and proportion of combination of the simple constituents of sensations may be expressed by the corresponding combination of the coördinates, or the dimensions. Considering the very simple case of two dimensions, the author reaches, as the general expression for a mixed sensation, a rather complicated formula involving all the elements above mentioned, and in addition thereto certain circular functions.  $\mu$ .

**DIE BEGRIFFE PHÄNOMENON UND NOUMENON IN IHREM VERHÄLTNISS ZU EINANDER BEI KANT.** Ein Beitrag zur Auslegung und Kritik der Transcendentalphilosophie. By *George Dawes Hicks, M. A., Dr. Phil.* Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann. 1897. Pages, 276. Price, 5 M.

In this pamphlet Dr. Hicks has expounded and subjected to critical scrutiny one of the fundamental problems of Kant's philosophy, viz., the interrelations of the concepts of "phenomenon" and "noumenon." As a piece of preliminary work the author has discussed the concept of "phenomenon" in the philosophies of Locke and Leibnitz, and in the six following chapters he discusses the subject proper of his book in connexion with Kant's own development. Upon the whole the investigation is comprehensive, the chapter to which we have taken the most objection on the score of critical deficiency being Chapter V., "On the Considerations which Lead From the Phenomenon to the Noumenon."  $\mu$ .

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
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
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